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VINCENT ELTSCHINGER, HELMUT KRASSER, JOHN TABER

CAN THE VEDA SPEAK?

DHARMAKĪRTI AGAINST MĪMĀṂSĀ EXEGETICS AND VEDIC AUTHORITY. AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF PVSV 164,24–176,16

ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE
SITZUNGSBERICHTE, 831. BAND

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Vincent Eltschinger, Helmut Krasser, John Taber

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Foreword

The project presented in this volume began in fall of 2006, when John Taber was Visiting Professor of Buddhist Studies at the Institute for South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies of the University of Vienna for winter term, 2006–07, replacing Prof. Ernst Steinkellner, who had just retired. Dr. Vincent Eltschinger of the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia (IKGA) of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, who had been working for some years on Dharmakīrti's engagement with Mīmāṃsā and whose translation and study of *Pramāṇavārttika(svavṛtti)* 1.213–268 was about to appear, proposed to Prof. Taber that they read some text of common interest together while he was in Vienna, preferably one relating to the Buddhist-Mīmāṃsaka debates. They chose PV(SV) 1.312–340. This passage is the culmination of Dharmakīrti's critique of the Mīmāṃsā theory of the authorlessness of the Veda as the foundation of its authority. It is closely related to the extensive portions of the Mīmāṃsā section of PV 1, which begins with v. 213, that Eltschinger had already translated; although there is a Japanese translation of the passage,[1] no translation of it into a European language exists. After selecting this text Taber and Eltschinger invited Dr. Helmut Krasser, soon to become Director of the IKGA, who had been working on issues relating to Dharmakīrti's understanding of scripture, to participate. Then, to everyone's delight, Steinkellner also expressed interest in joining the group.

Starting in November, 2006, the group began meeting once a week, usually on Tuesday afternoons, in the seminar room of the IKGA, then located in Strohgasse. The sessions were conducted in English, since the intention was to produce an English translation. Eltschinger bravely provided a draft translation of the section to be covered each day. The sessions were marked by lively exchanges (including challenges to Taber to justify his intuitions of English usage by looking up words in Webster's Dictionary!). On several occasions – as he has done over the

[1] See Wakahara 1990.

years in many collaborations he has organized at the IKGA – when the group was stumped, Steinkellner succeeded in pulling a rabbit out of a hat. The group met approximately 7–8 times, until Taber's departure at the end of January, 2007. By then, they had reached p. 167, l. 8. All were pleased with the results thus far and felt that every effort should be made to continue the collaboration.

It was not until summer, 2008, however, that Taber was able to break free from his duties as Chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of New Mexico (UNM) and return to Vienna. For three weeks, from July 21 to August 16, the team of Eltschinger, Krasser, and Taber met nearly every afternoon for four to five hours, in the new facilities of the IKGA in Prinz-Eugen-Strasse, to hammer out a draft of the remaining ten pages of the text. (Taber's trip to Vienna was financed by the College of Arts and Sciences of the University of New Mexico and the IKGA.) Steinkellner was occupied with other projects by this time. Eltschinger, as before, prepared the initial draft translation; the sessions were this time conducted in German. By Taber's departure the team had produced a translation of the entire passage.

Over the ensuing months Eltschinger prepared the notes to the translation. Then the project lay mostly dormant until fall, 2009, when Taber, thanks to a teaching release from UNM, was able to copy-edit the entire translation. The results of the copy-editing and remaining problems with the translation were discussed over e-mail that fall, continuing into January, 2010, when Taber also wrote the synopsis. In spring of 2010 attention shifted to the notes, as Taber and Krasser also worked on their essays. (Eltschinger's essay had been ready for some time.) Steinkellner also kindly read the translation and offered comments and suggestions, which were taken into account in a final proofing of the manuscript in fall, 2010. Electronic formatting and other technical tasks were in the hands of Krasser throughout the project.

From the outset, the team endeavoured to provide a readable English translation. At the same time, they sought to base their translation on a close reading of Śākyabuddhi's and Karṇakagomin's commentaries, which proved, however, to be too long to be quoted and translated in full in the footnotes (many of the footnotes summarize these commentaries' insights). The translators drew occasional inspiration from Manorathanandin's commentary and also took into consideration

Dharmottara's commentary on those stanzas of PV 1 that recur in PVin 2. Three essays of varying length and function round off the translation. Eltschinger's introduction locates the translated section in the overall economy of the PV(SV); Krasser's essay focuses on Dharmakīrti's views on *āgama*, which serve as an important part of the background of the text; Taber's contribution is meant to do justice to the system of Mīmāṃsā exegesis that is being attacked by Dharmakīrti. Since Krasser's and Taber's essays can be considered as contributions in their own right, they are treated here as appendices to the translation. Needless to say, the present study does not presume to provide the last word on this extremely rich final section of Dharmakīrti's PV 1. It is, rather, meant to draw attention to the deep involvement of exegetical and apologetic issues in the Buddhist master's overall philosophical project.

It is the authors' pleasure to acknowledge their gratitude to Eli Franco, Elisa Freschi, Kunio Harikai, Kei Kataoka, Shoryu Katsura, Isabelle Ratié, François Voegeli and, last but not least, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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Albuquerque and Vienna,
Spring 2011

Introduction

VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

The Place of PVSV 164,24–176,16 in the Work of Dharmakīrti

1.1. Dharmakīrti is likely to have belonged to one of the first generations of those early medieval Buddhist intellectuals who attempted to answer an ever-increasing Brahmanical hostility towards Buddhism and other non- or anti-Vedic movements. The first among these thinkers was most certainly Dignāga (480–540, or slightly earlier), the author of several (now lost) tracts against the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Sāṅkhya.[1] Together with the Mīmāṃsā and the author of the *Vādavidhi*, these schools were again the target of Dignāga's last and major work, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS). During more than a century Dignāga's version of the *hetuvidyā* remained the standard system studied at Nālandā. Dignāga, however, seems to have limited the scope of his answer to issues of "logic" and "epistemology." Dharmakīrti was the one who provided Dignāga's thought with an ontology, a psychology, and a religious doctrine, thus building a genuinely Buddhist system able both to respond to Brahmanical criticism and to defend Buddhism as a salvational path.[2] As a representative of the most uncompromising Brahmanical orthopraxy,[3] the Mīmāṃsā and its doctrine of the authorlessness (*apauruṣeyatva*) of the Veda had recently become Buddhism's mortal enemy. It is thus hardly surprising that Dharmakīrti's main opponent was Mīmāṃsā, quite probably in the person of its most brilliant classical exponent, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (Dharmakīrti's senior contemporary).

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[1] On Dignāga, see Frauwallner 1959 and Hattori 1968.

[2] General introductions to Dharmakīrti's thought include Steinkellner 1971, Stcherbatsky 1984, Katsura 1984, Dreyfus 1997, Dunne 2004, Eltschinger 2010.

[3] Rather than "orthodoxy." See McCrea 2009: 55.

1.2. We know next to nothing of Dharmakīrti's life, though he is likely to have been born to a Brahmin family and have spent at least part of his career in Nālandā. His dates are still a matter of controversy. According to Frauwallner's chronology, Dharmakīrti's dates must be around 600–660 CE. However, on the basis of very different arguments, these dates have been challenged by Lindtner, Kimura, and Krasser, who are inclined to locate Dharmakīrti in the sixth century CE.[4] Whatever the case may be, the first non-philosophical testimony regarding Dharmakīrti is Yijing's remark to the effect that Wuxing had studied his system in Telāḍhaka (near Nālandā) under the guidance of Jñānacandra. Dharmakīrti's works are traditionally held to amount to seven.[5] Among them, the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) is the first and by far the most important in that it shows us Dharmakīrti in his philosophical workshop. His later works mainly consisting of didactic digests or treatises dealing with specific topics, the PV is the fountainhead of Dharmakīrti's thought, the work to which any serious account of his system should primarily refer. As demonstrated by Frauwallner, the PV is a composite work composed of at least two layers.[6] Its first chapter (PV 1 = *Svārthānumānapariccheda*), dedicated to the three valid logical reasons and accompanied by a prose auto-commentary (PVSV), is likely to have originally formed an independent treatise (entitled *Hetuprakaraṇa* according to Frauwallner's – groundless – hypothesis). The last three chapters, entirely in verse, present themselves as a very loose and independent commentary on Dignāga's PS (PV 2 = *Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda* on the *maṅgalaśloka* of the PS, PV 3 = *Pratyakṣapariccheda* on PS 1, and PV 4 = *Parārthānumānapariccheda* on PS 3). The present study consists in an annotated translation of the concluding section of PV 1, viz., PV 1.312–340 and PVSV 164,24–176,16.

1.3. Although PV 1/PVSV deals with the three kinds of logical reasons (*hetu*, viz., essential property, effect, and non-perception),

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[4] See Krasser 2012. For a summary of research before Krasser, see Eltschinger 2007a: 25–29. I accept Krasser's new chronology.

[5] On Dharmakīrti's works, see Frauwallner 1954 and Steinkellner/Much 1995: 23–44.

[6] See Frauwallner 1954: 142–151.

hence with private inferential judgment (*svārthānumāna*), this topic is overshadowed by two lengthy, seventy page-long digressions.[7] The first one (= PV 1.40–185/PVSV 24,16–93,5) focuses on the so-called *apoha* theory (Dharmakīrti's innovative account of the two truths), which presents Dharmakīrti's views on the genesis of concepts, language, error, and practice.[8] The second one deals with Dharmakīrti's understanding of scriptural authority (*āgamaprāmāṇya*) and mainly consists in his polemics against the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda (PV 1.213–338/PVSV 107,14–176,4).[9] One should be wary of considering Dharmakīrti's polemics against authorlessness as a mere appendix to PV 1. To put it briefly, this doctrine claims that human judgment (conditioned by moral laxity) is the source of error and that human beings lack any cognitive access to the supersensible realm. As a consequence, only an authorless scripture – the Veda – can provide unbiased access to the invisible Dharma. And this claim is nothing but an attack on Buddhism, Jainism, Sāṅkhya, and other emerging religious movements (like Pāñcarātra and Pāśupata) deriving the authority of their scriptures from the trustworthiness (*āptatva*) of their human or divine authors.[10] But the Veda is far from being the only point at stake. For according to Mīmāṃsā, all that can be proven to be rooted in this authorless Veda (*vedamūla*) is authoritative, including those

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[7] Gnoli's edition of the PVSV has 176 pages. The two excursus amounting to about 140 pages, the systematic treatment of the three kinds of valid reasons does not exceed 35 pages.

[8] The most thorough account of Dharmakīrti's *apoha* theory remains Frauwallner's (see Frauwallner 1932 and 1933). See also Dunne 2004: 113–144.

[9] For a more precise analysis of this digression, see below, pp. 10–12. This digression on scriptural authority occurs towards the end of Dharmakīrti's treatment of non-perception as a logical reason and returns to it at the very end of our passage, viz., PV 1.339/PVSV 176,6–12. The question raised by Dharmakīrti's opponent can be summarized as follows: Since there is no object left out of consideration by scripture (*āgama*), if scripture keeps silent on a certain object, this object can be considered as non-existent. Non-perception can thus be defined as the silence (*nivṛtti*) of the three means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). As Dharmakīrti makes clear at PV 1.339, the aim of this lengthy excursus is to prove that the silence of scripture doesn't allow one to ascertain the non-existence of a certain entity.

[10] See McCrea 2009.

*Smṛti*s and *Purāṇa*s that are replete with an ostensible hostility towards Buddhism and other "heretical" (*pāṣaṇḍa*) denominations. In other words, authorlessness is nothing but an attempt to "naturalize" Vedic ritual and Brahmanocentric society, to legitimize the hostility of these "secondary" scriptures to movements challenging the Brahmanical order. This is something Dharmakīrti was most certainly aware of, something which, if accepted, represented a serious danger for Buddhism.

1.4. After a comparatively short theoretical elaboration on scriptural authority and its criteria (PVSV 107,14–112,6),[11] Dharmakīrti starts criticizing the doctrine of authorlessness by attacking the Mīmāṃsakas' and the Grammarians' account of the relation between word and meaning (*śabdārthasambandha*; PVSV 113,8–120,7), which these schools take to be permanent (*nitya*, but in the sense of *sāṃvyavahārikanitya*, whereas Dharmakīrti's portrayal of their position interprets it as *kūṭasthanitya*). Dharmakīrti then turns to the Mīmāṃsaka arguments in favour of the eternality (*anāditā*, viz., beginninglessness; PVSV 120,8–126,15) of the Veda and Vedic memorization-cum-recitation (*adhyayana*). His discussion returns to linguistic issues as he sets about criticizing the two main classical accounts of authorlessness or, at least, permanent speech: first, the Grammarians' *sphoṭa* (according to which meaningful linguistic units are "transphonetic" but revealed by ephemeral articulated sounds; PVSV 126,24–134,25), and second, the Mīmāṃsā's (more precisely, Kumārila's) *varṇavāda* (according to which language consists of phonemes that are one and permanent [*kūṭasthanitya*], appear in permanent [*sāṃvyavahārikanitya*] series and are revealed

[11] Properly speaking, Dharmakīrti's own doctrine is expounded in PVSV 107,14–109,22 (see Yaita 1987; Dunne 2004: 361–366; Eltschinger 2007a: 217–227; see also below, pp. 83–118). It is followed by a short critique of (mainly) Naiyāyika views on *āptavāda* (PVSV 109,23–110,15), by a rebuttal of the Mīmāṃsaka contention that a morally immaculate *āpta* is impossible (PVSV 110,15–111,11), and by Dharmakīrti's own views on nescience as personalistic belief (PVSV 111,11–112,5). On this, see Yaita 1988, Dunne 2004: 366–373, Eltschinger 2007a: 227–239. Note that the present outline of PVSV 107,14–176,16 is but a very cursory one leaving several aspects out of consideration.

by ephemeral articulated sounds; PVSV 134,26–141,14).[12] In all this, Dharmakīrti takes his adversaries' claims about permanence for granted and uses them in unceasing *reductiones ad absurdum*. There follows, then, a passage commonly known as the *vināśitvānumāna* ("inference of perishability"[13]) where Dharmakīrti improves on Vasubandhu's arguments to the effect that all entities perish as soon as they are produced (PVSV 141,14–150,5). After a few elaborations of a more logical character, Dharmakīrti returns to a topic already[14] dealt with while criticizing the beginninglessness of the Veda, viz., that of mantras and their efficacy (PVSV 155,18–164,24).[15] His argument, here, is as follows: If, as the Mīmāṃsā claims, the Vedic mantras were authorless, then the Brahmins couldn't arbitrarily restrict their efficacy to the twice-born, excluding women and *śūdra*s. In other words, authorless mantras ought to yield their results for every possible user independently of his or her social background.[16] Either the Vedic mantras are authorless (and then their efficacy is the same for everyone), or they are of human origin, hence arbitrarily controllable by their "author" (*kartṛ)* as to their fruitfulness and the conditions (social, ritual, behavioural, psychological, devotional) that have to be fulfilled for them to bring about their results (and then the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine falls to the ground). Then comes the concluding part of the chapter (PVSV 164,24–176,16), the one translated in the present book.[17]

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[12] On all this, see Eltschinger 2007a: 239–385.

[13] See Sakai 2011.

[14] See PVSV 123,14–124,28 and Eltschinger 2007a: 299–307. On Dharmakīrti's position on mantras, see Eltschinger 2001 and 2008. See also Wakahara 1988.

[15] Mantras proper do not exhaust PVSV 155,18–164,24. This passage also contains Dharmakīrti's own doctrine concerning phonetic series (PVSV 157,29–162,11). See Ōmae 1999 and Eltschinger 2007a: 204–212.

[16] This conclusion is only legitimate once it has been proven that "castes" are nothing but arbitrary conventions, which Dharmakīrti duly demonstrates in PVSV 157,10–18. See Eltschinger 2000: 103–115.

[17] Wakahara 1990, which provides a Japanese translation of the same passage, and Eltschinger 2001: 94–101, are the only secondary literature I am aware of. But since Dharmakīrti quotes PV 1.317–329 in his PVin 2 (70,6–72,8) and briefly deals there (PVin 2 72,10–11) with the *ekadeśāvisaṃvāda* argument (see PV 1.330–335 and PVSV 173,14–175,10, below, pp. 61–73; see also below, pp. 18–

21), Steinkellner 1979: 73–78 is to be considered as an important contribution to our passage. Note, however, that PVin 2.39, 43 and 44 do not belong to the PV (see below, p. 53 n. 89 and p. 55 n. 97). Dharmottara's general introduction to PVin 2.35–50 provides us with a fascinating interpretation of the meaning of our passage (PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 71a4–b3/PVinṬ$_{Tib}$ *Dze* 227b4–228a2): *na vāstavaḥ kaścit sambandhaḥ kiṃ tu sāmayikaḥ / icchāto 'rthābhidhānād iti / ayaṃ ca vāstavasambandhavādaḥ pramāṇavārttike vistareṇa niṣiddha ity atra na vistāryate / iha ca vedāpauruṣeyatve na varṇānāṃ padānāṃ vā nityatvam upakāri / loke vede ca teṣāṃ viśeṣābhāvād rathyāpuruṣavākyasyāpi prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt / kevalaṃ vākyam evāpauruṣeyaṃ pratipādayitavyaṃ vākyārthaś ca / ācāryasya tu padarūpaṃ pauruṣeyaṃ pratipādayato 'yam abhiprāyaḥ / padād vākyaṃ na vyatiricyate / tasya pauruṣeyatve vākyasyāpi pauruṣeyatvam / vākyarūpe ca pauruṣeye 'rtho 'pi pauruṣeyaḥ sidhyati / ato vedaḥ pauruṣeyaḥ siddho bhavati / athāpi pauruṣeyāṇāṃ padānāṃ samāhārātmakaṃ vākyam apauruṣeyaṃ padāny eva vā nityāni syuḥ / tathāpy arthasyāpauruṣeyatve vedaprāmāṇyaṃ na rūpasyeti / padānāṃ nityatvaṃ tadracanātmakasya ca vākyasyāpuruṣaracitatvaṃ vārttike nirākṛtam apy abhyupagamya vārttikakārikābhir vāstavārthasambandhaniṣedhaṃ darśayati / vaidikānāṃ śabdānāṃ vākyabhūtānāṃ padabhūtānāṃ vā 'rtho na kenacid api śakyo niścetuṃ puruṣopadeśaṃ vineti darśayitum āha.* "There is no real relation [between word and meaning], but a [purely] conventional [one], because the expression of a meaning is according to [a certain speaker's] intention (*icchā*). But since the doctrine according to which the relation [between word and meaning] is real has [already] been refuted extensively in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, [Dharmakīrti] does not develop [it] here [in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*]. But [neither] is the [alleged] permanence of the phonemes or of the words of any help to the authorlessness [and, hence, to the authority] of the Veda, because, since these [phonemes or words] do not differ in ordinary [language] and in the Veda, it would follow that even the statement of a man in the street would be authoritative. Rather, it is the sentence and the meaning of the sentence that must be shown to be authorless. But the following is the intention of Ācārya [Dharmakīrti] in showing that the nature of the word is of human origin (*pauruṣeya*): [Since] the sentence is not distinct from the word, if the [word] is of human origin, [then] the sentence is of human origin also. And if the nature of the sentence is of human origin, [then its] meaning too is established as of human origin, [and] therefore, the Veda is established as of human origin. But even if the sentence consisting of an aggregation of words of human origin were authorless, or [if] the words themselves were permanent, the Veda would [only] be authoritative if [its] meaning [, and] not [its verbal] form, were authorless. [Now,] although [Dharmakīrti] has refuted, in the *[Pramāṇa]vārttika*, that words are permanent and that a sentence consisting of an arrangement of these [words] is not created by humans, [he now provisionally] accepts [it] and presents, by [resorting to] the stanzas of the *[Pramāṇa]vārttika*, a refutation of a real relation with the meaning. [And] in order to show that no one is able to as-

1.5 Up to this point, Dharmakīrti has demonstrated the possibility, even the necessity, of *atīndriyadarśana*. That mantras yield results is due to the fact that certain beings (including humans, gods, bodhisattvas, etc.) are able to discern, hence to *perceive*, which phonetic series is efficient and which is not; that these superior beings (*puruṣātiśaya*, *puruṣaviśeṣa*) prescribe, as a covenant (*samaya*; glossed *pratijñā*), ethical and behavioural conditions for the fruition of mantras; and, finally, to the fact that they empower (*adhi*√*ṣṭhā*) these mantras so that they benefit ordinary persons (*prākṛtapuruṣa*). Such is the conclusion of his elaborations on mantras:

> It is this [demonstration that the creators of mantras possess a superiority in cognition and power] that dismisses the [Mīmāṃsaka] proof that humans are incapable [of perceiving supersensible things]. Indeed, [we have] shown that the mantras are made by humans and yield results due to their [the humans'] empowerment. Therefore, since there is someone who possesses a [cognitive] superiority, the [Mīmāṃsaka] proofs that [supposedly] negate this [cognitively superior person] are also refuted. As for [that] which is regarded as a proof [by the Mīmāṃsaka, viz., reasons] like cognition, sense-faculties, language, and humanity, [all this is nothing but] an [inconclusive] pseudo-argument (*pramāṇābha*),[18] for there is no correct cognition [of a state of affairs] from [a reason] possessing a remainder. As for the proof that [supposedly] negates [the existence of] a superior person, namely, 'Because, since he possesses cognition, sense-faculties, and language, [the alleged creator of a mantra] is a human being [, like every other human being],' this [proof] is strictly unconvincing, because there can be proofs neither of the negation nor of the sameness. [That is to say,] in the case of supersensible [things], indeed, a [person] who [can]not perceive [the said things] cannot [validly] negate

certain the meaning of the Vedic sounds – be they sentences or words – independently of a [purely] human instruction, [Dharmakīrti] says [the following]."

[18] Note PVSVṬ 583,16–17: *kiṃ kāraṇam / vipakṣavṛtteḥ sandehena sarvasya śeṣavattvāt* /. "Why [are these reasons inconclusive]? – Because, since one can suspect [their] occurrence in the counter-instances [, viz., in human beings who *are* superior], all [of them] possess a remainder." On the *śeṣavadanumāna*, see PV 1.331/PVSV 173,22–26 below, pp. 62–65, pp. 62–63 nn. 126–127, and pp. 83–118.

> [them, and this for three reasons: first,] because [this person of limited cognition can]not know them even though they exist; [second,] because, for the very reason [that they are supersensible, both kinds of] incompatibility [between them are] not established; and [third,] because it is not incompatible that [something co]exists with [something] that is not incompatible [with it]. This too [has already been] said [above]. [But] the sameness [of the alleged superior person] with another is not established either [, and this again for three reasons: first,] because one cannot know that there is no difference [between the two; second,] because non-perception has been dismissed as being a [valid logical] reason in cases such [as the qualities of another's mind]; and [third,] because one sees a certain difference [in wisdom or intelligence between two persons] in spite of the fact that [their] humanity, etc., is the same, and that if a difference exists, [then] sameness is not established. [But all this has already been] said [earlier]. Therefore, this inference possessing a remainder is incapable [of proving that a superior person does not exist], because even though one does not notice the presence [of the logical reason] in the dissimilar instances, one [can] suspect the contrary.[19]

In PV 1.312–329/PVSV 164,24–173,13, Dharmakīrti turns to the absurd consequences which a Mīmāṃsaka exposes himself to as long as he rejects *atīndriyadarśana*. As Dharmakīrti strongly insists upon in an earlier passage,[20] by denying the Veda any human agency and

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[19] PVSV 164,9–24 (together with PV 1.310cd–311): *aśaktisādhanaṃ puṃsām anenaiva nirākṛtam // pratipāditā hi puruṣakṛtās tadadhiṣṭhānāc ca phaladā mantrāḥ / tad asti kaścid atiśayavān iti tatpratikṣepasādhanāny api prativyūḍhāni / buddhīndriyoktipuṃstvādi sādhanaṃ yat tu varṇyate / pramāṇābhaṃ yathārthāsti na hi śeṣavato gatiḥ // yat tu buddhīndriyavacanayogāt puṃstvād iti puruṣātiśayapratikṣepasādhanaṃ tat tv agamakam eva / pratikṣepasāmānyasādhanayor asambhavāt / na hy atīndriyeṣv ataddarśinaḥ pratikṣepaḥ sambhavati / satām apy eṣām ajñānāt / ata eva virodhāsiddheḥ / avirodhinā ca saha sambhavāvirodhād ity apy uktam / nāpītarasāmānyasiddhir viśeṣāsambhavasya jñātum aśakyatvāt / īdṛśeṣu cānupalabdher hetutvapratikṣepāt / puṃstvādisāmye 'pi kasyacid viśeṣasya darśanāt / sambhavadviśeṣe ca sāmyāsiddh[e]r*[a] *ity uktam / tasmāc cheṣavad anumānam etad vyatirekasya sandehād asamartham adarśane 'pi vipakṣavṛtteḥ /.* [a] PVSVṬ 584,17: *sāmānyāsiddher*; PVSV$_{\text{Tib}}$ D358a7/P525a7 = PVṬ *Ñe* D45a6/P51b3: *spyi ma grub pa'i phyir ro*, against PVSV 164,22–23: *sāmyāsiddhir*. On this passage, see Eltschinger 2001: 101–114 and 2008: 281–286.

[20] See especially PVSV 112,16–27 and Eltschinger 2007a: 240–243.

hence intentionality, the Mīmāṃsaka deprives it of any *meaning*, for meaningfulness depends on conventions (*saṅketa*, *samaya*) that are nothing but shared semantic intentions (*vivakṣā*, *vaktur icchā/abhiprāyaḥ*).[21] An authorless scripture could only be unintelligible and devoid of truth value. But there is yet another reason why the meaning of the Veda, granted it exists, cannot be arrived at by the Mīmāṃsaka unless he contradicts his own claim that humans, *qua* humans, cannot perceive supersensible things. Since Vedic words have an invisible relation to invisible things, no one can pretend to ascertain what they really refer to. In other words, nobody can rule out the possibility that the paradigmatic Vedic injunction: *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*, may actually mean *khādec chvamāṃsaṃ svargakāmaḥ*.[22] As it turns out, every interpretation of the Veda reflects nothing but the interpretor's own arbitrary conceptions. The Veda is, then, a *mutus liber*, sealed by its original, unfabricated nature as well as by the cognitive limitations of humans. As a consequence, if the Mīmāṃsaka pretends, as he does, to provide an authoritative exegesis of the Veda,[23] he has either to attribute human agency and intentionality to the Veda (together with an unbroken explanatory tradition), or he has to admit that its most respected interpreters, Jaimini and Śabarasvāmin,[24] were endowed with extraordinary perceptual abilities.

1.6. More precisely, insofar as Vedic words refer to supersensible realities, their relation to these things is supersensible too. As Dharmakīrti insists, their being limited (*[prati]niyata*) to a specific thing

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[21] See PV 1.327/PVSV 172,15–24 below, pp. 58–59; see also Eltschinger 2007a: 134–143.

[22] See PV 1.318/PVSV 167,11–14 below, pp. 40–41 and n. 35; see also below, pp. 126–127 and 135–140.

[23] For a detailed account of Mīmāṃsa's exegetical methods, see below, pp. 119–149.

[24] In PVṬ *Ñe* D49a4/P56b2 ≈ PVSVṬ 589,16, Mīmāṃsakas such as Jaimini are presented as *vedārtham ākhyātāraḥ*. In PVṬ *Ñe* D47a6/P54a1–2, these are termed **pramāṇabhūtapuruṣa*s (*skyes bu tshad mar gyur pa*). Śabarasvāmin is mentioned at PVṬ *Ñe* D49b5/P57a6 = PVSVṬ 589,31–590,12.

is beyond the reach of ordinary experience.[25] In other words, the Mīmāṃsaka exegete may well *believe* that Vedic words refer to the things he *expects* them to point to, such as the daily morning and evening oblations he is acquainted with in the case of "*agnihotra*;" he may well believe that they have the desired meaning (*abhimatārtha*) or conform to his own wishes (*svecchānurūpa*).[26] Yet this remains just wishful thinking. As an ordinary (*prākṛta*),[27] hence cognitively limited (*arvāgdarśin*, *arvāgdarśana* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound) person,[28] the Mīmāṃsaka cannot discern (*vivecana*, *viveka*) what these words really refer to[29] and is simply ignorant of the true nature (*tattva*) of their meaning.[30] And as Dharmakīrti repeatedly points out, the Mīmāṃsaka can resort neither to ordinary linguistic usage (*prasiddhi*, *lokavāda*), nor reason(ing) (*yukti*, *nyāya*),[31] nor tradition (*sampradāya*).[32] The only thing he can do, and which Dharmakīrti actually accuses him of *doing*, is to ascribe extraordinary cognitive abilities to his authorities. And such is Dharmakīrti's introduction to the passage translated below: "Moreover, in holding such a view, the Jaiminīyas compromise their own position with

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[25] See PVṬ *Ñe* D46a7/P52b8 = PVSVṬ 585,27–28 and PVṬ *Ñe* D50a1–2/P57b3–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 590,16–17.

[26] See PVṬ *Ñe* D46a4/P52b3–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 585,21.

[27] See PVṬ *Ñe* D46b4/P53a5 = PVSVṬ 586,10, PVṬ *Ñe* D63b7/P76b2 = PVSVṬ 610,12, PVṬ *Ñe* D56a3/P66a2–3 = PVSVṬ 598,21 (D with no equivalent of *prākṛta*).

[28] See PVSVṬ 598,15, PVṬ *Ñe* D61a1/P72b2 = PVSVṬ 605,24–25, PVSVṬ 585,28–30 (to be compared with PVṬ *Ñe* D46b1/P52b8–53a1).

[29] See PVṬ *Ñe* D47a2–3/P53b4–5 ≈ PVSVṬ 586,21–22, PVṬ *Ñe* D52b2–3/P61a5–6 = PVSVṬ 593,27, PVṬ *Ñe* D46b7–47a1/P53b2–3 ≈ PVSVṬ 586,18–19.

[30] See PVṬ *Ñe* D45b5/P52a3–4 = PVSVṬ 585,8.

[31] PVṬ *Ñe* D51a6/P59a8–b1 = PVSVṬ 592,7, PVṬ *Ñe* D51a6–b1/P59b1–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 592,7–13. These passages contain suggestive claims, on the part of the Buddhists, that they alone are rational. See below, p. 42 n. 40.

[32] See, e.g., Dharmakīrti's conclusion in PVSV 168,3–4, below, p. 44. Note also PVSV 169,4–13, below, pp. 47–48, where Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the Vedic schools or recensions (*śākhā*), in being notoriously liable to decay, charismatic revival, and innovation, are far from handing down unaltered scriptures.

their own assertion."[33] The Mīmāṃsakas gain access to the invisible meaning of the Veda due to persons (like Jaimini) who must *ipso facto* be somehow superior to ordinary people. Therefore, they *de facto* recognize epistemically superior beings able to discern the meaning of Veda,[34] for this cannot be achieved without such persons.[35] But this conflicts with the Mīmāṃsakas' ever-repeated doctrine (their very "complexion," Dharmakīrti says) according to which there can be no person able to perceive supersensible things.[36] Furthermore, if the Mīmāṃsaka acknowledges that his own authorities somehow access the supersensible realm, all his arguments against the existence of *atīndriyadarśipuruṣa*s such as those recognized by the Buddhists (*bauddhādyabhimata*) fall to the ground.[37] As a consequence, he will be forced to admit that either all or a few human beings, and certainly not only Mīmāṃsakas, are endowed with extraordinary abilities.[38]

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[33] PVSV 164,24–25: *api caivaṃvādino jaiminīyāḥ svam eva vādaṃ svavācā vidhurayanti* /.

[34] According to PVṬ *Ñe* D45b1–2/P51b6–7 = PVSVṬ 584,22–23: *svam eva vādam iti kathaṃcid atiśayavato jaiminyādeḥ sakāśād vedārthagatir bhavatīti puruṣātiśayābhyupagamavādam*.

[35] According to PVṬ *Ñe* D45b2–3/P51b8–52a1 = PVSVṬ 584,24–25: *vidhurayanti bādhante 'tiśayavatpuruṣapratikṣepeṇa vedārthagater asambhavāt* /.

[36] According to PVṬ *Ñe* D45b1/P51b6 = PVSVṬ 584,21: *evaṃvādina iti nāsty atīndriyārthadarśī puruṣa ity evaṃvādino jaiminīyāḥ*, and PVṬ *Ñe* D45b2/P51b7–8 = PVSVṬ 584,23–24: *nāsty atīndriyārthajñaḥ puruṣaḥ kaścid ity anayā svavācā*.

[37] Most regularly mentioned among these *puruṣātiśayapratikṣepasādhana*s or *atīndriyārthadarśipuruṣapratikṣepasādhana*s is *puruṣatva* or *puṃstva*. See PVṬ *Ñe* D46b6–7/P53b1–2 ≈ PVSVṬ 586,17–18, PVṬ *Ñe* D47a2/P53b4 ≈ PVSVṬ 586,22–23, PVṬ *Ñe* D47a1–2/P53b3 = PVSVṬ 586,19–20, PVṬ *Ñe* D45b6–7/P52a5–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 585,11–13. Note PVṬ *Ñe* D45b6–7/P52a5–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 585,11–13: *atha puruṣatvādisāmye 'py asādhāraṇaśaktiyukto vaidikānāṃ śabdānām atīndriyair arthaiḥ saha sambandhasya vettā kaścij jaiminyādiḥ kalpyate / tadā tadvaj jaiminyādivat*. "But if one postulates that a certain [person] such as Jaimini, possessed with a special ability in spite of his being [allegedly] the same [as any other person] regarding humanity, knows the relation of the Vedic words with [their] supersensible meanings, then, just as Jaimini, etc." See above, pp. 13–15.

[38] See PVṬ *Ñe* D46a1/P52a8 ≈ PVSVṬ 585,14–15, PVṬ *Ñe* D46b5/P53a6–7 = PVSVṬ 586,13–14, PVṬ *Ñe* D47a3/P53b5–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 586,23–24, PVṬ *Ñe* D45b6–7/P52a5–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 585,11–13.

1.7. Strictly speaking, Dharmakīrti's critique of authorlessness comes to a close with PV 1.329/PVSV 173,13. But before returning to the questions that concerned him prior to his excursus on scriptural authority, namely, the relation between (scriptural) words and their meanings (PV 1.336–338/PVSV 175,10–176,4) and non-perception (PV 1.339/PVSV 176,5–12), and then concluding with anti-Hindu sarcasms (PV 1.340), Dharmakīrti attacks yet another attempt to legitimize scriptural authority (PV 1.330–335/PVSV 173,14–175,10), viz., *ekadeśāvisaṃvādana*. According to his opponent, the Veda as a whole, including those of its *loci* that bear on supersensible (hence inverifiable/infalsifiable) matters, can be proved to be true provided one of its parts (*ekadeśa*) bearing on empirical (hence verifiable/falsifiable) matters can be proved to be veracious. This polemic raises two distinct problems. The first one concerns the identity of Dharmakīrti's opponent. For, as it is obvious, the doctrine he criticizes comes quite close to that of the Nyāya.[39] According to his commentators, however, Dharmakīrti's opponent is (an)other Mīmāṃsaka(s) (*dpyod pa pa gźan dag*, Śākyabuddhi), and more specifically an "old Mīmāṃsaka" (*vṛddhamīmāṃsaka*, Karṇakagomin, Manorathanandin).[40] Taking this seriously, who can this

[39] See NSū 2.1.68 and NBh 96,11–97,16. Note especially NBh 97,8–9: *dṛṣṭārthenāptopadeśenāyurvedenādṛṣṭārtho vedabhāgo 'numātavyaḥ pramāṇam iti, āptaprāmāṇyasya hetoḥ samānatvād iti* /. "One can infer that one Vedic passage whose object is invisible is a *pramāṇa* from the [fact that the] *Āyurveda*, the teaching of an *āpta* the object of which is visible [, is a *pramāṇa*; it is so] because [their] cause, the [personal] authority of the *āpta*, is the same." And further, NBh 97,15–16: *draṣṭṛpravaktṛsāmānyāc cānumānam / ya evāptā vedārthānāṃ draṣṭāraḥ pravaktāraś ca ta evāyurvedprabhṛtīnām apīty āyurvedaprāmāṇyavad vedaprāmāṇyam anumātavyam iti* /. "And [such an] inference is [made possible] by the [fact that these scriptures'] seers and expounders are the same. Since those very *āpta*s who saw and expounded the objects of the Veda are exactly those of the *Āyurveda*, etc., one can infer that, as the *Āyurveda* is authoritative, the Veda is authoritative." Note, however, that Dharmakīrti's portrayal of his adversary does not allude to the underlying principle of *draṣṭṛsāmānya*. See Oberhammer 1974 and Steinkellner 1979: 78 n. 272.

[40] PVṬ *Ñe* D62b2/P74b4–5, PVṬ *Ñe* D62b2/P74b5 = PVSVṬ 608,17: *anyas tu mīmāṃsakaḥ*; PVV 409,13: *aparo mīmāṃsakaḥ*; PVṬ *Ñe* D62b7/P75a5, PVṬ *Ñe* D66b7–67a5/P80b2–81a1: *dpyod pa pa*. PVSVṬ 608,15–16: *aparo vṛddhamīmāṃsakaḥ*, PVV 409,8: *vṛddhamīmāṃsakānām*, PVV 411,4: *jaranmīmāṃsakaḥ*.

rather unorthodox Mīmāṃsaka be? Should we think of Bhavadāsa, who is criticized by Kumārila and is likely to be one among the *vṛddhamīmāṃsaka*s, i.e., the "pre-Śabarasvāmin" Mīmāṃsakas alluded to by Jayantabhaṭṭa?[41] Whoever he may be, what we would have to do with is a Mīmāṃsaka who does not (yet?) acknowledge the authorlessness of the Veda as a criterion of its reliability, or at least one who puts forward addititional criteria for its authority.[42] However, since Dharmakīrti does not provide any hints as to the identity of his opponent,[43] one may feel justified in hypothesizing that Dharmakīrti *also* targets the Nyāya.[44] Though I am strongly inclined to favor the hypothesis of a Mīmāṃsaka opponent, I would like to postpone any conclusion until further research has been carried out

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Vibhūticandra seems to regard this designation as sarcastic (Vibh 409 n. 8): *vṛddhaś cakṣurdoṣopahatatvāt*. Against this interpretation, see below, n. 41. See also PVin 2 72,10–11 (Steinkellner 1979: 77–78 and n. 252), TS_K 2775/$TS_Ś$ 2774 and TSP_K 736,3–18/$TSP_Ś$ 892,13–893,10.

[41] See Bronkhorst 1994: 383–385. NM I.664,6–7 is all the more interesting that it contrasts the *vṛddhamīmāṃsaka*s (*jarajjaiminīya*s in NM I.664,16) and the followers of Śabara (*śābara*), thus allowing us to understand *vṛddhamīmāṃsaka* as "pre-Śabarasvāmin Mīmāṃsaka": *vṛddhamīmāṃsakā yāgādikarmanirvartyam apūrvaṃ nāma dharmam abhivadanti yāgādikarmaiva śābarā bruvate /*. "The old Mīmāṃsakas declare that dharma is what is called *apūrva*, which is to be brought about by ritual activities such as sacrifices. The followers of Śabara say that the ritual activities such as sacrifices themselves are [dharma]." Translation Bronkhorst 1994: 384. On *vṛddha-* or *jaranmīmāṃsaka*s, see also Kunjunni Raja 1963: 199 and Eltschinger 2007a: 161 n. 7.

[42] Though it is more likely to refer to (a) Buddhist(s) than to (a) heterodox Mīmāṃsaka(s), ŚV *codanā* 121 testifies to Kumārila's familiarity with such a strategy: *yo 'pīndriyārthasambandhaviṣaye satyavāditām / dṛṣṭvā tadvacanatvena śraddheye 'rthe 'pi kalpayet //*. "The one who has observed [a certain person's] truthfulness regarding a matter related to the sense objects might postulate [that it is] also [veracious] regarding something to be trusted, since it is a statement of this [same person]." For Sucaritamiśra's and Pārthasārathimiśra's explanations, see Eltschinger 2007a: 99 n. 98, and below, p. 115. For an alternative hypothesis regarding the *vṛddhamīmāṃsaka*, see Krasser 2012: 567–568 with n. 79.

[43] Unless one understands *parityajya* very literally ("giving up, abandoning, disregarding") in the following statement (PVSV 173,16–17): *anyas tv apauruṣeyam āgamalakṣaṇaṃ parityajyānyathā prāmāṇyaṃ vedasya sādhayitukāmaḥ prāha.*

[44] As PVSVṬ 610,12 and PVṬ *Ñe* D64a2/P76b5–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 610,15–16 (*mīmāṃsakādiḥ*) might testify to. See also Steinkellner 1979: 78 n. 252.

on this passage. The second problem is of a philosophical nature. Dharmakīrti criticizes his opponent's apologetic strategy (i.e., *ekadeśāvisaṃvādana*) by pointing out that to infer the authority of the Veda in this way amounts to a *śeṣavat*-inference, an inference "with a remainder."[45] What does this pseudo-inference consist of? To put it briefly, this kind of inconclusive argument characteristically doesn't rule out the possibility of a counterexample. In other words, that *one* empirically verifiable Vedic *locus* is true in fact does not exclude (an)other Vedic statement(s) being false. But Dharmakīrti is well aware of the fact that his own apologetic strategy (ultimately, the one he ascribes to Dignāga), which amounts to nothing but a sophisticated version of *ekadeśāvisaṃvādana*, is open to the same charge. But is it really so? According to Dharmakīrti, one is entitled to infer a certain scripture's reliability (*avisaṃvāda*) in regard to non-empirical (*adṛṣṭa*, *atīndriya*, *atyakṣa*, etc.) things if *all* that this scripture claims to be perceptible is indeed perceptible (contrary to most of the Vaiśeṣika categories and to the Sāṅkhya constituents), *all* that it holds to be "objectively" inferable is indeed (successfully) inferable (contrary to *īśvara* and the *ātman*), and if one cannot detect any inconsistency or internal contradiction (*pūrvāparavirodha*) in it (contrary to the prescription of physical ablutions in order to annihilate moral defilements).[46] Now, as Dharmakīrti insists, the difference between his own and his opponent's strategies lies in the scope of the verification process. Whereas his opponent restricts it to one (trivial, *atyantaprasiddha*) point, Dharmakīrti requires that it should bear on *all* the empirically verifiable/falsifiable matters alluded to in the treatise under scrutiny.[47] What Dharmakīrti doesn't say in this context, however, is that the verification strategy according to which he proves the Buddhist scriptures to be reliable is an alternative one. As he announces in PV 1.217/PVSV 109,11–19 and makes clear in PV 2.145–279, the reliability of the Buddhist scriptures can be inferred from the fact that their principal tenet (*pradhānārtha*), the four Noble('s) Truths,

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[45] See above, pp. 13–15 and n. 18, and below, pp. 62–63 nn. 126–127.

[46] See below, pp. 86–87 and 107–111; see also below, p. 64 n. 130, pp. 69–70 n. 142, p. 77 n. 172 and p. 78 n. 174.

[47] See PVSV 173,26–174,6 below, pp. 63–65.

withstands critical analysis. In other words, the first strategy (PV 1.215–216/PVSV 108,16–109,11) is of a "heresiological" character, whereas the second (PV 1.217/PVSV 109,11–19) is apologetic in nature. And it is of the first strategy as applied to the Veda that PV 1.332–334 and PVSV 174,14–175,4 provide a fascinating example.

JOHN TABER

A Synopsis of PV(SV) 1.312–340

1. The validity of the Veda cannot be based on "authorlessness" (*apauruṣeyatva*).

1.1. If the Veda were authorless, we could never know what it means.

1.1.1. The Veda itself does not establish its meaning; nor, according to Mīmāṃsā principles, can some authoritative expositor do so.

Dharmakīrti begins his final assault on the Mīmāṃsā teaching of the authorlessness of the Veda with the statement, "Moreover, in holding such a view" – namely, that humans are unable to cognize supersensible things, which is the basis for the Mīmāṃsaka's claiming that the mantras of the Veda, in particular, could not possibly have been composed by humans – "the Jaiminīyas compromise their own theory with their own assertion."

If humans cannot cognize the supersensible, as Mīmāṃsā maintains, then how can one ascertain the meaning of the Veda? The Veda does not itself declare what it means. Humans must surmise what it means. (312) If you think some esteemed person – Jaimini himself, for instance – is able to ascertain its meaning, then you must accept that humans are capable of cognizing supersensible things. But why should only Jaimini be capable of this? In short, if you deny that humans are capable of cognizing the supersensible because they are afflicted by defects like desire, then you must deny that Jaimini is able to do so – in which case there is no way the meaning of the Veda can be known. If, on the other hand, you accept that Jaimini, at least, can know such things, then other humans ought to be able to know them as well. In that case, the question becomes why we should place our confidence in one person as knowing the meaning of the Veda rather than another. (313)

The Mīmāṃsaka at this point proposes that one should accept as an authority that person whose interpretations are supported by other *pramāṇa*s. But, Dharmakīrti responds, it is hard to see how other *pramāṇa*s could support his interpretations, since percep-

tion, etc., do not apprehend the supersensible. And if it were accessible to perception, one wouldn't need scripture to cognize it. If the Mīmāṃsaka were to hold that one cannot cognize the supersensible *solely* through other *pramāṇa*s – the other *pramāṇa*s are only effective, even in regard to their own objects, in dependence on scripture – that would entail the absurd consequence that one couldn't even infer fire from smoke unless it were supported by scripture. If, finally, the Mīmāṃsaka were to say that we have to rely on the other *pramāṇa*s in determining *when scripture applies*, then one could once again ask why we need to resort to scripture at all when it comes to supersensible matters. (314)

If, moreover, the Mīmāṃsaka insists that only a Vedic statement explained by someone who is a reliable expositor, insofar as *other* statements of his are confirmed by other *pramāṇa*s, is authoritative – or else, as the *Vṛtti* puts it, a Vedic statement that is consistent with other *pramāṇa*s – then that should be the definition of scripture – "consistency with [other] *pramāṇa*s (*pramāṇasaṃvāda*)" – not "authorlessness" (*apauruṣeyatva*). (315)

Dharmakīrti returns to the point that if Jaimini is able to ascertain the supersensible meaning of the Veda, then other humans, even though afflicted by various defects, ought to as well. The Mīmāṃsaka's acceptance of Jaimini as an authority means he believes humans are capable of cognizing supersensible things. Yet that is precisely what he denies! (316)

Or, again, if he insists that people, afflicted with moral defects, cannot cognize these things, then how is the meaning of the Veda known? The supposedly authoritative person who expounds it – this Jaimini – is incapable of knowing it on his own. Nor could he have learned it from someone else; for the same problem would arise for that other person. And of course the Veda does not declare its meaning itself. (317)

Thus, we really have no idea what statements like *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*, which is usually understood to mean "One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra," really mean. For all we know, it could mean, "One should eat dog meat"! This is not the case for all traditions of practice. In the case of a human tradition, founded by an original Preceptor, such as the Buddhist tradition, the meanings of the statements one follows, i.e., the Pre-

ceptor's *intentions*, are transmitted along with them. And in the case of more rational traditions like Buddhism, Dharmakīrti maintains, the learned tend to following reason (*nyāya*) when determining what is to be done and avoided; they do not just rely on authoritative teachers. Here the Mīmāṃsaka is allowed to object: But don't you Buddhists also accept certain teachings from supposedly reliable persons, such as those concerning the arrangement of the world (i.e., cosmology)? Dharmakīrti responds, such statements are not to be considered *pramāṇa*s; just because their authors have been shown reliable in some matters we are able to confirm does not mean they are reliable about everything they talk about. For practical purposes, when it comes to supersensible matters (in particular, matters of merit and demerit), one follows scripture because one has no other recourse. But, strictly speaking, scripture is not a *pramāṇa*. (318)

1.1.2. Common usage (*prasiddhi*) is not a means of establishing the meaning of the Veda, either.

Now the Mīmāṃsaka proposes: ordinary parlance (*lokavāda*) determines the meaning of the Veda. This may be an allusion to the principle declared in MīSū 1.3.30 that the words of the Veda and those of ordinary language have the same meanings; in any case, Mīmāṃsakas routinely cite *prasiddhi*, common usage, as a reason for interpreting Vedic passages in certain ways.[1] Yet, Dharmakīrti points out, even if we construe Vedic words as ordinary ones, they will still in many instances be polysemic – as indeed ordinary words often are. Who will be able to determine which of many possible meanings of a word in the Veda is the right one? The "ordinary" meaning, moreover, is established by convention, which is accessible to instruction, while the Veda is supposedly eternal. How could someone, in the case of words which supposedly have a beginningless, authorless relation with supersensible meanings, tell us what they mean? If one held that there is an explanation of the meaning of the Vedic word that is beginningless and authorless as well – that is to say, an exegetical tradition that extends forever back into the past – then the problem is just moved back a step.

[1] See below, pp. 135–140.

How is the meaning of this beginningless explanation known? Moreover, how do we know the explanation has never been corrupted? We are aware of various factors that introduce errors into traditions – enmity, pride, and so forth. And why would the Mīmāṃsaka, of all people, put confidence in a supposedly unbroken tradition of explanation, since he is the one who emphasizes that humans afflicted with moral faults are not to be trusted?[2] That, in fact, is his most characteristic point, says Dharmakīrti. In his *Svavṛtti* to 3.319, Dharmakīrti goes further into how we hear of Vedic schools recovering after nearly dying out – even today some have only a few reciters – so that one might suspect that even those schools that have many adherents today could have been nearly extinct at one time but were restored, and that in the process of restoration errors could have crept into the recitation of the Veda in various ways. And the same could be the case for any "beginningless" tradition of Vedic interpretation. In summary, one cannot establish the meaning of the Veda either through an authorless explanation or ordinary linguistic practice. Even if the relation of word and meaning were eternal, ordinary parlance teaches us that words are polysemic, so that, in the case of Vedic words, only someone who knows supersensible things could know which meanings are the correct ones. And also according to ordinary parlance, the meanings of words are conventional; in themselves they are indifferent as to what they mean, it is only convention that assigns them certain meanings. Thus, a person capable of knowing supersensible things would again be required in order to tell us the supersensible things to which Vedic words are assigned. (319)

But even the Mīmāṃsaka, continues Dharmakīrti, does not really follow common usage when it comes to explaining the meaning of Vedic words. He offers as examples the words *svarga* and *urvaśī*. *svarga* commonly means "heaven," but the Mīmāṃsaka construes it as "delight."[3] *urvaśī*, meanwhile, is usually the name of a nymph who resides in heaven, but in general the Mīmāṃsaka does not interpret proper names in the Veda as referring to individuals – which would impugn the eternality of the Veda – but offers etymo-

[2] Thus, Kumārila's famous statement in ŚV *codanā* 144ab. See below, p. 125 n. 15.

[3] See ŚBh V.72,6–7 ad MīSū 4.3.15 and below, pp. 139–140 n. 78.

logical analyses of them instead.[4] At the same time, ritualists referred to the two kindling sticks that are rubbed together to start the fire in the Soma sacrifice as Urvaśī (the lower) and Purūravas (the upper one), who according to a widespread myth was her consort.[5] The Mīmāṃsaka cannot claim that one must sometimes resort to an uncommon meaning because the common one is blocked, i.e., it does not fit the context, for how could one ever know in the case of a Vedic statement, which refers to a supersensible state of affairs, that the common meaning is blocked? (320ab) And if we accept uncommon meanings in the case of such words as *svarga* and *urvaśī*, how do we know we shouldn't do so for *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* (i.e., "One should eat dog meat")? The meaning of this sentence cannot be resolved by other Vedic passages, because the meaning of those other passages are in doubt as well – for all we know, the occurrence of *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* there could also mean "One should eat dog meat." (320cd)

The Mīmāṃsaka has made it clear that he puts little faith in what humans say. Yet now he takes ordinary parlance as the criterion of the meaning of the Veda. He is being egregiously inconsistent. (321) Indeed, by calling common usage into question he disqualifies it as a *pramāṇa* that could in any way be applied in interpreting the Veda, i.e., when the common meaning is not blocked. The understanding of the Veda by means of common usage is "a haphazard grasping" which follows no rule at all. (322) Finally, it is common usage itself – which we know to be ambiguous so much of the time – which has raised doubts about the meaning of the Veda in the first place. (323) Therefore, if one were to resort to common usage, it is difficult to see how one could ever be certain of the meaning of the Veda. (324)

1.2. An authorless Veda could not have an inherent *meaning*.

Thus, a teacher like Jaimini, who presumes to tell us what the Veda means without really knowing it himself, is simply foisting upon his followers "his own conception" in the guise of the Veda, and is really no different from any other religious teacher (insofar as he is simply

[4] See below, p. 126 n. 17.

[5] See below, pp. 49–50 n. 78.

inventing doctrines about what one must do in order to attain salvation, etc.). He is like the man who, when asked the way to Pāṭaliputra, says, "The post says it is this way," instead of correctly saying (upon reading the post), "*I* say it is this way" – for *the post* cannot say anything! (325)

The idea that the Veda of itself is restricted to a certain meaning, a meaning which Jaimini is supposedly able to divine, is also certainly mistaken. Words in general are not restricted to meanings by nature; rather, they are suited to mean anything, for we use them arbitrarily to refer to whatever we want. (326ab) And if a word were by nature restricted to only one meaning, how could one ever know it in the case of a Vedic word, whose meaning is something supersensible? (326cd) In fact, however, a word is restricted to a certain meaning only by the intention of the one who employs it; the convention (*saṅketa*), by which the meaning of a word is learned, is the statement of this intention. If a word were authorless, as is supposedly the case for a Vedic word, then it would not be restricted to any particular meaning – it would be in effect meaningless; moreover, there being no convention expressing an author's intention to convey its meaning, a particular meaning for it could never be learned. (327) If, to the contrary, a Vedic word were naturally restricted to a certain meaning, then it could not be used arbitrarily to mean whatever one wants, nor would one even require the statement of a convention to cognize what it means; for if its meaning were something sensible, its restriction to that would be evident to anyone. (If, on the other hand, it were something supersensible, no one would ever be able to cognize it.) Nor would a convention, which arbitrarily assigns a meaning according to the speaker's intention, necessarily reveal just the natural meaning of a word. (328) When one has to do with conventions, one can no longer really speak of the restriction of a word to a certain meaning, natural or not. (329)

2. Nor can the validity of the Veda be based on an inference from the confirmation of a few of its statements.

Because of the futility of attempting to ground the authority of the Veda on its authorlessness, then – which Dharmakīrti has been considering since PVSV 1.224 – there are those who might resort to establishing its validity on the basis of an inference from the truth of

some of its statements which we are able to confirm. Just as those statements are true, so are all of its statements – even those which the Buddhists find most questionable – "because they are part of the same [Veda]." (330)

Dharmakīrti rejects this inference as a *śeṣavat* inference, a fallacious type of reasoning which he discusses in the opening section of PV(SV) 1, which treats the three types of valid reason (PV[SV] 1.11). It would be like concluding, from the fact that the few grains one has sampled are cooked, that all of the grains in a pot of rice are cooked. And although Dharmakīrti himself, following Dignāga, has proposed a similar account of scripture at PV(SV) 1.216, namely that the validity of its statements is inferred from the fact that they are made by a trustworthy person (*āpta*) whose other statements have been shown to be reliable, he stresses that such an inference can be made only if *all* of the statements of scripture that can be confirmed by other *pramāṇa*s are correct; and even then, such an inference is made only out of necessity, because there is no other means of knowing what pertains to the achievement of a higher state of life and, eventually, salvation. (331) But to proclaim that the whole Veda is true because it contains a true statement here and there, while it makes so many other assertions that are patently false – that there is a soul, that some things are eternal, and so forth; in his *Vṛtti* Dharmakīrti meticulously characterizes a variety of fallacious Vedic teachings – such a person's audacity exceeds that of the woman who brazenly denies committing adultery even when caught in the very act! (332–334) Indeed, if one considered a person an authority just because *one* of his statements turned out to be true, then there would be no one we would not consider an authority. (335)

3. Conclusion.

Returning finally to the question of non-perception, specifically, whether the silence of scripture, along with that of the other *pramāṇa*s perception and inference, can establish the non-existence of something (PV[SV] 1.199), which precipitated his discussion of *āgama*, Dharmakīrti reiterates the point made at 1.213 that there is no invariable concomitance between sounds and the things signified by them – speech is not of the nature of the things signified by it, nor their effect. Thus, we can never be sure from an utterance of the exis-

tence of that which it is supposed to signify. (336) Should one object that words are in fact the *indirect* effects of what they signify insofar as they are uttered upon perceiving them, then the response would be that if that were the case, we would not find words having opposite meanings in different teachings, e.g., the word "sound," which refers to something permanent in the writings of one school, but to something impermanent in the writings of others. (337) Thus, there must always be doubt about scripture, whose relation to what it means is never fixed. Those who rely on scripture in the conduct of their lives, putting into practice its teachings, cannot be said to be acting on the basis of true knowledge of anything. (338) Scripture cannot even reliably inform us as to what does *not* exist, i.e., insofar as it is silent about it. For even if everything falls within the scope of scripture, one cannot be certain that the reason scripture doesn't mention something is because it doesn't exist. (Here, Dharmakīrti's argument is not explicit. It seems to be as follows: Given that scripture does not have a fixed relation to any meaning, we can no more be certain, from the fact that it does not mention something, that it does not exist, than we can be certain, from the fact that it does mention something, that it does.) (339ab) Thus, one cannot conclude, from the non-cognition of a thing by means of perception, inference, and scripture, that it does not exist. (339cd)

In sum, anyone who believes in the Veda and follows the Vedic-sanctioned practices of pious Brahmins – ablutions to remove sin, and so forth – is a pathetic creature completely devoid of discrimination. (340)

Part 1 – Translation

Moreover, in holding such a view, the Jaiminīyas compromise their own position with their own assertion,[1] for

> [Vedic] words do not [themselves] declare: "This is our meaning, not this." This meaning [which Vedic words have] must be postulated by humans.[2] The latter are possessed, however, of [moral defects] like desire.[3] [4]Besides, how is the distinction made that among [such humans] one knows what [the meaning of the Veda] really is, the other doesn't?[5] Why isn't there for you in some way some [other person who is] knowledgeable [of the meaning,] given that he is as human as the [other] [i.e., Jaimini, etc.]? (PV 1.312–313)

These Vedic words surely do not cry out like this: "Come you revered Brahmins, this is to be grasped as our meaning, not something else." [Such Vedic words] simply fall upon the ear, without an association with a particular meaning being manifest. For these [words] one person postulates a certain meaning, another another.[6] [7]But words have no natural restriction by which they favor one meaning, not another. They are simply seen as referring to this or that due to convention. It is not right that one[8] totally ignorant [person] afflicted by [moral] defects can explain what [the meaning] of these [Vedic words] really is, their

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[1] See above, pp. 15–17 and nn. 33–36.

[2] I.e., by the Mīmāṃsakas (PVṬ *Ñe* D45b4/P52a2 = PVSVṬ 584,27).

[3] As a consequence, the meaning postulated (*kalpita*) by these human beings is not a *pramāṇa* (PVṬ *Ñe* D45b4/P52a2–3 ≈ PVSVṬ 584,28; Vibh 404 n. 1).

[4] The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now objects that only such persons as Jaimini know (*vettṛ*) the meaning of the Veda (PVṬ *Ñe* D45b4–5/P52a3 ≈ PVSVṬ 584,29).

[5] Explanation, PVṬ *Ñe* D45b5–6/P52a4–5 = PVSVṬ 585,8–10: *nātra kiṃcit kāraṇam asti mīmāṃsakasya / puruṣatvāviśeṣāt / sarvo vā vetti na vā kaścid iti bhāvaḥ /*. "The Mīmāṃsaka lacks any criterion (*kāraṇa*) for this [distinction], because [these persons] do not differ as to [their] humanity: either all [of them would] know [the meaning], or none [of them]. Such is the sense."

[6] As a consequence, there can be no ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) of the meaning of the Veda (**vedārtha*; PVṬ *Ñe* D46a4/P52b4 ≈ PVSVṬ 585,21–22).

[7] The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now objects that words and their meanings have a natural (*svābhāvika*) relation, so that Vedic words are restricted (*pratiniyama*) to one meaning (*ekārtha*; PVṬ *Ñe* D46a4–5/P52b4–5 ≈ PVSVṬ 585,23–24).

[8] I.e., Jaimini or Śabarasvāmin (PVṬ *Ñe* D46b2/P53a2 = PVSVṬ 585,30–31).

restriction to a meaning being [in general] unknown because they refer to [something] supersensible, [and] not another. But if this [person and] no other knows [the meaning of the Vedic words] due to some superiority, e.g.,[9] of the intellect or the sensory faculties, where does his superior knowledge of the supersensible come from? [10]Likewise, why is some other [person][11] who can perceive things beyond the reach [of ordinary cognition] in [terms of] space, time, and nature considered impossible? [12][Among] the "proofs" [brought forward] to discard these [other superior beings],[13] there is indeed none which does not apply to this one [too, whom you accept]. [14]Just as the [latter] is distinguished [through his ability to know the supersensible] in spite of there being these "proofs," so should all others be [distinguished]. Therefore [in this matter], non-commitment [to a particular person as the authority regarding the meaning of the Veda] alone is justified.

> [15]If [you hold that] that one knows the meaning [of the Vedic words] whose [explanatory] statements are consistent with

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[9] Besides *buddhi* and *indriya*, the commentators add, as an explanation of °*ādi*, repeated practice (*abhyāsa*; PVṬ *Ñe* D46b3/P53a4 = PVSVṬ 586,9–10; PVV 404,9).

[10] Introduction, PVṬ *Ñe* D46b4–5/P53a6 = PVSVṬ 586,13: *bhavatu vā jaiminiprabhṛtiḥ puruṣo 'tīndriyārthasya vettā* /. "Or, let there be a human being, such as Jaimini, who knows something supersensible."

[11] According to PVṬ *Ñe* D46b5/P53a6–7 ≈ PVSVṬ 586,13–14, "likewise" (*tathā*) should be understood as, "like Jaimini, etc." (*jaiminyādivat*), whereas "some other [person]" (*anyo 'pi*) should be interpreted as "the superior person(s) recognized by [followers of other traditions] such as the Buddhists (*puruṣātiśayo bauddhādyabhimataḥ*)."

[12] Introduction, PVṬ *Ñe* D46b6/P53a8–b1 ≈ PVSVṬ 586,15–16: *so 'py atīndriyārthadarśy astv itīṣyatām* / *na ced abhimato 'pi jaiminyādir mā bhūt* / *yataḥ*… "[You] ought to admit that the one [accepted by another tradition] must also perceive the supersensible. If not, even the [one] recognized [by you as superior, i.e.], Jaimini, etc., cannot be [held to perceive the supersensible], because…"

[13] See p. 17 n. 37.

[14] The following is said on the hypothesis that the Mīmāṃsaka, going against his own arguments (*sādhana*, so-called proofs, such as *puruṣatva*), accepts that people such as Jaimini perceive what the meaning of the Veda really is (*vedārthatattva*)$_{\text{PVṬ}}$ or are different from, say, Buddhist authorities$_{\text{PVSVṬ}}$ (compare PVṬ *Ñe* D47a1–2/P53b3–4 and PVSVṬ 586,21).

[15] The Mīmāṃsaka now turns from *atīndriyadarśana* to another criterion in order to argue for Jaimini's authoritative *vedārthajñāna*. Jaimini and others discriminate (*vivecana*) the meaning of the Veda only when they make statements (*vacana*) that are

> valid cognition, [we would reply that this is not the case,] for there can be no valid cognition of transcendent [things]. (PV 1.314)

Suppose the following [be urged]: We do not commit ourselves to someone's explanation [of the Veda] on the ground of his authority as a person, but because [his explanation] is consistent with other valid cognitions. Among all the numerous expositors [of the Veda,] we assent to the one who makes [the meaning] coincide with valid cognitions such as perception. [Answer:] This is not [the case], because the other means of valid cognition do not function with regard to supersensible [things] such as *adṛṣṭa* [i.e., merit and demerit]. It is indeed just because of the unavailability of those [other means when it comes to supersensible matters] that scripture is required in order to cognize them; for otherwise,[16] one would not cognize [such things] when other means of valid cognition do not function, even though this [scripture] is available. And since one would cognize [these] things through these [other means of valid cognition] alone, scripture would not be a means at all. Objection: One does not cognize supersensible [things] through any of the other [means of valid cognition] alone.[17] [18][Answer:] How

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consistent with valid cognition (*pramāṇasaṃvādin*; PVSVṬ 586,26, to be compared with PVṬ *Ñe* D47a4/P53b6–7; PVṬ *Ñe* D47a4–5/P53b7–8 = PVSVṬ 586,28–29).

[16] I.e., if, even with regard to something which is accessible to scripture (*āgamagamya*), it were only on the grounds of a statement's consistency with other valid cognitions that one ascertained (*niścaya*) the meaning, then… (PVṬ *Ñe* D47b3–4/P54a8–b1 ≈ PVSVṬ 587,19).

[17] I.e., independently of scripture (PVṬ *Ñe* D47b6/P54b4 = PVSVṬ 587,23), but rather, through perception, etc., as accompanied by scripture (*āgamasahita*; compare PVṬ *Ñe* D47b6–7/P54b4–5 and PVSVṬ 587,24). This is of course reminiscent of Bhartṛhari's reservations about inference. VP$_R$ 1.30–32, 34: *nāgamād ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate / ṛṣīṇām api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy āgamapūrvakam // dharmasya cāvyavacchinnāḥ panthāno ye vyavasthitāḥ / na tāṃl lokaprasiddhatvāt kaś cit tarkeṇa bādhate / avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu / bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā // … yatnenānumito 'py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ / abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapādyate //*. "And without *āgama*, reasoning cannot determine merit; even the knowledge of seers presupposes *āgama*. And no one can by means of reasoning invalidate the paths of merit which have been determined without interruption, because they belong to ordinary knowledge. Since things can have different powers due to differences regarding conditions, places, and times, their knowledge (*prasiddhi*) is extremely difficult to obtain through inference …

[can something like heaven be] called "supersensible" and [at the same time be] the object of [means of valid cognition] such as perception?[19] Objection: Yet even with regard to their own objects, these [means of valid cognition] are effective only in dependence on scripture.[20] [Answer:] There would [then] be no [inferential] cognition of fire, etc., on the basis of a [logical reason] such as smoke without scripture [as its support]! Objection: One certainly does not seek after another means

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Even something that has been inferred with [great] effort by skillful experts in inference is demonstrated [to be] otherwise by other more skillful ones." Note also VPV 89,2–6 ad VP_R 1.32 (quoted in Akamatsu 2010: 187): *tatra rūpasāmānyād apahṛtabuddhiḥ parokṣaviśeṣo durjñānaṃ bhedam arvāgdarśano darśanamātreṇāgamyam āgamenaiva prapadyate / kālabhedād api / grīṣmahemantādiṣu kūpajalādīnām atyantabhinnāḥ sparśādayo dṛśyante / tatra sūkṣmam avasthānaviśeṣaṃ prākṛtam aprākṛtagamyam āgamacakṣur antareṇāpratyakṣam anumānamātreṇāniścitaṃ kaḥ sādhayitum asammūḍhaḥ prayatate* /. "The ordinary man (*arvāgdarśana*), misled by external resemblance, is unable to see the difference and can see it only with the help of tradition. Similarly, properties of things change with time. The temperature of the waters of a well and the like is very different in summer and winter. Which intelligent man would try to demonstrate, by mere reasoning, this subtle difference in nature, imperceptible to the ordinary man, unascertainable by inference and incomprehensible except through knowledge derived from tradition?" Translation Iyer 1965: 44. See also Akamatsu's (2010: 188) comments on this passage. On Bhartṛhari's views on inference, see e.g. Iyer 1992: 84–86, Aklujkar 1989, Houben 1997: 322–327 and Akamatsu 2010. Note also the following passage of Pakṣilasvāmin's NBh (3,11–12): *kaḥ punar ayaṃ nyāyaḥ? pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam / pratyakṣāgamāśritaṃ cānumānam / sānvīkṣā* /. "But what is this 'reasoning'? The examining of an object through the means of knowledge; and inference depends upon perception and scripture. This is [what is meant by] 'analysis.'" Translation Perry 1997: 451. On Pakṣilasvāmin's problematic assertion and its ideological background, see Perry 1997: 450–452; on Uddyotakara's, Vācaspati's, and Udayana's comments on NBh 3,11–12, see Perry 1997: 452–457.

[18] Introduction, PVṬ *Ñe* D47b7/P54b5: *ji skad du brjod pa na śin tu lkog tu gyur pa'i don la yaṅ mṅon sum la sogs pa'i 'jug par 'dod pa ma yin nam* /. "[But] in so speaking, don't [you] accept that [*pramāṇa*s] such as perception also function with regard to something supersensible?"

[19] I.e., either something is the object (**viṣaya*) of perception, etc., and it is not transcendent (**atyantaparokṣa*), or it is transcendent, and *pramāṇa*s such as perception do not apply to it. As a consequence, there can be no consistency with other *pramāṇa*s in the case of something transcendent (PVṬ *Ñe* D48a1–2/P54b6–7).

[20] As a consequence, scripture is the main epistemic requirement (**prādhānya*; PVṬ *Ñe* D48a3/P55a1).

of valid cognition when scripture applies;[21] however, whether scripture applies is in itself not known.[22] [Answer: If that is so,] how does the addition of this scripture enhance these [means of valid cognition] which are capable of establishing [supersensible things] by themselves? [If] on the other hand, a [means of valid cognition is by itself] incapable [of establishing them], it will surely not prove that scripture applies [to supersensible things] either. How indeed does another [means of valid cognition] establish the fact that scripture applies, which, as it relates to supersensible things, is supersensible [itself]? In this way, however, something other [than authorlessness] should be the definition of scripture,[23] for

> [from all this] it follows that a [Vedic] statement that has been sanctioned[24] by a [person] whose statements are [otherwise] consistent with valid cognitions is scripture. [In that case] the [Veda's] authorlessness [turns out to be] useless. (PV 1.315)

If, even though the account of scripture [as authorless] should remain the same, it is due [only] to valid cognitions that a scripture is scripture with regard to a certain [meaning], [then] the consistency of [its] statements with valid cognitions should be the definition of scripture, not not being composed by a human being (*apuruṣakriyā*). [This is so] because, though the [authorlessness of the Veda] is the same for all the meanings [taught by human interpreters], one [still] cognizes [the correct meaning only] on the ground that it is not negated by valid cognitions; for even though this [authorlessness] is given, you do not accept

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[21] For otherwise, scripture would lose its independent effectiveness with regard to its own object (**svaviṣaya*; compare PVṬ *Ñe* D48a5/P55a4–5 and PVSVṬ 588,11–12).

[22] I.e., one does not know whether its application to something supersensible is reliable or not; therefore, one seeks after another means of valid cognition in order to evaluate (**parīkṣā*, **vicāra*) a particular application (PVṬ *Ñe* D48a5–6/P55a5–7).

[23] For those who claim that one should adopt (√*grah*), among many interpreters (*vyākhyātṛ*), the teaching (*bhāṣita*) of the one who agrees (*saṃsyandayati*) with *pramāṇa*s such as perception (PVṬ *Ñe* D48b3–4/P55b5–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 588,21–22).

[24] *kṛta* is explained as *saṃskṛta* (PVṬ *Ñe* D48b5/P55b7–8 = PVSVṬ 588,23–24). PVṬ *Ñe* D48b5/P55b8 ≈ PVSVṬ 588,24–25: *vacanasya ca saṃskāras tadarthasya pramāṇānugṛhītatvakhyāpanam* /. "And to sanction a [Vedic] statement is to declare that its meaning is supported by the *pramāṇa*s." See also Vibh 404 n. 5.

[that one cognizes the correct meaning[25]] in another case, [where the meaning is] inconsistent with valid cognitions.
Furthermore,

> if [in fact] there were knowledge of something transcendent without scripture [then] it would be admitted [by you] that there is someone who knows supersensible things. (PV 1.316)

If it is accepted that [one] human being [such as Jaimini] has true knowledge of a transcendent thing (*parokṣa*) without depending on scripture, [then] it would be admitted that there are [other] human beings who [, just like Jaimini,] perceive supersensible things, [26]because [any] valid cognition, insofar as it is dependent on perception, is impossible without a [prior] perceptual cognition of those [things].[27] It is indeed because other means of valid cognition are impossible, since perception does not function with regard to those [supersensible things], that scripture is a means of valid cognition for cognizing [things] which are not the objects (*ālambana*) of these [other means of valid cognition]. But since the functioning of other means of valid cognition [with regard to supersensible things] implies (*anvākarṣati*) a [prior] perception, a superior person should not be excluded. Therefore, [you have to agree that] other means of valid cognition do *not* function with regard to supersensible [things. And] because he does

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[25] Or: "you do not accept [that the scripture makes something known correctly]" (PVṬ *Ñe* D49a2/P56a6).

[26] The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now claims that interpreters such as Jaimini do not teach the meaning of the Veda on the basis of their perception of it, but on the basis of an inference (*anumāna*; compare PVṬ *Ñe* D49a5–6/P56b4–5 and PVSVṬ 589,19–20). According to Karṇakagomin, PVSV 166,21–22 is an answer to this objection (*tan na / yataḥ*). But according to Śākyabuddhi, PVSV 166,21–22 completes the first part of the answer, which must be supplied as follows (PVṬ *Ñe* D49a6–7/P56b5–6): *de ni ma yin te / gal te dbaṅ po las 'das pa'i don de ni mṅon sum gyis mthoṅ bar 'gyur ba de'i tshe de sṅon du soṅ ba can gyi rjes su dpag pa de la 'jug par 'gyur ro // ci'i phyir źe na*. "This is not [the case, for only] if he had seen this supersensible meaning through perception would inference, which presupposes this [perception] (*tatpūrvaka*), apply to it. – Why?"

[27] According to PVṬ *Ñe* D49a7/P56b6–7, °*tad*° = *atīndriya* (in the genitive case: *tasyātīndriyasya*); but according to PVSVṬ 589,21, °*tad*° = *pratyakṣa* (in the instrumental case: *tena pratyakṣeṇa*).

not, for this very reason,[28] comprehend which particular meaning the [Vedic] scripture refers to, this Jaimini [whom you are always talking about] or another [person, such as Śabara],

> filled with [moral defects] such as desire, does not know the meaning of the Veda himself, nor [does he know it] from another [person], nor does the Veda [itself] make [its meaning] known.[29] [So] how is there comprehension of the meaning of the Veda? (PV 1.317 = PVin 2.35)

Since no human being has overcome the confusion which is due to [moral] defects, as an expositor [of the Veda] he does not know the supersensible restriction [of Vedic words] to a particular meaning by himself. Nor does another [person] teach him [this restriction], either, for there would be the same [undesirable] consequence for this [other person] too [, namely, he too would be incapable of knowing supersensible things, due to moral defects]. Indeed, a blind [person] does not find the way when led by [another] blind [person]! Nor does the Veda disclose its own meaning itself,[30] for it would follow that [Jaimini's or someone else's] instruction would be useless.[31] Therefore, this verbal goitre[32] [that we call the Veda] whose meaning has not been compre-

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[28] I.e., because the other means of valid cognition do not function with regard to supersensible things (PVṬ *Ñe* D49b4/P57a4–5 ≈ PVSVṬ 589,30).

[29] I.e., when one listens to it (*śrūyamāṇa*) independently of someone's instruction (*upadeśam antareṇa*; PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 71b4).

[30] I.e., independently of someone's instruction (*upadeśanirapekṣa*; PVṬ *Ñe* D50a4/P57b7 = PVSVṬ 590,19–20).

[31] I.e., all humans would grasp the meaning of the Veda merely upon hearing it (**śravaṇamātreṇa*; PVṬ *Ñe* D50a4–5/P57b8–58a1).

[32] As a lump of flesh (*māṃsapiṇḍa*) located between the neck and the head (*ghāṭāmastakayor madhye*), is called an excrescence or goitre (*gaḍu*), because it is useless (*niṣphala*), the Vedic word too is like a goitre, because it is useless, since it is of unknown meaning (*aparijñātārtha*; PVṬ *Ñe* D50a5–6/P58a2–3 ≈ PVSVṬ 590,22–24). According to the *Bhāskarī* (I.98,9), however, *gaḍu* (in fact: *antargaḍu*) refers to a *kubjapṛṣṭhastho māṃsapiṇḍaḥ*, a lump of flesh located on the back of a hunchback; in the ĪPV (I.64,10) a Buddhist opponent compares the permanent self (*ātman*) to a hunchback's hump in that it only results in speculative weariness (*kalpanāyāsamātraphala*) but brings nothing. See Ratié 2006: 51 n. 31. The (generally pejorative) expression *śabdagaḍumātra* is commonplace in Indian philosophy. See, e.g., ĪPVV I.62,16, AJP I.323,11 (accusing a statement very similar to PVSV 39,6–8 of being *śab-*

hended, is in this way[33] a veritable splinter. Fixed by the ligaments of bad doctrine and [extremely] difficult to remove, it causes pain.[34]

> Therefore, what valid cognition is there that the [Vedic] statement [which is ordinarily taken to mean] "One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra" doesn't mean "One should eat dog meat"?[35] (PV 1.318 = PVin 2.36)

A [Vedic] sentence such as "One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra" is neither [inherently] close to nor remote from any

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dagaḍumātra); see also MBh II.37,17. Note that *gaḍu* may also refer to a tumor. In this sense, it occurs in the famous maxim (*nyāya*): *gaḍupraveśe 'kṣitārakavinirgamaḥ* ("going out of the pupil of the eye when the tumor enters," Franco 1987: 392–393 n. 137), which, according to Franco, is an equivalent of "falling from the frying pan into the fire." See, e.g., AJP I.56,6, TUS 148,12 (Franco 1987: 149), HBṬĀ 368,1.

[33] I.e., because one doubts (*saṃśaya*) whether its meaning is this or that (PVṬ *Ñe* D50a6/P58a3–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 590,24).

[34] Difficult to remove even for a compassionate being (*[mahā]kāruṇika*) who would be eager to do so (PVṬ *Ñe* D50a7–b1/P58a4–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 590,25–26), it causes pain to those who put their faith in it (*tadabhiprasanna*; PVṬ *Ñe* D50a7/P58a4 = PVSVṬ 590,24–25), or who adopt the Veda (*aṅgīkṛtaveda*; PVṬ *Ñe* D50a7/P58a4 = PVSVṬ 590,25).

[35] PV 1.317–318 are quoted in NM II.220,4–5 and 10–11. PV 1.318 recurs in a slightly different form (*pāda* c: *jinaḥ sarvajña ity evaṃ*) in TS_K 3527/$TS_Ś$ 3526. *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* is featured by Śabarasvāmin as an example when discussing the problem of how the meaning of a Vedic sentence is derived from the meanings of its words (ŚBh I.110,5 ad MīSū 1.1.24); here, it is not clear that he actually intends to refer to a particular Vedic passage. When discussing the *injunction* to perform the *agnihotra*, however, ad MīSū 1.4.4, he cites *agnihotraṃ juhoti svargakāmaḥ* (ŚBh II.285,1). The Vedic passages that come closest to this are TaitS 1.5.9.1 (*agnihotraṃ juhoti*), KāṭhS 6.3 (*payasāgnihotraṃ juhoti*), and MaitS 1.8.6 (*yad evaṃ vidvān agnihotraṃ juhoti*). (Garge 1952: 102 considers the *Maitrāyaṇī* passage, not TaitS 1.5.9.1, as providing the originative injunction, because the latter does not deal primarily with the *agnihotra*; KāṭhS 6.3 is evidently a *guṇavidhi*. For a helpful discussion of Śabara's rather imprecise method of citing Vedic passages in general, see Garge 1952: 39–45.) See also ŚBh III.497,2–509,6 ad MīSū 2.2.13–16. Various other authors, both Mīmāṃsaka and non-Mīmāṃsaka, cite *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt (svargakāmaḥ)* as the paradigm of a Vedic injunction; see MNP 16,3–17,6; AS 32,1–7; NV 254,4 ad NSū 2.1.59 (*agnihotraṃ juhuyāt*); etc. On this injunction and its interpretation in Mīmāṃsā, see below, pp. 135–140.

[particular] meaning;[36] [hence] we do not see any distinctive property [of the sentence which would determine] that its meaning is that one should pour ghee, etc., into a certain element [i.e., fire] in a way that is admissible [to Brahmins], but not that one should eat dog meat. [37]Objection: This consequence is similar for any [scriptural statement, whether it is authorless or not]: Do people nowadays follow the meaning of statements whose [original] expounders are no longer living (*parokṣa*) according to the [original] intention, or rather a contrary [meaning]? [Answer:] No [, we do not have the same consequence in every case], for a tradition is made possible by [the fact that] a teacher may reveal his own intention [to his contemporaries, and they in turn reveal it to others, etc.]. Indeed, this is not possible in the case of words that lack an [original] expounder. And speaking with the intention of having people understand, [the teacher] follows the common usage of ordinary conventions. For this reason also, the meaning of this [kind of scripture] is established, [but] not [that] of authorless words, for in their case, there is no desire of anyone [to communicate].[38] Moreover, learned people apply themselves to [things which are] to be obtained and avoided and their causes[39] by following reasoning alone, not by

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[36] Because the hypothesis of a real (*vāstava*) relation between words and meanings has been refuted earlier (see above pp. 10–12, and PVSV 172,15–16 below, p. 58; PVṬ *Ñe* D50b3/P58b1 = PVSVṬ 591,10).

[37] For a parallel passage, see TS$_K$ 2774/TS$_Ś$ 2773 and TSP$_K$ 735,19–736,3/TSP$_Ś$ 891,20–892,12.

[38] In PVSV 167,16–21, Dharmakīrti has argued that the consequence is not the same for any scriptural statement, i.e., that it is possible to know the meaning of a scripture of human origin (*pauruṣeya*): (1a) because of the possibility of a tradition (*sampradāya*) and (1b) because of the teacher's compliance with ordinary linguistic conventions (*saṅketānupālana*; PVṬ *Ñe* D51a4–5/P59a7–8 ≈ PVSVṬ 591,29–31). PVSV 167,21–23 provides a second argument to the same effect: (2) one can ascertain (*niścaya*) the meaning of a scripture of human origin by following reasoning (*nyāyānusāreṇa*; compare PVṬ *Ñe* D51a5/P59a8 and PVSVṬ 592,6).

[39] I.e., what is to be avoided (*heya*) is suffering (*duḥkha*), and its cause consists in acts and defilements (*karmakleśāḥ*); what is to be obtained (*upādeya*) is liberation (*mokṣa*), and its cause consists in the knowledge of true reality (*tattvajñāna*; PVṬ *Ñe* D51a6–7/P59b1–3 ≈ PVSVṬ 592,8–9).

[listening to] just the talk [of their predecessors];[40] and so the consequence is not similar. But we shall explain this[41] in due course.

[42]Objection: Isn't it the case that such a thing as the arrangement of the world, even though it is not an object [accessible] to reason,[43] is known [by you Buddhists] from the statement of a person which must be assumed [to be true, on the basis of his reliability in regard to other

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[40] At least according to Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin, Dharmakīrti alludes here to the champions of practical rationality (the so-called "practically rational persons" [*prekṣāpūrvakārin*]), the Buddhists (*bauddha*; PVṬ *Ñe* D51a6/P59a8–b1 = PVSVṬ 592,7), for "even if the words [of their scriptures] can be [as] polysemic [as those of the Veda], the Buddhists (*saugata*) determine, for [their] scriptures, only [such] a meaning [as is] rational (*yuktiyukta*) [and] serves a human goal, [but they do] not [ascertain it] merely by [resorting to] the teaching of other [persons]." (PVṬ *Ñe* D51a7–b1/P59b3–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 592,9–13; see also Vibh 406 n. 2: *etad uktaṃ bhavati / anekārthatvasambhave 'pi śabdānāṃ yuktiyuktaṃ puruṣārthopayoginam evāgamārthaṃ niścinvanti saugatā na paropadeśamātreṇa /*.) For a parallel passage, see TSP$_{K}$ 735,22–23/TSP$_{Ś}$ 891,23–892,4 (*tatra nyāyam evānupālayantaḥ saugatāḥ sudhiyaḥ pravartante na pravādamātreṇa /*); on the Buddhist epistemologists' "rhetoric of reason," see McClintock 2010; on practical rationality, see McClintock 2010: 58–62 and Eltschinger 2007b.

[41] I.e., that rational persons proceed towards scripture (*āgame pravartanam*) by following reasoning (*nyāyānupālana*; PVṬ *Ñe* D51b1–2/P59b5–6 = PVSVṬ 592,14). We are not aware of any subsequent statement of Dharmakīrti to this effect. But one may think of PV 2 as a whole, and especially PV 2.29–33 (see Eltschinger 2001: 110–114).

[42] The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now objects that if the ascertainment of a scripture's meaning (*āgamārthaniścaya*) follows reasoning alone, there cannot be any ascertainment regarding the transcendent things dealt with in scripture (PVSVṬ 592,16–17, to be compared with PVṬ *Ñe* D51b2–3/P59b6–7).

[43] Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin refer here to Buddhist cosmology as it appears, e.g., in AK 3.45 (which they quote): *tatra bhājanalokasya sanniveśam uśanty adhaḥ / lakṣaṣoḍaśakodvedham asaṅkhyaṃ vāyumaṇḍalam //*. "Here is how it is thought that the receptacle world is arranged: at the bottom there is a circle of wind, immeasurable, with a height of sixteen hundred thousand leagues." (Pruden 1988–1990: II.451, translating La Vallée Poussin 1980: II.138). Other instances of things that are not accessible to reason (because they are beyond reach in terms of space, time, and nature, *deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa*) include the desirable and undesirable results of intentions such as giving and injury (*dānahiṃsādicetanānām iṣṭāniṣṭaphaladānādi*), i.e., karmic retribution (PVṬ *Ñe* D51b3–4/P59b7–60a2 ≈ PVSVṬ 592,17–22).

things]?[44, 45] [Answer:] No, because [we have] no confidence [in such a person].[46] It is indeed not the case that, since [a person has been observed] not to err with respect to a certain [matter], everything [that person says] is like that [i.e. true, and this for two reasons: first], because one observes that [people who are known to be reliable in regard to a certain thing do in fact] err [in regard to other things]; and [second,] because a concomitance between the [verbal] activity of this [allegedly superior person] and reliability is not established.[47] [48]Beyond that, the [aforementioned] definition of scripture has been accepted for lack of [any other] recourse.[49] There is [indeed] no ascer-

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[44] I.e., if someone's statement concerning things that are not accessible to perception and inference proves to be reliable (*avisaṃvādin*), then one may assume (*sambhāvyate*) that this person's statement regarding the third order (*tṛtīyasthāna*) of things, viz., transcendent things, is veracious (*satyārtha*, PVṬ *Ñe* D51b5/P59a2–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 592,23–24).

[45] Consequently, the Buddhists, too, learn about transcendent things from the statements of a person whom they merely trust, and thus do not deal with the meaning of their scriptures by following reasoning alone. Therefore, it is the case that the same consequence (see above, PVSV 167,14–16) applies to them (PVṬ *Ñe* D51b5–6/P60a4–5 = PVSVṬ 592,24–26).

[46] Dharmakīrti now argues that one cannot ascertain (*niś√ci)* someone's reliability (*saṃvāda*) in regard to something transcendent on account of his reliability in regard to things accessible to perception and inference (PVṬ *Ñe* D51b7/P60a6–7 and PVSVṬ 592,28–29).

[47] Consider the following argument (PVṬ *Ñe* D52a2–3/P60b1–2): "With regard to something supersensible also, the verbal activity of this superior person, because it is his verbal activity, is reliable, like [his] verbal activity regarding things that are accessible to the [ordinary] *pramāṇas*." Here, the concomitance between the properties "being reliable" (*probandum*) and "being this person's speech" (*probans*) cannot be established for want of a valid cognition that excludes (*bādhaka*) the presence of the *probans* (here: "verbal activity") in cases dissimilar to the *probandum* (here: "not being reliable"; PVṬ *Ñe* D52a3/P60b3–4 = PVSVṬ 593,12).

[48] The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now objects that in PV 1.215, Dharmakīrti himself accepts a definition of scripture (*āgamalakṣaṇa*) that makes the scripture's partial reliability (*ekadeśāvisaṃvādana*, i.e., in regard to empirically accessible things) a reason for its overall reliability (i.e., in regard to transcendent things as well; PVṬ *Ñe* D52a4/P60b4–5 ≈ PVSVṬ 593,12–15). On Dharmakīrti's doctrine of scriptural authority, see below, pp. 83–118; see also PVSV 173,26–174,2 below, pp. 63–65.

[49] According to Dharmakīrti, people eager to engage in religious practice (*pravṛttikāma*) cannot live without resorting to scripture (PVSV 108,2–5) because of their co-

tainment [of supersensible things] from [scripture thus defined, and] this is the reason why [we have] also stated [above] that scripture is not a means of valid cognition.[50] Since the meaning of authorless words [can] be known neither from tradition, nor from reason, nor from the [ordinary] world,[51] it is [only] proper [to say] that there is no cognition [of the meaning] in this case. Objection: In their case too,

> ordinary parlance, which is [commonly] established, (PV 1.319a = PVin 2.37a)

is the cause of [our] cognition [of the meaning].[52]

> [Answer:] What [human being] is there in this [world able] to perceive supersensible things, who [could] discriminate the [proper] meaning of [Vedic] words which have multiple meanings?[53, 54] (PV 1.319bcd = PVin 2.37bcd)

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gnitive limitations. Now, according to PVSV 108,5–6, if someone is to act according to scripture (*āgamāt pravṛttau*), he would do better (*varam*) to follow a scripture whose statements about empirical matters, at least, have proved to be veracious (PVṬ *Ñe* D52a4–5/P60b5–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 593,15–16). See the references provided above, n. 48, and PVSV 174,1 below, p. 64.

[50] See below, pp.102–105.

[51] Not from tradition, because there is no preceptor (*daiśika*) at the beginning of a tradition (PVṬ *Ñe* D52a6/P60b8 = PVSVṬ 593,19); not from reason, because the *pramāṇa*s do not function with regard to something transcendent (PVṬ *Ñe* D52a6–7/P60b8–61a1 = PVSVṬ 593,20); and not from the world, because there is no concern with following ordinary linguistic conventions (PVṬ *Ñe* D52a7/P61a1–2 ≈ PVSVṬ 593,20–21).

[52] I.e., the cause of our ascertainment (*niścaya*) of the meaning of the Veda (PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 71b6). And indeed, according to the Mīmāṃsaka opponent, neither is dog meat (*śvamāṃsa*) the thing signified (*vācya*) by the word *agnihotra*, nor is eating (*bhakṣaṇa*) the meaning of *juhuyāt* (PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 71b6). Or, according to Manorathanandin (PVV 405,20), the word *agni* ordinarily refers to something capable of burning (*dāhādisamartha*), whereas *hotra* (*havana*) points to pouring ghee, etc. (*ghṛtādiprakṣepa*) into fire.

[53] I.e., whose specific meaning is doubtful (*āśaṅkyamānārthaviśeṣa*) because it is not restricted to a single meaning (*ekārthapratiniyama*; PVṬ *Ñe* D52b2/P61a4–5 ≈ PVSVṬ 593,26–27). Here, Dharmottara refers to the well-known example of the nine meanings of the word "cow" (*gośabdasya navārthāḥ pratītāḥ*; PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 72a3). On this example, see AKBh 80,28–81,3: *tad yathā gaur ity eṣa śabdo navasv artheṣu kṛtāvadhiḥ / vāgdigbhūraśmivajreṣu paśvakṣisvargavāriṣu / navasv artheṣu medhāvī*

Indeed, such ordinary [linguistic] practice is not due to an authorless relation between word and meaning, but to convention[55] – just like the [linguistic] practice of the Pāṇinīyas, etc., [regarding words like *vṛddhi* or *guṇa*] is due to the convention [fixed long ago] by [Pāṇini,] the founder of their science – because it depends on instruction.[56] [57]Instruction, indeed, is not justified in the case of such an authorless [relation], since no one knows the [meaning of a Vedic word], because it is supersensible, [and] because if it were sensible, it would follow that it would be cognized of itself [i.e., without any instruction], like visible form, etc. And there can be no confidence in[58] the instruction of arbitrary[59] human beings [about supersensible matters], because one cannot establish the reliability [of their instruction] by [verifying that they are] teaching truthfully. Objection: Like the Veda, an authorless expla-

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gośabdam upadhārayed iti //. "For example, the word 'cow' has been assigned to nine meanings [, as it is said]: 'The wise should consider the word 'cow' [as being used] in regard to nine meanings: speech, region, land, light and diamond, as well as cattle, eye, heaven, and water.'" Note also Yaśomitra's (AKVy 183,16–17) comment on *tad yathā gaur ity eṣa śabdo navasv artheṣu kṛtāvadhiḥ*: *etena saṅketāpekṣaḥ śabdo 'rthaṃ pratyāyayati* /. "Thus [it is only] in dependence on a convention [that] a word communicates a meaning."

[54] I.e., there is no person (such as Jaimini or Śabarasvāmin) able to discriminate (**vivecana*) the proper meaning of the Vedic words, which are not preceded by a speaker's intention (PVṬ *Ñe* D52b3–4/P61a6–7, to be compared with PVSVṬ 593,27–28).

[55] Defined as the communication of an intention (*abhiprāyakathana*; PVṬ *Ñe* D52b4/P61b1 = PVSVṬ 594,8). See below, PV 1.327 and PVSV 172,19–24, and Eltschinger 2007a: 134–143.

[56] On Pāṇini (and Piṅgala) in Mīmāṃsā, see ŚBh on MīSū 1.1.5/I.63,5–66,2, ŚBh$_F$ 42,16–44,12. See also Biardeau 1964: 157–159 and D'Sa 1980: 95–96.

[57] In PVSV 168,9–11, Dharmakīrti has argued that if ordinary linguistic practice also (*laukiko 'pi vyavahāraḥ*) were established naturally (*nisargasiddha*), it would not require another person's instruction (*paropadeśa*). But it actually requires it. Therefore, it is due not to an authorless relation between words and meanings, but to convention. In PVSV 168,11–15, Dharmakīrti now explains why no one can know the meaning of the Veda through conventional linguistic practice (**sāmayikaśābdavyavahāra*; PVṬ *Ñe* D52b6–7/P61b3–5, to be compared with PVSVṬ 594,12–14).

[58] I.e., no ascertainment (*niścaya*) of the meaning of the Veda through… (PVṬ *Ñe* D53a4/P62a3 = PVSVṬ 594,25).

[59] Because, due to their being overcome by defilements such as desire (*rāgādyabhibhava*), those teaching the meaning of the Veda (*vedārthopadeṣṭṛ*) lack any correct knowledge (*samyagjñāna*; PVṬ *Ñe* D53a3–4/P62a2–3 ≈ PVSVṬ 594,24–25).

nation of it has also come down [to us] through an unbroken tradition, [and it is] by means of this [explanation that] the meaning [of the Veda] is established. [Answer:] This [explanation] also, being verbal in nature, [is confronted with] the same question [as the Veda]: How is its meaning known? A human being [founding a tradition] can indeed impart ostensively (*śṛṅgagrāhikayā*) the meanings of words, for which he himself has fixed conventions, to someone who is not yet (*tāvat*) familiar [with them]. Therefore, there is a means of gaining access to the meaning of words having an author. An authorless word, however, does not do this, and nobody can know the restriction of the relation [of the word] to a certain [supersensible meaning]. Therefore, [there can be] no cognition of its meaning at all. Moreover, the Veda or its explanation [, even though authorless, still] follows an uninterrupted tradition taught by one human to [another] human. Thus in this case too, an oath (*samaya*) [swearing that it is true] is all you have to fall back on.[60] For one observes that the destroyers of scripture falsify [it] either out of pride, or due to hostility towards its doctrines (*darśana*),[61] or out of sheer malevolence in order to humiliate those who adhere to them (*pratipanna*), or for some other reason. Moreover, out of attachment to your own theory you have forgotten the color of your [own] face (*mukhavarṇa*)[62] now that it comes to (*atra*) [determining the meaning

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[60] Because there is no *pramāṇa* enabling one to ascertain (**niścāyakapramāṇa*) its meaning (compare PVṬ *Ñe* D53b4/P62b6 and PVSVṬ 595,17–18). *samaya* is explained as *śapathādi* in PVṬ D53b4/P62b6–7 ≈ PVSVṬ 595,18. On the Indian oath, see Hara 1991; on the juridico-philosophical use of the oath, see Eltschinger 2007a: 302 n. 339.

[61] Out of pride, as the Sāṅkhyasiddhānta was altered (*anyathāracana*) by Mādhava, the destroyer of Sāṅkhya (*sāṅkhyanāśaka*; PVṬ *Ñe* D53b5–6/P62b8–63a1 = PVSVṬ 595,21–22; on Mādhava as a *sāṅkhyanāśaka*, see Hattori 1968: 134 n. 4.16 and 155 n. 5.40); due to hostility, as the enemies of the Mahāyāna (*mahāyānavidviṣṭa*) composed (pseudo-)Mahāyānasūtras expounding a counterfeit Mahāyāna (*mahāyānapratirūpaka*; PVṬ *Ñe* D53b6/P63a1–2 ≈ PVSVṬ 595,22–23).

[62] So that you are now looking for (*pra*$\sqrt{}$*arth*) the ascertainment of the meaning of the Veda from humans who, according to your most characteristic doctrine, are tarnished by defilements such as desire (*rāgādimalina*; PVṬ *Ñe* D54a1–2/P63a5–6 = PVSVṬ 595,29). Skt. *svam eva mukhavarṇam* is rendered *bdag ñid kyis khas blaṅs pa* in PVSV$_{\text{Tib}}$ D361a2/P528b3–4 and PVṬ *Ñe* D54a1/P63a5, and explained by the synonymous *svābhyupagama* in PVSVṬ 595,28–29: "the color of your own face," viz., your most characteristic tenet, which Dharmakīrti gives in PVSV 169,1–2.

of the Veda, namely, the idea that] since a human being afflicted with [moral defects] such as desire, may also speak what is false, his speech is not a means of valid cognition. Why don't [you] consider[63] whether this [falsehood] is present or not in this [tradition of exegesis] too? [For,] due to being afflicted [by moral defects] this very [person] teaching the Veda or the meaning of the Veda may also teach falsely. [64]Indeed, we hear from certain people[65] that there are certain Vedic schools which have reappeared after nearly dying out – even today, some have very few reciters.[66] [Therefore, those who teach and recite the Veda now may very well do it falsely] for, like the [schools which now have only a few reciters, those schools] which have numerous reciters could have somehow declined at a certain time [in the past], since one can suppose that [the reciters] grew again in number due to [their] confidence[67] in a person esteemed [to be an authority]. And [thus, there is doubt about their reliability for three reasons: First,] because those who restored [the Vedic schools which had declined], having sometimes forgotten the recitation [which they had] learned, could have taught it falsely on account of such [motives] as fear that they would lose the esteem (*sambhāvanā*) of others;[68] and [second,]

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[63] I.e., without partisanship for Jaimini, etc. (**jaiminyādipakṣapāta*; PVṬ *Ñe* D54a3–4/P63a7–b1).

[64] In talking, in PVSV 169,4–15, about the demise of Vedic schools (*śākhā*), Dharmakīrti provides additional reasons for distrusting (*āśaṅkākāraṇ[āntar]a*) traditional Vedic exegesis (PVṬ *Ñe* D54a5/P63b3 ≈ PVSVṬ 596,11).

[65] I.e., from Jaimini, etc., according to Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ *Ñe* D54a5/P63b3), or from Yājñavalkya, etc., according to Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 596,11–12). However, there is no mention of such a thing in either the MīSū or the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*.

[66] PVSVṬ 596,14–15 adduces the *Āhūraka*s, etc., as an example. *Āhūraka* seems not to be attested as a designation for a Vedic school/recension, but according to AVP 49.2,1, the *Āhvarakāḥ* form one of the twenty-four divisions (*bheda*) of the Yajurveda.

[67] I.e., due to the fact that they acknowledge his (personal) authority (*prāmāṇya*; PVṬ *Ñe* D54b2/P64a1 ≈ PVSVṬ 596,20–21). See also below, p. 48 n. 69.

[68] I.e., of other reciters who have placed their faith in them (*tadabhiprasanna*; PVṬ *Ñe* D54b5/P64a6 = PVSVṬ 596,28). Their fear can be expressed as follows: "If I didn't at least (*api*) teach [something] otherwise [i.e., falsely, rather than saying nothing at all], they [would] immediately lose [their] confidence in me as someone who is trustworthy" (PVṬ *Ñe* D54b5–6/P64a6–7 ≈ PVSVṬ 596,29–30: *yady aham anyathāpi nopadiśeyaṃ nūnam ete mayy āptasambhāvanāṃ jahātīti* /). (I.e., if I don't fake it, I'll

because, due to [their] confidence in the [person believed to be an authority], his devotees [could have] practiced (*pratipatteḥ*) [his recitation] carelessly, for one observes [nowadays] that among the many reciters [of the Veda, recitation] practice [proceeds] mostly because of a person who is esteemed [as trustworthy];[69] [and third,] because deception can arise somehow[70] from that [sort of person] also. Furthermore, we hear that your own [tradition] regarding the [interpretation of the Veda has] also [consisted in] a succession of human expositors [at times] limited in number. Since among them, one could also have been either hostile, ignorant, or malevolent, there can be no confidence [in your explanation of the Veda].

Therefore, the meaning of the Veda [can be] established neither through an authorless explanation nor through ordinary [linguistic] practice, which is conventional. [Ordinary linguistic practice cannot establish it for two reasons: first,] because even if [Vedic words] were not conventional, words are seen to have various meanings in [ordinary linguistic] practice; therefore doubt [about the meaning] would not cease for any [word], [71]for [even in the case of Vedic words] one observes that a certain [word] of uncommon meaning or an uncommon [word] has [to be] explained anew.[72] [73][Second,] because, whatever

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lose their trust!) Additional motives include pride, hostility, and malevolence (see above, PVSV 168,24–26; PVṬ *Ñe* D54b6/P64a7–8 ≈ PVSVṬ 596,30–31).

[69] I.e., because of a person whose personal authority (*puruṣaprāmāṇya*; PVSVṬ 597, 11–12) is acknowledged by the reciters, or due to their confidence in a human being who is or has become an authority (**pramāṇabhūtapuruṣa*; PVṬ *Ñe* D55a1/P64b2–3). On *pramāṇabhūta(puruṣa)*, see Krasser 2001.

[70] I.e., because of motives such as a teacher's fear of losing the esteem of others (PVṬ *Ñe* D55a2–3/P64b4–5 ≈ PVSVṬ 597,15).

[71] The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now claims that only ordinary (*laukika*) words are polysemic (*nānārtha*), not Vedic ones (PVṬ *Ñe* D55b1/P65a5–6 = PVSVṬ 597,26).

[72] As a consequence, one may again wonder whether the interpreter teaches the correct (*yathāsthita*) meaning of these Vedic words or an erroneous (*viparīta*) one (PVṬ *Ñe* D55b2–3/P65a7–8 ≈ PVSVṬ 597,28–30).

[73] The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now claims that, since Vedic words do not generate the cognition (**pratīti*) of their meaning if they are used in a way contrary (**anyathā*) to the desired meaning (**abhimatārtha*), they have only one meaning (**ekārtha*). In other words, these words behave differently according to whether they are used to designate a desired (**iṣṭa*) or undesired (**aniṣṭa*) meaning (PVṬ *Ñe* D55b5–6/P65b3–4, to be compared with PVSVṬ 598,12).

meaning [the word] may be employed for, all [words, both ordinary and Vedic,] generate the understanding [of a meaning] indifferently (*avaiguṇyena*) according to a convention, since there is no difference[74] between [meanings which are] desired and undesired [for followers of the Veda].[75] Who among average human beings, who do not perceive the supersensible, could discriminate for [Vedic words which are in themselves] indifferent with regard to all meanings, the one [correct] meaning, whose connection [with the word] is supersensible, so that (*yataḥ*) the understanding could arise from the [ordinary] world?
Moreover, even the [Mīmāṃsaka] himself does not comply with common usage[76] in every case, because

> words such as[77] *svarga* and *urvaśī* are seen to express an unconventional meaning (PV 1.320ab = PVin 2.38ab)

when [they] are interpreted by him. According to ordinary parlance (*iti lokavādaḥ*) heaven is the abode of special beings (*puruṣaviśeṣa*) superior to [ordinary] human beings, a place of divine pleasure, offering abundant enjoyments, [while] the one called Urvaśī is a nymph residing there. How can the [Mīmāṃsaka], disregarding this [ordinary parlance and] proposing a totally new (*anya*) meaning,[78] set up common

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[74] I.e., no difference in generating the understanding (*pratītijanana*; PVṬ *Ñe* D55b6/P65b5 = PVSVṬ 598,13).

[75] Because no words are either inherently close to or remote from any particular meaning (*pratyāsattiviprakarṣābhāvena*; PVṬ *Ñe* D55b6/P65b5 = PVSVṬ 598,13). See above, p. 41 n. 36.

[76] So that one could gain access to the meaning of the Veda through commonly established linguistic practice (compare PVṬ *Ñe* D56a1/P65b8–66a1 and PVSVṬ 598,17–18).

[77] Additional words with unconventional meaning include *nandanavana* (Tib. *dga' ba'i tshal*, i.e., *nandana-vana*, "[Indra's] pleasure grove;" PVṬ *Ñe* D56a2–3/P66a2 = PVSVṬ 598,19).

[78] According to ŚBh V.72,6–7 on MīSū 4.3.15 as well as ŚBh V.179,11–180,5 on MīSū 6.1.2, *svarga* is to be defined as happiness or delight (*prīti;* see below, pp. 139–140 n. 78; cf. Eltschinger 2007a: 244 n. 130). As for *urvaśī*, it is explained by Dharmakīrti's commentators as a piece of wood used for kindling fire (*araṇ*) or as a vessel (*pātrī*; PVṬ *Ñe* D56a4–5/P66a5–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 598,25–26; PVV 406,9; note that PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 72a has only *araṇi*). The *apsaras* Urvaśī is prominent in Vedic and Hindu mythology. Dharmakīrti must have been familiar with the story of Urvaśī and her human consort, king Purūravas, which is told in the HV (App. I.6 [found in some

usage as the criterion in the case of other words [such as *agnihotra*]? Objection: Since in the case [of words such as *agnihotra*] there is no contradiction [of the postulate of the common meaning], we accept

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mss. after HV 21.10 of the critical edition]) and various *Purāṇa*s, and which is the theme of Kālidāsa's drama the *Vikramorvaśīya*; it goes all the way back to ṚV 10.95 and ŚB 11.5.1. Other stories of Urvaśī – about her seducing Ṛṣyaśṛṅga and attempting to seduce Arjuna – are found in the *Mahābhārata* (Hopkins 1974: 162). A reference to *urvaśī* as *araṇi* remains to be traced in the Mīmāṃsā literature. Nevertheless, one may guess that Dharmakīrti was aware of Mīmāṃsā explanations of the mantras to be applied during the kindling of the fire by friction (*agnimanthana*) in the Soma sacrifice, namely, *agnér janítram asi vṛ́ṣaṇau stha urváśy asy āyúr asi purūrávā ghṛ́tenākté vṛ́ṣaṇaṃ dadhāthām* (TaitS 1.3.7.1h–l; for the corresponding *brāhmaṇa* see TaitS 6.3.5.2–3) (also: *agnér janítram asi vṛ́ṣaṇau stha urváśy asy āyúr asi purūrávā asi*; MaitS 1.2.7; *brāhmaṇa* MaitS 3.9.5). The *adhvaryu* priest mutters, "Thou art Urvaśī," while picking up the lower *araṇi* and, "Thou art Purūravas (or: Āyus)," while picking up the upper. In other words, Urvaśī is taken by the ritualists to refer, not to a heavenly nymph, which is the common meaning of the word, but to one of the kindling sticks! See also VādhŚSū 5.2.1.4 (Voegeli 2010: II.24), BaudhŚSū 20.27; BhārŚSū 7.9.13–15; ĀpŚSū 7.12.13–14; VaikhŚSū 8.5, 10.10. For a discussion, see Voegeli 2010: I.165–167; see also Gonda 1988: 229 (VājS 5.2c and ŚB 3.4.1.22). We are not aware of any identification of *urvaśī* with a *pātrī* (a kind of dish by which the *adhvaryu* brings the *iḍā* portion of the *paśupuroḍāśa* to the *brahman* priest, or to the *āgnīdhra* priest, according to Voegeli 2010: I.173). *nandanavana*, the other example mentioned by Karṇakagomin and Śākyabuddhi of a word used by Mīmāṃsakas in violation of its common meaning (see above, p. 49 n. 77), poses a special problem, because not only is there no known Mīmāṃsā treatment of it but it does not occur in any Vedic mantra, either. In epic and later literature it is the name of the pleasure grove in Indra's city where gods and saints dwell (MBhār 1.84.17, 3.78.3, 12.329.19; see Hopkins 1974: 141). It seems relevant to mention here that it was a general principle of Mīmāṃsā that proper names in the Veda do not refer to "non-eternal" entities; there is "merely a similarity of sound" of some words in the Veda (Śabara mentions *babara prāvāhaṇi* and *kusumavinda auddālaki*) to proper names (MīSū 1.1.31, *paran tu śrutisāmānyamātram*). They, in effect, refer to concepts. It is possible that *urvaśī* was explained in this way as well by some Mīmāṃsakas. Yāska gives etymologies of *urvaśī* at Nir 5.13: *uru abhyaśnute, ūrubhyām aśnute, urur vā yaśo 'syāḥ*, "She ranges widely, or she pervades with her thighs, or her desire is extensive." Whether Dharmakīrti had in mind this kind of explanation of *urvaśī* or, as his commentators imply, the explanation about Urvaśī rubbing together with Purūravas (as one of the kindling sticks), he must have thought it was a good joke! See also below, pp. 126–127.

[it].[79] [Answer:] No, because in the case [of words such as *svarga* and *urvaśī*] a contradiction of the [common meaning, which is] something supersensible, is not established, [and] because in the other case [i.e., in the case of words such as *agnihotra*, the fact that it] is not contradicted is hard to grasp.[80] Even if the attainment of heaven by [performing] the Agnihotra were contradicted [by other *pramāṇa*s], this [expositor of the Veda] would not even notice it due to [his] dullness. Moreover, contradiction and non-contradiction are [nothing but, on the one hand,] the occurrence of a means of valid cognition which negates [something, e.g., non-perception,] and [, on the other hand,] the [occurrence] of a means of valid cognition which establishes [something, i.e., perception or inference]; but neither of these is admitted [as possible] in the case of something supersensible. How, then, could one ever understand [that a Vedic word has the commonly accepted meaning or some other meaning] due to them?[81] [82]And it is not the case that there is no contradiction [of the commonly accepted meaning] just due to the

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[79] On the other hand, since there is a contradiction of the common meaning in the case of words such as *svarga* and *urvaśī*, we don't accept it (PVṬ *Ñe* D56a7/P66a8–b1 ≈ PVSVṬ 598,30–31).

[80] In the case of words such as *svarga* and *urvaśī* one would require a *pramāṇa* that opposes (*bādhaka*) the common meaning (PVṬ *Ñe* D56b1/P66b3 ≈ PVSVṬ 599,8) in resorting to another meaning, viz. non-perception (*anupalambha*; PVṬ *Ñe* D56b4 [with no equivalent in P66b6] = PVSVṬ 599,14). In the case of words such as *agnihotra* one would require a *pramāṇa* that establishes (*sādhaka*) the common meaning (compare PVṬ *Ñe* D56b2/P66b4 and PVSVṬ 599,9–10), viz., perception or inference (PVṬ *Ñe* D56b4/P66b6 = PVSVṬ 599,14–15). But since these words refer to supersensible things and no *pramāṇa*, negative or positive, functions with regard to such things (PVṬ *Ñe* D56b5/P66b7–8 ≈ PVSVṬ 599,16–17), a contradiction can be neither established nor ruled out.

[81] I.e., that *svarga* and *urvaśī* do not have the commonly established meaning (*aprasiddhārtha*) because of a contradiction (*virodhavaśāt*), and that *agnihotra* has the commonly established meaning (*prasiddhārtha*) because of non-contradiction (*avirodhavaśāt*; compare PVṬ *Ñe* D56b6–7/P67a1–2 and PVSVṬ 599,18–19; PVṬ *Ñe* D56b6/P66b8 = PVSVṬ 599,18).

[82] The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now claims that non-contradiction does not consist in the operation (*vṛtti*) of a positive *pramāṇa* (which, he seems to agree, is impossible in regard to the supersensible realm), but just in the occurrence (*pravṛtti*) of a statement of the *agnihotra*, termed "scripture" (*āgamasañjñita*), as expressive (*vācaka*) of the commonly established meaning (PVṬ *Ñe* D56b7–57a1/P67a2–3 ≈ PVSVṬ 599,20–22).

occurrence of the [Vedic] statement [in the case of *agnihotra*], for [that[83]] would follow in the other case as well [i.e., in the case of words such as *svarga* and *urvaśī*].[84] [Furthermore, your] scripture [called the Veda] is [supposedly] authorless [but it does not reveal its own meaning by itself; on the contrary, you say] its meaning is established through the [ordinary way of] talking. But if in [following the latter you] are concerned about contradictions, then there can be no confidence in [any part of that] scripture.[85] For even if this [scripture] is [authorless], the meaning [of *svarga* and *urvaśī* understood by you] is unlike [the commonly accepted one]; therefore, another [word such as *agnihotra*] too can be suspected [of having a different meaning], for there is no *pramāṇa*.[86] [Objection:] When [you] state that one can conceive the [Vedic statement] "One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra" as enjoining[87] (*deśanā*) that one should eat dog meat, [we reply that] this is not [the case], because this [statement] is repeated in [exactly] this way in other passages [of the Veda itself]. [Answer:] No, because, the meaning of this [statement occurring in other passages] not being comprehended [either], the conjecture that [these] other [Vedic] passages also have such a meaning cannot be excluded. If this authorless multitude of words had a known meaning in one particular [passage], then one could indeed understand the meaning [of these other passages] from that. But since, even though there are so many of them, all these [words remain] completely obscure, they are fixed [in their meaning] arbitrarily. Therefore,

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[83] I.e., non-contradiction with the commonly established meaning (PVṬ *Ñe* D57a1–2/P67a4–5).

[84] Because one observes that in common usage (*loka*) words such as *svarga* and *urvaśī* are employed to refer to a specific place (*sthānaviśeṣa*) and a specific nymph (*apsaroviśeṣa*). Since that is the same for *agnihotra* – it is commonly used to refer to a sacrifice – one should adopt (*parigraha*) the commonly established meaning either for both – i.e., *svarga*/*urvaśī* and *agnihotra* – or for neither (PVṬ *Ñe* D57a2–3/P67a5–6 = PVSVṬ 599,24–26).

[85] Because with regard to something supersensible it is impossible to ascertain either a contradiction or the absence of one (PVṬ *Ñe* D57a4–5/P67b1 ≈ PVSVṬ 599,29–30).

[86] I.e., there is no *pramāṇa* allowing one to adopt (*grahaṇa*) the commonly established meaning in this case (PVṬ *Ñe* D57a7–b1/P67b5–6 = PVSVṬ 600,14–15).

[87] On *deśanā*/*codanā*, see Gnoli 1960: 170 n. ad line 6.

> in the case of other [explanatory] statements of this type,[88] the conjecture ought to be exactly the same (PV 1.320cd = PVin 2.38cd)

as for the sentence "One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra."[89] Moreover,

> common usage is human parlance (*nṛṇāṃ vādaḥ*); and this [parlance] is not accepted [by you] as a *pramāṇa*. But on the other hand it is from that that one gains access to the meaning [of the Veda]. Why [do you both] approve and disapprove of this? (PV 1.321 = PVin 2.40)

What is called common usage is nothing other than the way humans talk; and since [they are] filled with [moral defects] such as desire, and by nescience, all people make statements whose truth cannot be assumed.[90] Therefore, their talk is not a *pramāṇa*. [91]Indeed, [the fact that there are] many [people who conduct themselves in a certain way] is worthless [as an argument], if there is not even one [person among them] who acts correctly, just like [incest does not become acceptable just because all] Persians misbehave with [their] mothers.[92] [But]

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[88] I.e., in similar statements that serve as explanations (*vyākhyābhūta*) of phrases (*vākya*) such as *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt* (PVṬ *Ñe* D57b5/P68a5 = PVSVṬ 600,27–28).

[89] Between PV 1.320 (= PVin 2.38) and PV 1.321 (= PVin 2.40), PVin 2 has one stanza with no equivalent in the PV. PVin 2.39 (see Steinkellner 1979: 74): *aprasiddhārthayogasya tatprasiddhiprasādhane / nāsiddhārthaḥ svayaṃ śaktas tulyaparyanuyogataḥ //*. "[An additional Vedic passage, being] of unknown meaning [also], is by itself [i.e., independently of any human intention,] incapable of establishing that common usage [as the meaning] of a [statement] with an unknown connection with its meaning, because the same question [would arise regarding this additional passage too, namely, How does one ascertain its connection to its meaning?]." For Dharmottara's commentary on this stanza, see PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 72b1–2/PVinṬ$_{Tib}$ *Dze* 228b6–229a1.

[90] For analyses of the compound *asambhāvanīyayāthātathyavacanāḥ* (called a *'bru maṅ po'i sñiṅ po can gyi 'bru maṅ po pa'o*, i.e., a **bahuvrīhigarbho bahuvrīhiḥ*, PVṬ *Ñe* D58a3/P68b5), see PVSVṬ 601,16–17, and especially PVṬ *Ñe* D58a2–3/P68b3–5.

[91] The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now claims that since these people are many (*bāhulyāj janasya*), their talk (*tatpravāda*) is a *pramāṇa* after all (PVṬ *Ñe* D58a4/P68b6–7 = PVSVṬ 601,20).

[92] On this and similar statements regarding Persians, see Eltschinger 2007a: 312 n. 377, Silk 2008a and 2008b.

since, on the other hand, it is from the speech of those very human beings that the imperceptible (*parokṣa*) meaning is arrived at, how can this [ordinary speech] be simultaneously approved and disapproved of?

> But if [you see] no reason to ignore common usage and postulate [another meaning], what reason [do you have] to adopt it, given that common usage is not a *pramāṇa*? (PV 1.322 ≈ PVin 2.41)

Objection: Using [words] in another [meaning] contrary to the [meaning] obtained [from common usage] is justified [only if] one observes an advantage [in the uncommon meaning] and a defect [in the common one]. [If this is not the case,[93]] then [we] follow common usage. [Answer:] No, because the obtaining [of a meaning] is defined as the occurrence of a *pramāṇa* [which establishes it. But] for the [Mīmāṃsaka], who does not set up common usage as a *pramāṇa*, the understanding [of the meaning obtained] by means of this [common usage] is a haphazard grasping (*yatkiñcanagrahaṇa*) indeed, because [by rejecting common usage] he [in effect] prohibits [the meaning] from being obtained according to a rule (*nyāyāt*).[94] Since the way [your] own and [your] adversary's conceptions [of the meaning[95] are arrived at] is the same [as regards its arbitrariness] in both ways [i.e., whether one preserves common usage or not],[96] what is [this] priviledge [given] to common usage? Moreover,

> it is precisely because of common usage that PVSVthisPVSV doubt regarding the ascertainment of the meaning of words has

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[93] I.e., if, as in the case of words such as *agnihotra*, one observes neither a defect in the commonly established meaning nor an advantage in the unconventional one (*aprasiddha*; PVṬ *Ñe* D58b3–4/P69a7–8 ≈ PVSVṬ 602,11–12).

[94] Consequently, since the meaning arrived at is devoid of any *pramāṇa* (**niṣpramāṇaka*), the meaning of words such as *agnihotra* can only be postulated arbitrarily (*icchayā parikalpanīyaḥ*; compare PVṬ *Ñe* D58b6–59a1/P69b5–7 and PVSVṬ 602,19–21).

[95] For the Mīmāṃsaka the meaning of words such as *agnihotra* consists in a burning substance, etc. (*dahanadravyādi*), whereas for his adversary, it consists in the eating of dog meat (*śvamāṃsabhakṣaṇa*; PVṬ *Ñe* D59a1–2/P69b7–8 ≈ PVSVṬ 602,22–23).

[96] I.e., in both cases, the adoption (*parigraha*) of the meaning is made arbitrarily for want of any *pramāṇa* (PVṬ *Ñe* D59a2/P69b8–70a1 = PVSVṬ 602,23–25).

> arisen, for in that [common usage] words [like *agni*] are seen to have various meanings.[97] (PV 1.323 = PVin 2.42)

It is not the case that one can ascertain the one [correct] meaning [of Vedic] words from common usage, for it is precisely due to it that doubt arises, because words [like *agni*] are seen to have various meanings in the world. But common usage (*pratīti*) is ordinary parlance, [and] it is due to this [ordinary parlance that words] have various meanings. Therefore, one is not justified in restricting [Vedic words] to a single meaning on the basis of it.

> Because it is not impossible that an utterance of itself possessed of various capacities, [could refer] otherwise [than to

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[97] Between PV 1.323 (= PVin 2.42) and PV 1.324 (= PVin 2.45), PVin 2 has two stanzas that have no equivalent in the PV. PVin 2.43–44 (see Steinkellner 1979: 75–76): *na yuktibādhā yatrāsti tad grāhyaṃ laukikaṃ yadi / gṛhyate vātaputrīyaṃ kiṃ na yuktyā na bādhitam // āgamārthāśrayā yuktir atyakṣeṣu na cetarā / tadarthasyāpratiṣṭhānād yukter atra na sambhavaḥ //*. "[Objection: Only] this [ordinary meaning] is to be adopted for which there is no invalidation by reasoning [i.e., by the *pramāṇa*s]. [Answer:] If [only] the ordinary [meaning that is not invalidated by reasoning is to be adopted], why is the swindler's [speech] not adopted [as long as it is] not invalidated by reasoning? [Moreover, the kind of] reasoning [that operates] regarding imperceptible [things] is [that] based on [a *trairūpya* derived from] the meaning of scripture, and not the other [kind, i.e., the kind whose *trairūpya* proceeds by the force of something real. But] since the meaning of this [scripture remains] unestablished, reasoning is impossible here." For Dharmottara's commentary on these two stanzas, see PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 73a1–6/PVinṬ$_{Tib}$ *Dze* 229a6–b4 and PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 73a6–b3/ PVinṬ$_{Tib}$ *Dze* 229b4–230a1. The kind of reasoning alluded to here, i.e., the *āgamārthāśrayā yuktiḥ*, is of course the scripturally based inference (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*) of PV 1.215/PVSV 109,1–3 (see Eltschinger 2007a: 105–109), PV 4.48–51 and 106–108 (see Tillemans 2000: 78–82 and 147–153). See below, pp. 111–115. All the elements that constitute such an inference, including the three characteristics of the logical reason, are based on scripture (*āgamasiddha*, NBṬ 81,19; see also NBṬ$_V$ 130,1–3 and PVV 410,18–411,1; see Moriyama, forthcoming). Note that PVin 2.44cd resorts to the two successive uses or stages of reasoning that apply in the exegesis of "ordinary" treatises (*śāstra*): "Indeed, the entire meaning of a treatise must be determined by reasoning. And once the meaning of the treatise has been determined [by reasoning], scripturally based reasoning proceeds by resorting to the meaning [as it is] known from other passages [in the same treatise]" (PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 73b1–2/PVinṬ$_{Tib}$ *Dze* 229b6–7: *yuktyā hi sarvaḥ śāstrārtho*[a] *vyavasthāpanīyaḥ / vyavasthite ca śāstrārthe yuktir*[b] *āgamāśrayā*[c] *pradeśāntaraprasiddhārthāpekṣayā pravartate /*. [a] PVinṬ$_{Tib}$ *bstan bcos thams cad kyi don* [**sarvaśāstrārthaḥ*]; [b] PVinṬ$_{Tib}$ *rjes su dpag pa* [*anumānam*]; [c] PVinṬ$_{Tib}$ *luṅ gi don la brten pa* [**āgamārthāśrayaṃ*]).

> the desired meaning], there must necessarily arise doubt for those who do not see any restricting [factor].[98] (PV 1.324 = PVin 2.45)

This is an intermediate stanza.

Therefore, Jaimini, when explaining [the Veda], attributes a single [desired] meaning to words whose [proper] interpretation (*arthavibhāga*) is unknown, [a meaning] whose connection [with the word] is supersensible [and] whose ascription is without foundation;[99] [in this way,] it is just his own conception which he formulates in this guise [i.e., in the guise of the Veda itself].[100] Thus, we do not see how he differs from other founders of religions.[101] For to say [that the Veda,] which [in fact] lacks the capacity to express that [desired] meaning, [expresses it] by [falsely]ascribing that [capacity] to it, amounts to nothing more than one's own assertion. Somebody who does that only brings to light his own bad breeding,[102] for

> [Asked about the way to Pāṭaliputra,] one [person says,] "This post says that this is the way,[103]" [whereas] another [answers,] "[The post can't say anything,] I myself say [that this is the way]." One should inquire [whether there is any] difference between the two. (PV 1.325 = PVin 2.46)

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[98] I.e., any *pramāṇa* establishing (*sādhaka*) the object to which this utterance is restricted (*pratiniyataviṣaya*; PVṬ *Ñe* D59b1/P70b2 = PVSVṬ 603,16–17). PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 74a1 explains: *niyāmakaṃ hetum apaśyatām*, and Manorathanandin (PVV 407,8–9): *anekārthasyaikavṛttiniyamakāraṇam apaśyatām*.

[99] I.e., devoid of any *pramāṇa* (*niṣpramāṇaka*; PVṬ *Ñe* D59b3/P70b4–5 ≈ PVSVṬ 603,20–21).

[100] I.e., by referring to the Veda (*vedopakṣepa*), saying that it is the Veda that says so (PVṬ *Ñe* D59b4/P70b6 = PVSVṬ 603,22–23).

[101] Because the founders of religions (*tīrthakara*) say honestly (*nirvyājam*) that they are speaking on their own (*svayam*; PVṬ *Ñe* D59b4/P70b6–7 ≈ PVSVṬ 603,23–24).

[102] Because he is like a person who would indicate a wrong way (*lam log pa*) in order to mislead a group of persons having lost their way (*lam draṅ po*; PVṬ *Ñe* D59b7–60a1/P71a3–4).

[103] I.e., indicates the way in the guise (*vyājena*) of a post that actually lacks the capacity of speaking (PVṬ *Ñe* D60a2/P71a5–6 = PVSVṬ 604,12–13).

One indicates [the way] by ascribing [expressiveness] to the post which is devoid of intention, exertion,[104] and speech, and (*vā*) [another indicates the way] independently.[105] When it comes to following their statements, there is no difference [between them] except for the slowness (*pratipattimāndya*) of the stupid [person who fails to understand that the former is speaking "in the guise of the post"].
Moreover, if [a given Vedic word really] were restricted to a single meaning, Jaimini would know it.

> [But] where does PVSVthis veryPVSV restriction to illumining a single meaning come from for a PVSVwordPVSV which is capable of [referring to] any [meaning]? (PV 1.326ab ≈ PVin 2.47ab)

Indeed, there is no meaning of a word that is restricted [to it] by nature, because it is suitable for any [meaning],[106] and because if it were not suitable [for any meaning], humans could not [arbitrarily] apply [it] or no longer apply [it] to something. For it would not be under [their] control, since it would never lose this [nature of *not* being suitable for *any* meaning].

> [107]Or, by whom [are] supersensible [things such as semantic restrictions] known in the absence of a statement of the speaker's intention? (PV 1.326cd = PVin 2.47cd)

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[104] Intention is defined as the resolve (*cetanā*) to do this or that; exertion, as the effort (*prayatna*) that follows (*pūrvaka*) such an intention (PVṬ *Ñe* D60a3/P71a8 = PVSVṬ 604,16–17).

[105] I.e., without resorting to the post (*sthāṇunirapekṣa*; PVṬ *Ñe* D60a4/P71b1 = PVSVṬ 604,19).

[106] According to Dharmakīrti's doctrine of *yogyatā*, any word is suitable (*yogya*) for any meaning whatsoever. On *yogyatā*, see Tillemans 1997 and Eltschinger 2007a: 134–138.

[107] Dharmakīrti now provisionally accepts (*bhavatu vā*) that Vedic words are restricted to a single meaning (*ekārthaniyama*; compare PVṬ *Ñe* D60b3/P72a3 with PVSVṬ 605,11–12). In PV 1.326cd, Dharmakīrti conflates two Mīmāṃsā doctrines into one argument. Even if natural semantic restrictions exist, they are supersensible; now, the Mīmāṃsaka rejects the possibility that humans perceive supersensible things (PVSVṬ 605,12–13). Moreover, these semantic restrictions are authorless according to Mīmāṃsā; therefore, they do not originate from an original speaker's (*vaktṛ*) intention (*abhiprāya*), the announcing (*kathana*) of which provides the only clue to

In the case of a word pronounced by a person with a certain intention, he might indeed at a certain time communicate[108] that [intention] to a certain [hearer]; therefore, one could very well understand the semantic restriction (*arthaniyama*) of [those] words [which are] preceded by a speaker's intention. But in the case of an authorless [word], how could [this] semantic restriction be cognized, even if it exists? For [Vedic words] do not have a specific nature;[109] or, if they did, it would follow, if it were perceptible, that it would be cognized by itself. [And] if it were imperceptible, it could not be known by anybody, either. And there is no difference [i.e., no specific nature at all], for words are never [inherently] close to or remote from any meaning.[110] Therefore,

> the speaker's intention is the cause of PVSVthesePVSV [words'[111]] being restricted [to a single meaning, and] the convention [is that which] reveals this [intention].[112] [Since] an authorless

understanding the meaning (PVSVṬ 605,14–15). Unless otherwise stated, subsequent occurrences of "(speaker's) intention" translate the Sanskrit term *vivakṣā*.

[108] I.e., teach that this or that is intended (*vivakṣita*) as the meaning (*vācya*) of the word he uses (PVṬ *Ñe* D60b4–5/P72a5 ≈ PVSVṬ 605,17–18).

[109] I.e., Vedic words do not have the nature of being restricted to a single desired (*abhimata*) meaning, the cognition (*darśana*) of which nature would bring about the understanding (*pratīti*) of the desired meaning (*iṣṭārtha*; PVṬ *Ñe* D60b6/P72a7–8 ≈ PVSVṬ 605,20–21; or, according to PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 74b1: the cognition of which would enable one to know the word's restriction to its meaning [*yaddarśanād arthaniyamapratītiḥ syāt*]). Dharmakīrti uses a *reductio ad absurdum* (PVṬ *Ñe* D61a1/P72b2 ≈ PVSVṬ 605,26) to disprove such a nature, first by considering the hypothesis that this nature is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*), i.e., that its cognition does not depend on instruction (*upadeśanirapekṣa*; PVṬ *Ñe* D60b7/P72b1 = PVSVṬ 605,23), and second, by considering the hypothesis that it is imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*) to persons of limited cognitive ability (*arvāgdarśana*; PVṬ *Ñe* D61a1/P72b2 = PVSVṬ 605,24–25; PVṬ *Ñe* D60b6–7/P72a8–b1 = PVSVṬ 605,21–23).

[110] See above, PVSV 167,11, and p. 41 n. 36.

[111] I.e., of these words that are inherently suitable for any meaning, or naturally (*svabhāvatas*) the same (*tulya*) for all meanings (*sarvārtha*; PVṬ *Ñe* D61a2/P72b4 = PVSVṬ 605,28–29).

[112] I.e., it is due to a convention that one understands that a certain person intended a certain meaning (*ayam arthas tena vivakṣita iti*; PVṬ *Ñe* D61a2–3/P72b5 ≈ PVSVṬ 605,30–31). According to Dharmottara (PVinṬ$_{ms}$ 74b3–5, to be compared with PVinṬ$_{Tib}$ *Dze* 230b8–231a1), a speaker "conventionalizes" (*saṅketayati*) that very meaning (*abhidheya*) which he intends; those instructed (*vyutpanna*) at that time

> [word] lacks this [intention], how does it have a single meaning? (PV 1.327 = PVin 2.48)

[It is] indeed due to the speaker's intention [that] a word is restricted to a [certain] meaning, not its nature, for the [word] is the same for every [meaning] since it lacks a relation to anything. [Words] are not even restricted to designating that to which [they do have] a relation, otherwise all words would designate the vocal organs.[113] Therefore, in order to reveal the speaker's intention, a convention is made, which is defined as the communicating of an intention. But in the case of an authorless [word, there is] neither a speaker's intention nor, [precisely] because of the lack of anyone's intention, a convention [for revealing it].[114] Thus [there is] neither restriction [to a certain meaning,] nor [could there be] knowledge of it [if there were one].

> If [one were to accept] a natural restriction, [then a Vedic word] could not be connected again by the [speaker's intention] with another [meaning]. (PV 1.328ab = PVin 2.49ab)

If [one were to accept that] a word is joined with meanings due to its very nature, independent[ly] of [any] convention, [then the reply] to

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will instruct their own pupils (*svaśiṣya*) in turn, and those pupils their pupils, and so on. In other words, whether it is a matter of a scripture that has been created (*kṛtrima*) or ordinary linguistic transactions (*lokavyavahāra*), one can know that there is a semantic restriction due to an uninterrupted scholarly tradition (*āmnāyāvicchedа*). On convention, see above, pp. 13–15, and Eltschinger 2007a: 134–143.

[113] Dharmakīrti accepts only two types of relation (*pratibandha*): identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*). That words are not the nature (*rūpa*) of objects and that objects are not the nature of words has been explained in PV 1.229cd and PVSV 114,25–27 (see Eltschinger 2007a: 253–254 and n. 159). But words are not the cause of their meanings, either, no more than meanings are the cause of words. Rather, words are related to the causal complex that gives rise to them, which includes the speaker's intention (which is why, according to passages such as PVSV 113,25–114,3, 118,14–17 and 120,2–6 [Eltschinger 2007a: 140–142], PV 2.1c$_2$–2 [Katsura 1984: 219], and PVin 2.1–7 [Steinkellner 1979: 73–73], one can *infer* the meaning or cause, i.e., the speaker's intention, from the word or effect), as well as the places of articulation (*sthāna*) and organs (*karaṇa*) involved in the utterance of sounds (PVṬ *Ñe* D61a5/P72b8–73a1 ≈ PVSVṬ 606,14–15). See also PV 1.336–337/PVSV 175,10–24 below, pp. 73–75, and p. 73 n. 155.

[114] See above, pp. 13–15.

this has [already] been stated:[115] Since [there is] no [real] relation, [there is] no restriction. Moreover, if the relation between signified and signifier were natural, [a word] could not be employed again arbitrarily according to the speaker's intention.[116]

And a convention would be useless. (PV 1.328c = PVin 2.49c)

Indeed, a specific nature accessible to the senses does not need anything like an explanatory rule[117] to be cognized (*svapratīti*), just like a specific [instance of] blue, etc. On the contrary, [those things] the cognition of which depends on this [sort of thing] do not have the nature of something real (*vastusvabhāva*), but are conventional, like the insignia of a king, etc.[118] And that which is conventional cannot be restricted by nature, for it exists [merely] according to [one's] wish. [119]Therefore,

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[115] See PVSV 172,19–20, above, p. 59.

[116] I.e., the eye (*cakṣus*), which is naturally restricted (*svabhāvato niyataḥ*) to revealing visible things/colours (*rūpaprakāśana*), cannot be used (*ni*√*yuj*) to reveal sounds (*śabda*). Now, a word is used arbitrarily (*yatheṣṭam*), and therefore is not restricted by nature (*svabhāvaniyata*) to revealing a certain meaning, like a hand-gesture (*hastasañjñā*; PVṬ *Ñe* D61b4–5/P73b3–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 606,29–31).

[117] Explanation, PVṬ *Ñe* D61b6–7/P73b6–7 = PVSVṬ 607,11: *paribhāṣā saṅketaḥ / ādiśabdāt saṅketasmṛtyādiparigrahaḥ /*. This is the only occurrence of *paribhāṣā* listed in Ono et al. In Pāṇini a *paribhāṣā* is a rule that explains how rules of the grammar are to be interpreted, hence a "metarule." Thus, A 1.1.68: *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāsaṃjñā*. The word itself is generally to be understood when mentioned in a rule (not its meaning), except in the case of a technical expression (such as *gha*, which stands for the affixes *tara* and *tama*, A 1.1.22). There are some fifty such *sūtra*s identified in A. Insofar as a *paribhāṣā* clarifies the meaning of a rule or an element of a rule that would not be evident otherwise it can be considered a statement of a convention. For an overview of the use of *paribhāṣā*s in Vyākaraṇa see Devasthali 1969 and Cardona 1980: 167–170.

[118] Additional instances of purely conventional things include hand-gestures (*hastasañjñā*; PVṬ *Ñe* D62a1–2/P74a1–2 = PVSVṬ 607,15–16). See also above, p. 60 n. 116.

[119] The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now claims that, although the specific nature (*svabhāviśeṣa*) of a Vedic word is naturally (*nisargata eva*) restricted to its meaning, this nature is revealed by a convention (*saṅketa*; PVṬ *Ñe* D62a3/P74a3–4 = PVSVṬ 607,19–21). This claim comes very close to the Mīmāṃsaka and Vaiyākaraṇa (but at least partly also Vaibhāṣika) doctrine according to which the relation between word and meaning, though real and permanent (be it just *sāṃvyavahārikanitya*), must be learned by a convention. Note that for Kumārila, it is not always learned from the di-

[when it comes to] the specific nature [which is supposedly restricted to a single meaning] –

> how could it be that [it] is necessarily revealed (PV 1.328d = PVin 2.49d)

by a convention? There is no constraint (*noparodho 'sti*) that this convention, which exists [merely] according to one's wish, be made with regard to the [desired meaning] only [and] not with regard to another one. And there is no necessity that this [convention], which is made by human beings according to their wish, [should] reveal only that nature [which is restricted to a certain meaning and] not another one.

> In this [convention], where there is arbitrariness, how can there be necessity? Thus, the convention cannot bring to light just a desired capacity [of the Vedic word and no other]. (PV 1.329 = PVin 2.50)

This is an intermediate stanza.[120]

> [121]For which reason, probably (*kila*)[122] [– that is, in light of all of the above –] another [philosopher] has said that just as a [Vedic] sentence,[123] such as [the one to the effect that] fire re-

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rect statement of a convention, but also from the observation of linguistic behavior. See PV 1.227cd/PVSV 113,14–23 (Eltschinger 2007a: 246–248) and Eltschinger 2007a: 122–134.

120 This closes Dharmakīrti's examination of the doctrine of authorlessness as the definition of scripture (*apauruṣeyatvam āgamalakṣaṇam*, PVṬ *Ñe* D62a6–7/P74b1 = PVSVṬ 607,29), which began at PVSV 112,6. See above, pp. 18–21.

121 In PV 1.330–335/PVSV 173,16–175,10, Dharmakīrti criticizes another definition of scripture (*āgamalakṣaṇa*), viz., the reliability of one part (*ekadeśāvisaṃvādana*) of the scripture as a criterion of its overall truth (PVṬ *Ñe* D62a7/P74b1–2 ≈ PVSVṬ 608,12). On the identity of his mysterious opponent, see above, pp. 18–21. For a (short) parallel passage, see PVin 2 72,10–11 and Steinkellner 1979: 77–78.

122 According to PVṬ *Ñe* D62a7/P74b2 = PVSVṬ 608,13, the word *kila* expresses (*dyotaka*) lack of intention (*anabhiprāya*), i.e., the *apauruṣeyatvavādin*'s being forced to change his definition of scripture. This is, at least, the way PVṬ *Ñe* D62b2/P74b5–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 608,17 account for PVSV 173,16 (*parityajya*): *yathoktadoṣopahatatvāt*, "reeling from the aforementioned errors."

123 For an earlier occurrence of the Vedic statement *agnir himasya bheṣajam* ("Fire is a remedy for cold"), see PVSV 152,1–4, where the context is similar; see also PVSV 173,18–19 and PVṬ *Ñe* D62b1/P74b3–4 = PVSVṬ 608,13–14. The statement can be

> moves cold, is true, any other one [, such as "One should perform the Agnihotra,"] is like this [i.e., true], because it is a part of the [same] Veda.[124] (PV 1.330)

But another [theorist], renouncing the definition of scripture as [that which is] authorless [because of a similar criticism, and] wishing to prove the authority of the Veda in another way, says, "[Those] Vedic sentences for which there is no cognition [on the part of Buddhists as being true] are [in fact] true, because they are part of the [same] Veda, just like the sentence 'Fire is the remedy for cold,' etc." The [argument] of this [adversary]

> is [an inference of the type known as] *śeṣavat*, like [the inference that something has a certain] taste [as other fruits] from having the same color and like [the inference that something is] cooked [from being] in one [and the same] pot.[125] This type of [inference] has been rejected by the Logician[126] because it deviates [from the property-to-be-proved]. (PV 1.331)

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traced back, at least in part, to TaitS 7.4.18.2 (where *agniḥ* is not mentioned but might be the answer to the riddle [*kíṃ svid dhimásya bheṣajám?*] posed by the text – which is incidentally the interpretation of BaudhŚSū 15.28 [*agnir himasya bheṣajam*]) and ŚB 13.2.6.12, and to Śrautasūtra literature (see e.g. ĀśvŚSū 10.9/2b and ŚāṅkhŚSū 16.5.4). The statement is quoted in NV 255,1 ad NSū 2.1.60. As an additional example of such trivially true Vedic statements, PVṬ *Ñe* D62b5/P75a1–2 = PVSVṬ 608,22–23 quote: *dvādaśa māsāḥ saṃvatsaraḥ*, "Twelve months are a year," which already appears in NV 254,1. The source of this statement must be KāṭhS 19.8, 19.9, 19.9, and 29.8. Note, however, that the KāṭhS reads *dvādaśamāsaḥ saṃvatsaraḥ*, "A year has twelve months." In ŚV *codanā* 121–122ab, Kumārila also criticises the *ekadeśāvisaṃvāda* argument; see Kataoka 2011a, n. 377.

[124] In this argument, *īdṛśam* – "is like this," i.e., true – is the property to be proved (*sādhya*, or **sādhanaphala*; PVṬ *Ñe* D62b1/P74b3 ≈ PVSVṬ 608,14–15), *satyaṃ yathāgniḥ śītanodano vākyam* is the example (**dṛṣṭānta*; PVṬ *Ñe* D62b1–2/P74b4), *vedaikadeśatvāt* is the reason (*hetu*; PVṬ *Ñe* D62a7/P74b2–3 = PVSVṬ 608,15). For other formulations of the argument, see PVSV 175,2–4 and PVṬ *Ñe* D67a6–7/P81a3–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 614,11–13, as well as PVinṬ$_{\text{Tib}}$ *Dze* 231a1–b3 (PVinṬ$_{\text{ms}}$ 75a is unfortunately missing!).

[125] On the second example, see PV 1.13d = PVin 2.65d, PVSV 10,15–17 ≈ PVin 2 92,4–6 and Steinkellner 1979: 114 and n. 434.

[126] I.e., by Ācārya Dignāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PVṬ *Ñe* D63a1–2/P75a7–8 ≈ PVSVṬ 608,25–26) when criticizing the deviating character (*vyabhicāra*) inherent in the Naiyāyikas' *śeṣavadanumāna* (PVṬ *Ñe* D63a3/P75b1–2 = PVSVṬ 609,7–8).

This kind of inference was declared to be not [really] a proof by the master [Dignāga] himself in pointing out the deviating character of the Naiyāyikas' *śeṣavat*-inference, like the [so-called] proof that fruit [one has not tasted] has the same taste [as fruit one has tasted] because it has the same color, and the [so-called] proof that rice grains one has not observed are cooked, like those which one has observed, because they are in one [and the same] vessel. And the manner in which this [*śeṣavat*-inference] is not a proof has [already] been stated earlier.[127] [128]And [true,] we have stated this definition of scripture [too].[129] How-

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See PS 2.28b and PSV_K 115b2–4, PSV_V 33a1–2 ad loc. in Horst Lasic's provisional Sanskrit reconstruction: *śeṣavaty api ced vatiḥ / śeṣavaty api ced vatiḥ kriyate – śeṣeṇa pratyakṣeṇa tulyo viṣayo yasya, taj jñānaṃ śeṣavad iti, tad api vyabhicārān na pramāṇam. na hy avaśyaṃ rūpasāmy(amātr)ād rasādi tulyaṃ bhavati. evaṃ śeṣavaty api vatir na yujyate*. On Dharmakīrti's definition of the *śeṣavadanumāna*, see below, n. 127, pp. 102–105, and Steinkellner 1979: 114–116 n. 436.

[127] I.e., in PV 1.14 = PVin 2.66 and PVSV 10,19–23 ≈ PVin 2 92,7–12 (PVṬ *Ñe* D63a5–6/P75b5 = PVSVṬ 609,11–12; see Steinkellner 1979: 114–116): *kiṃ punar etac cheṣavat / yasyādarśanamātreṇa vyatirekaḥ pradarśyate / tasya saṃśayahetutvāc cheṣavat tad udāhṛtam // sa tasya vyatireko na niścita iti vipakṣe vṛttir āśaṅkyeta / vyatirekāsādhanasyādarśanamātrasya saṃśayahetutvāt / na sarvānupalabdhir gamikā /*. "But what does this [inference] 'with a remainder' consist in? The [reason] whose absence [in the dissimilar instances] is established by mere non-cognition is named 'with a remainder,' because it is a cause of doubt. Since the absence of this [reason in the dissimilar instances] is not ascertained, one may suspect that it occurs in the dissimilar instances, for mere non-cognition, which does not [successfully] prove absence, is a cause of doubt. [Indeed,] not every [kind of] non-perception is conclusive." In light of this definition, the parallel discussion in PVin 2 72,10–11 makes it very clear why the argument of Dharmakīrti's opponent must be termed *śeṣavat*: *ekadeśāvisaṃvādanam apy āgamalakṣaṇam āhuḥ / tad vipakṣe 'darśanamātrād avyabhicārāsiddhyāniścitārtham /*. "[Certain theorists] claim that the reliability of one part [of a scripture] is the definition of scripture. [But] since non-deviation [can]not [be] established through the mere non-cognition [of the reason] in the dissimilar instances, this [argument] is uncertain." See Steinkellner 1979: 77–78 and nn. 251–253.

[128] The opponent now objects that Dignāga, in PS 2.5ab, has also made use of partial reliability (*ekadeśāvisaṃvādana*) as a definition of scripture (PVṬ *Ñe* D63a6/P75b5–7 ≈ PVSVṬ 609,12–16). On PS 2.5ab and Dharmakīrti's interpretation of it, see below, pp. 85–100.

[129] I.e., Dharmakīrti has indeed at least implied that the definition of scripture consists in partial reliability (*ekadeśāvisaṃvādirūpam āgamalakṣaṇam*) in his explanation of PS 2.5ab (see above, n. 128), stating that "this human being cannot live without re-

ever, this [is justified only] if, for every object capable of being examined, there is correctness (*viśuddhi*) of positive and negative assertions by appropriate means of valid cognition.[130] [And] even if there is no necessary relation between words and [their] meanings [, which would ensure the validity of scripture], it is better that a [person] act in [a state of] doubt [when it comes to matters relating to worldly prosperity and salvation]; for [scripture] may occasionally be reliable in this case.[131] But in the opposite case,[132] a human being who has observed a conflict with a means of valid cognition would not [be justified] in act-

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sorting to the authority of scripture" (PVSV 108,2–3: *nāyaṃ puruṣo 'nāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsitum samarthaḥ*; PVṬ *Ñe* D63a6–7/P75b7–8 ≈ PVSVṬ 609,16–19). On PVSV 108,2–3 and Dharmakīrti's interpretation of PS 2.5ab, see below, pp. 85–100, and above, pp. 18–21. In PVSV 173,26–174,2, Dharmakīrti is going to show that his own and his opponent's accounts of *ekadeśāvisaṃvādana* are methodologically very different; for Dharmakīrti's version is not based on the truth of scripture about a single trivial matter (*atyantaprasiddhaikaviṣayasatyatāśraya*; PVṬ *Ñe* D63a6–7/P75b7–8 ≈ PVSVṬ 609,16–19).

130 I.e., according to PV 1.215 and PVSV 108,16–109,4, by perception and the two types of inference. The establishment of a positive assertion (*vidhisiddhi*) functions as follows: That which is recognized (*abhimata*) as perceptible (*pratyakṣaviṣaya*) in the treatise (*śāstra*) under consideration must indeed be perceptible, e.g., cognition (*buddhi*) as understood in Buddhist doctrine (*bauddhasiddhānte*); that which is recognized as an object of an inference based on the reality of entities (*vastubalāyātānumānaviṣaya*; *āgamānapekṣānumānaviṣaya*) must indeed be inferable by an inference of that type, e.g., the Truth of Suffering (*duḥkhasatya*); that which is recognized as an object of a scripturally based inference (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*; see Eltschinger 2007a: 105–109, and Moriyama, forthcoming; see also above, p. 55 n. 97) must indeed be inferable by an inference of that type. The establishment of a negation (*pratiṣedhasiddhi*) functions as follows: That which is recognized as not being the object of perception, an "objective" inference, or a "scriptural" inference must be imperceptible, non-"objectively" inferable, and non-"scripturally" inferable. (PVṬ *Ñe* D63b1–4/P76a2–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 609,22–27.) See below, pp. 86–87. For a translation of PV 1.215/PVSV 108,16–109,4, see Yaita 1987: 7–8, Dunne 2004: 362–363, and Eltschinger 2007a: 221–224.

131 I.e., in the case of scripture that has not been observed to err (*adṛṣṭavyabhicāra*) in regard to empirically verifiable matters (PVṬ *Ñe* D63b5/P76a7–8 ≈ PVSVṬ 609,29–30). See PV 1.213 and PVSV 107,19–108,6 (Yaita 1987: 6–7, Dunne 2004: 361, Eltschinger 2007a: 217–220) and above, pp. 43–44 n. 49.

132 I.e., in the case of a scripture that can be proved not to possess the aforementioned reliability in regard to empirically verifiable matters, i.e., the necessary correctness (**viśuddhi*; PVṬ *Ñe* D63b5–6/P76a8–b2).

ing. But he who, pointing out that the statement (*abhidhāna*) that fire – an object [accessible] to ordinary persons – has the capacity to eliminate cold, is veracious, declares the entire treatise [known as the Veda] to be veracious, though it is mostly incorrect due to [its] being contradicted by the means of valid cognition even in regard to something that can be determined – [such a person's audacity knows no bounds].

> [The Veda] says that a permanent soul is the agent [of action], [indeed] that there are permanent entities, [and] that supersensible [things] are sensible. [It declares] a wrong cause, a wrong duration as well as a [wrong] cessation of entities, or [puts forward yet] other [things] whose possibility[133] (*gocara*) is excluded by the two means of valid cognition or contradicted by inference based on scripture. He who would pretend that [such a treatise] is veracious without having set aside [its] contradictions and without exhibiting the purpose of the treatise, would surpass an unchaste woman in audacity.[134] (PV 1.332–334)

The Veda declares that a soul (*puṃs*), which neither loses its former nature nor assumes a new one, [i.e., which is permanent] is successively the agent of [good and bad] deeds and the experiencer of the fruits of [those] deeds. [It is supposedly the experiencer] due to being the inherence cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) [of pleasant and unpleasant sensations,] and [the agent] due to assuming the supervision (*adhiṣṭhāna*) [of bodily actions], etc.[135] And this has repeatedly been shown

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[133] *gocara* is explained as *avakāśa* in PVṬ *Ñe* D64a5/P77a2 ≈ PVSVṬ 610,22–23.

[134] For a parallel passage, see TS$_K$ 2775/TS$_Ś$ 2774 and TSP$_K$ 736,4–18/TSP$_Ś$ 892,13–893,10.

[135] Although Dharmakīrti's intention in PV 1.332a and PVSV 174,14–16 remains unclear, these two passages seem to target primarily Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika ideas regarding the self. (1) The concept of inherence cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) is at home in Vaiśeṣika, as is the description of the self as a *samavāyikāraṇa*. On the *samavāyikāraṇa* in general, see VSū 1.1.14 and DPŚ 91 (Miyamoto 2007: 26); on *samavāya* and *samavāyikāraṇa* in connection with the self, see VSū 10.1 (*ātmasamavāyaḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ*) and especially DPŚ 10 (Miyamoto 2007: 10: **ka ātmā? yo buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnasaṃskāradharmādharmāṇāṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ jñānotpādanalakṣaṇaṃ sa evātmā* /. "What is the self? The self is that which is the inherence cause of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, residual traces, merit, and demerit, [and which is] characterized as producing cognition"). Here is the

Vaiśeṣika's classic statement regarding the inference of the self (VSū 3.2.4): *prāṇāpāṇanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni* /. "The marks of the self are breathing in and out, closing and opening [the eyes], life, the movements of the mental organ, and the transformations of the other sense organs; pleasure and pain; desire and aversion; and effort." (On this *sūtra* see, e.g., Preisendanz 1994: 263–274 and Oetke 1988: 319–322 and 334–340.) Now, Praśastapāda seems to divide these inferential marks into two categories: those that allow one to infer the self as a supervisor (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*) and those that are the marks of a property-possessor (*guṇin*), i.e., an inherence cause. Here are Praśastapāda's remarks as regards the first inference (PDhS 15,8–10): *śarīrasamavāyinībhyāṃ ca hitāhitaprāptiparihārayogyābhyāṃ pravṛttinivṛttibhyāṃ rathakarmaṇā sārathivat prayatnavān vigrahasyādhiṣṭhātānumīyate, prāṇādibhiś ceti.* "[The self] is inferred [as] the body's supervisor endowed with effort from the undertaking [of action] and abstaining [from it], which inhere in the body [and] are suitable for obtaining what is useful and rejecting what is harmful, just as a charioteer [is inferred] from the action of the chariot. And [the self is also inferred thus] through breath, etc." (See Oetke 1988: 279, arguments no. 3 and 4.) And here are his views regarding the second inference (PDhS 16,3–4): *sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnaiś ca guṇair guṇy anumīyate.* "And [the self] is inferred [as] a property-possessor from the properties that are pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort." (See Oetke 1988: 280, argument no. 9; to be compared with NSū 1.1.10: *icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam* /. "The marks of the self are desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain, [and] cognitions.") Thus, whereas the first inference (→*adhiṣṭhātṛ*) seems to be concerned with the self as an agent (*kartṛ*) inasmuch as it presides over bodily actions, the second one (→*guṇin*, i.e. *samavāyikāraṇa*; note VSū 1.1.5: *buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś ca guṇāḥ* /, and VSū 1.1.14: *kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam* /) seems to deal with the self as an experiencer (*bhoktṛ*) inasmuch as it experiences pleasure and pain, but also – and this has eschatological consequences – merit and demerit (*dharmādharma*, see PDhS 16,7–8: *tasya guṇā buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharma*°, and DPŚ 10, quoted above). In other words, the self is an agent in that it supervises bodily action and an experiencer in that it is the inherence cause of pleasant and unpleasant sensations as well as merit and demerit. (2) While explaining PVSV 174,14–16, Karṇakagomin quotes three half-verses that recur at the beginning of Śāntarakṣita's examination of the Vaiśeṣikas' *and* Naiyāyikas' conception of the self as well as in Prajñākaramati's BCAP. Here are $TS_{K/Ś}$ 171–173: *anye punar ihātmānam icchādīnāṃ samāśrayam / svato 'cidrūpam icchanti nityaṃ sarvagataṃ tathā // śubhāśubhānāṃ kartāraṃ karmaṇāṃ tatphalasya ca / bhoktāraṃ cetanāyogāc cetanaṃ na svarūpataḥ // jñānayatnādisambandhaḥ kartṛtvaṃ tasya bhaṇyate / sukhaduḥkhādisaṃvittisamavāyas tu bhoktṛtā //*. "However others admit that the self is the substrate (*samāśraya*) of desire, etc., while not consisting of consciousness by itself, that it is permanent and omnipresent, that it is the agent of acts [both] good and bad, and the experiencer of the fruit of these [acts and, finally,] that it is conscious due to its association with consciousness, but not by nature. Its con-

nection with cognition, effort, etc., is called its agency, whereas the inherence of the awareness of pleasure, pain, and so forth [in the self] is [its] being an experiencer." Prajñākaramati introduces the two stanzas of the TS he quotes (= $TS_{K/Ś}$ 171–172) as follows ($BCAP_{Sh}$ 327,7–13/$BCAP_{LVP}$: 295,17–23): *tatra naiyāyikās tāvan nityaṃ*[a] *sarvagataṃ pratiprāṇibhinnam acetanaṃ*[b] *cetanāyogāt tu cetanaṃ sukhādiguṇādhāraṃ śubhāśubhkarmakartāraṃ tatphalopabhoktāraṃ paralokinaṃ cātmānam icchanti / naiyāyikavad vaiśeṣikā api / tad uktam /.* [a] *nityaṃ* $BCAP_{LVP}$: *nitya-* $BCAP_{Sh}$; [b] *pratiprāṇibhinnam acetanaṃ* $BCAP_{LVP}$: *pratiprāṇibhinnacetanaṃ* $BCAP_{Sh}$. "In this regard, first of all the Naiyāyikas admit that the self is permanent, omnipresent, distinct according to each living being, not conscious [by nature] and yet conscious because of [its] association with consciousness; [it is] the substrate (*ādhāra*) of the properties pleasure, etc., the agent of actions [whether] good or bad, the experiencer of the fruit of these [actions], and it transmigrates to another world. Like the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas too [admit this]; this has been said in [the following two stanzas]." As we can see, both Śāntarakṣita and Prajñākaramati hold these ideas to be common to Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. These conceptions form the background of Karṇakagomin's explanation (PVSVṬ 611,7–12) of PVSV 174,14–16: *kena prakāreṇa bhoktā kartā cety āha / pūrvakarmajanitasukhaduḥkhādisaṃvittiṃ prati samavāyikāraṇabhāvenātmā karmaphalānām*[a] *bhoktā*[b] */ tad uktam – sukhaduḥkhādisaṃvittisamavāyas tu bhoktṛteti / śubhāśubhakarmakaraṇe jñānaprayatnādikaṃ praty adhiṣṭhānabhāvenātmā karmaṇāṃ*[c] *kartā / tad uktam – jñānayatnādisambandhaḥ*[d] *kartṛtvaṃ tasya bhaṇyata iti / ādigrahaṇād / jaḍarūpasyāpy ātmanaś cetanāyogena bhoktṛtvaṃ gṛhyate / tad uktam – bhoktā ca cetanāyogāc cetanaṃ na svarūpata iti /.* [a] *karmaphalānām* em.*: karma phalānām* ed.; [b] *bhoktā* em.: *bhoktāḥ* ed.; [c] *karmaṇāṃ* em.: *karmaṇā* ed.; [d] *jñānayatnādisambandhaḥ* em.: *jñānādisambandhaḥ* ed. "[In order to explain] in what way [the self] is an experiencer and an agent [Dharmakīrti] says [that] the self is the experiencer of the fruits of actions insofar as it is the inherence cause with respect to the awareness of pleasure and pain, etc., which result from previous actions. This has been said in [the following stanza]: 'Whereas the inherence of the awareness of pleasure, pain, and so on [in the self] is [its] being an experiencer' (= $TS_{K/Ś}$ 173cd, above). [And] the self is the agent (*kartṛ*) of actions insofar as it assumes the supervision (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of cognition, effort, and so on in the performance of acts that are either good or bad. This has been said in [the following half-verse]: 'Its connection with cognition, effort, etc., is called its agency' (= $TS_{K/Ś}$ 173ab, above). And because of the word 'etc.', [we should] understand that the self is an experiencer although its nature is insentient, due to its association with consciousness. This has been said in [the following half-verse]: 'And [that] it is the experiencer [and, finally,] that it is conscious due to its association with consciousness, but not by nature (= $TS_{K/Ś}$ 172cd, above).'" Note, however, that Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ *Ñe* D64b3–6/P77b1–5) favors another explanation: *de la sems las byuṅ ba bsod nams daṅ bsod nams ma yin pa de'i 'phrod pa 'du ba can gyi rgyu ñid kyis byed pa po yin te / blo bdag la 'du ba daṅ ldan pa ñid kyi phyir ro // lus daṅ ṅag gi las byin gyis brlabs* (D: P *rlobs*) *pa'i ṅo bo byed pa po yin te / bdag ñid kyis brlabs pa'i lus daṅ ṅag dag ni raṅ gi bya ba rnams la 'jug pa'i phyir ro // … de*

to be incorrect.[136] And [the Veda also states] the permanence of certain entities, [which] is incorrect, because a non-momentary [entity] violates the criterion (*dharma*) of something real.[137] [Moreover, the Veda

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bźin du las kyi 'bras bu bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal dag gi 'phrod pa 'du ba'i rgyu ñid kyi phyir za ba po yin te / bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal ba dag ni bdag daṅ 'du ba daṅ ldan pa ñid kyi phyir ro // bde ba (P: D *lus*) *daṅ sdug bsṅal sgrub par byed pa mṅon par 'dod pa daṅ / mṅon par 'dod pa ma yin pa'i yul rnams byin gyis brlabs pa'i ṅo bo'i phyir za ba po yin no*. "Here, [the self] is an agent (**kartṛ*) inasmuch as it is the inherence cause (**samavāyikāraṇatvena*) of mental [factors] (**caitta*, **caitasika*) such as merit and demerit, [and this] because cognition (**buddhi*) inheres (**samavāyin*?) in the self. [And the self] is an agent in assuming the supervision (**adhiṣṭhānabhāvena*) of corporeal and verbal actions (**kāyavākkarman*), because [, insofar as they are] supervised by the self, body (**kāya*) and speech (**vāc*) proceed (**[pra]vṛtti*?) to their own [characteristic] actions (**svakriyā*?) … Similarly, [the self] is an experiencer (**bhoktṛ*) because it is the inherence cause of the pleasant and unpleasant results of actions (**sukhaduḥkhakarmaphala*), [i.e.,] because pleasure and pain (**sukhaduḥkha*) inhere (**samavāyin*?) in the self. [The self] is an experiencer because it assumes the supervision of [psycho-physical activities with regard to those] desirable and undesirable things (**viṣaya*) that are the means of realizing (**sādhana*) pleasure and pain." Thus, according to Karṇakagomin the self's being an agent is to be explained in terms of *adhiṣṭhāna*, whereas its being an experiencer is to be accounted for in terms of *samavāyikāraṇa*. But according to Śākyabuddhi, the self's being an agent and the self's being an experiencer are *both* to be explained in terms of both *samavāyikāraṇa* and *adhiṣṭhāna*. (Although he does not allude to *adhiṣṭhāna* in this context, Uddyotakara too accounts for both *kartṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva* in terms of *samavāya* in NV 337,14–15 ad NSū 3.1.6: *kiṃ punar idaṃ kartṛtvaṃ kiṃ vā bhoktṛtvam iti jñānacikīrṣāprayatnānāṃ samavāyaḥ kartṛtvaṃ sukhaduḥkhasaṃvitsamavāyo bhoktṛtvam.* "[But] how (*kim*) [to account for the self's] being an agent, and (*vā*) how [to account for its] being an experiencer? The inherence of cognition, desire to act, and effort is [the self's] being an agent; the inherence of the awareness of pleasure and pain is [the self's] being an experiencer." For other statements regarding the self as an agent due to its *adhiṣṭhāna*, see SK 17 and ŚV *ātmavāda* 76.

[136] I.e., by Dharmakīrti (*śāstrakāra*) himself while demonstrating the impossibility of causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāvāsambhava*) for permanent things, and by his coreligionists (**svayūthya*, most probably Vasubandhu) in their own treatises (**svaśāstra*; compare PVṬ *Ñe* D64b6/P77b6–7 and PVSVṬ 611,17). For references to Dharmakīrti's PVSV and PVin 2 as well as Vasubandhu's KSP and more ancient Yogācāra and Sautrāntika sources, see Yoshimizu 1999. See also below, n. 137.

[137] I.e., causal efficiency (*arthakriyāvirodha*). According to Dharmakīrti (see, e.g., PV 1.166ab and PVSV 84,5–6) to be a real entity (*vastu*) is to be causally efficient (*arthakriyāsamartha*). Something non-momentary (*akṣaṇika*) could not have any causal efficiency (because it could not produce an effect either successively or at once

says that things which are] indeed strictly imperceptible, such as universals,[138] are perceptible, and [declares] a wrong origination, duration, and cessation of entities: [Indeed, it proclaims that something] which initially is not an agent [and which, being permanent,] cannot receive [any] new property (*viśeṣa*), can generate [an effect] through dependence on [something] else;[139] [that something] whose nature is no [longer] to be brought about since it has [already] been completed [by its own causes can] last by virtue of a substratum [upon which it depends];[140] and [that entities] perish due to a cause,[141] etc. [The Veda states] yet other [things] which are contrary to what is established by perception and inference and are negated by inference based on scripture, such as the capacity of the Agnihotra and [ablutions] to purify one of sin, etc.[142] [He who,] failing to set aside the contradictions of the

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[*kramayaugapadya*]), hence it could not be something real (PVṬ *Ñe* D64b7–65a1/ P77b7–78a1 ≈ PVSVṬ 611,19–21). See Yoshimizu 1999.

[138] For additional examples of (pseudo-)things erroneously held to be perceptible by Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika authors, see PVSV 108,22–24 and Yaita 1987: 8, Dunne 2004: 362–363, Eltschinger 2007a: 222–223 and n. 25; see also PVṬ *Ñe* D65a1/ P78a1–2 = PVSVṬ 611,21–22, and above, p. 20.

[139] I.e., a cooperating factor (*sahakārin*; PVṬ *Ñe* D65a3/P78a4–5 = PVSVṬ 611,26).

[140] That which depends on nothing (*sarvanirāśaṃsasya*; *thams cad la ltos pa med par grub pa*) cannot last (*sthāna*) by force of something else (*anyabalena*; compare PVṬ *Ñe* D65a5/P78a7–8 with PVSVṬ 611,29–30). See SPV 270,5–8 on SP 3cd (*saṃś ca sarvanirāśaṃso bhāvaḥ katham apekṣate*; see Vibh 410 n. 8): *yod na yaṅ kun la rag ma las te / raṅ gi ṅo bo thams cad skyes pa bltos pa med pa'i dṅos po bltos pa gaṅ gis na 'brel par 'gyur ba ji ltar bltos pa yin* /. "Wenn [das betreffende Ding] dagegen etwas Seiendes ist, durch welche Bedingtheit kann dann ein vollkommen unabhängiges Ding, d.h. (ein Ding), das seinem ganzen Wesen nach entstanden und daher nicht bedingt ist, verbunden sein; wieso kann es bedingt sein?" Translation Frauwallner 1934: 284.

[141] I.e., due to a cause of destruction (*vināśahetu*; PVṬ *Ñe* D65a6/P78a8–b1 = PVSVṬ 611,31). According to Dharmakīrti destruction is without a cause (*nirhetukatvaṃ vināśasya*; PVSVṬ 612,6) or incompatible with the fact of having a cause (*rgyu daṅ ldan pa ñid du 'gal ba*; PVṬ *Ñe* D65a6/P78b1). On Dharmakīrti's *vināśitvānumāna*, see Sakai 2011.

[142] This refers back to PVSV 109,1–3 (see Yaita 1987: 8, Dunne 2004: 363, Eltschinger 2007a: 105–109 and 223, and below, pp. 77–78 nn. 172 and 174). If a given treatise teaches that sin or demerit (*adharma*) consists in defilements such as desire (*rāgādirūpa*) and the actions born of them (*tatprabhavaṃ karma*), it cannot prescribe practices such as the *agnihotra* and ablutions (*tīrthasnāna*) as means of eliminating

pramāṇas in the entire body of the treatise[143] [and] failing to exhibit [that it has] the properties of a [sound] treatise,[144] viz., [its] expressing [internal] consistency, appropriate means, and a human purpose,[145]

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demerit or increasing merit (*dharmavṛddhi*; PVṬ *Ñe* D65b2/P78b6, to be compared with PVSVṬ 612,10). For such practices, since they do not counteract the causes (*nidāna*) of demerit (especially nescience [*avidyā*]), cannot remove it; and since they do not consist in the the absence of greed (*alobha*) or the actions born of it, they cannot increase merit (PVṬ *Ñe* D65b3–5/P78b6–79a2 ≈ PVSVṬ 612,11–15). Looking for this kind of internal contradiction (*pūrvāparavirodhacintā*) is the only thing a cognitively limited person (*arvāgdarśin*) can do to assess the statements regarding supersensible matters of the treatise under scrutiny. This is what Dharmakīrti calls an "inference based on scripture" (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*, see above, p. 55 n. 97). On Dharmakīrti's threefold analysis, see above, p. 64 n. 130, and below, pp. 86–87 and n. 15.

143 I.e., in regard to matters (*vastu*) taught by the treatise, which are threefold (*trividha*): those that bear on perceptible things, those that pertain to things "objectively" inferable, and those concerning things "scripturally" inferable (PVṬ *Ñe* D65b5/P79a2–3 = PVSVṬ 612,16–17). Dharmakīrti's notion of *pratisamādhāna* (PVSV 174,25; see also PVṬ *Ñe* D64a7/P77a5–6 = PVSVṬ 610,27–28 and PVṬ *Ñe* D65b5–6/P79a3 = PVSVṬ 612,17) is likely to echo the VY's *codyaparihāra*. According to Vasubandhu an apt commentator of the Buddhist sūtras (*sūtrārthavādin*), after having indicated the purpose (*prayojana*) of the sūtra, provided a summary (*piṇḍārtha*) of it, explained the meaning of the words (*padārtha*), and explicated the connection (*anusandhi*) of its various parts, should formulate hypothetical objections and *refute* them (*codyaparihāra*; see Cabezón 1992: 237–238 n. 16, Skilling 2000: 318–319, and Verhagen 2008). What Dharmakīrti's opponent fails to do is to refute the objections raised against the Veda by the application of *pramāṇa*s.

144 I.e., the properties which are causes of one's engagement with a treatise (*śāstre pravṛttyaṅgabhūtā dharmāḥ*; PVṬ *Ñe* D65b6/P79a3–4 = PVSVṬ 612,17–18). These three properties (see below, n. 145) constitute the purpose of the treatise (*śāstrārtha*) alluded to in PV 1.334b (PVṬ *Ñe* D64a7–b1/P77a5 = PVSVṬ 610,28–29).

145 This refers back to PV 1.214 and PVSV 108,6–16; see Yaita 1987: 7, Dunne 2004: 361–362, and Eltschinger 2007a: 102–104 and 220–221. Here, Dharmakīrti formulates the three properties that a treatise must possess in order to be qualified for the evaluation of its reliability (< *parīkṣādhikṛta*), namely, (1) internal consistency (*sambandha*, *sambaddhatā*, *saṅgatārthatā*), i.e., the mutual subordination (*aṅgāṅgībhāva*) of its statements, or the fact that its statements (*vākya*) converge towards a single meaning (*ekārthopasaṃhāra*, *mīlana*; PVṬ *Ñe* D65b6–7/P79a4–5 ≈ PVSVṬ 612,19–20); (2) the existence of appropriate means (*anuguṇopāya*) for attaining its purpose, such as the cultivation of selflessness (*nairātmyabhāvanā*, TSP$_K$ 877,24–25/TSP$_Ś$ 1062,21–22; PVṬ *Ñe* D65b7/P79a5–6 = PVSVṬ 612,20–21); (3) the indication of a human purpose (*puruṣārthābhidhāyakatva*), such as heaven (*svarga*), liberation (*apavarga*), worldly prosperity (*abhyudaya*), or the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*;

[and even] wishing to prove, just by [resorting to] the [occasional] truthful indication of something trivial, that the Veda which says these things is equally faultless when it comes to [those] profundities which can scarcely be penetrated by great insight – he surpasses the unchaste woman in audacity. There was (*kila*) a certain unchaste woman who was reproached by [her] husband after catching [her] in the act of adultery (*vipratipattisthāna*). She answered him: "Behold, mothers,[146] the faithlessness (*vaiparītya*) of [this] man! Rather than putting his trust in me, [his] lawful wife,[147] he puts it in those two water-bubbles he calls his eyes! Though I was propositioned by this old, one-eyed village wood gatherer,[148] I never (*na*) had sex [with him]. Indeed, because I am attached to [your] beauty and virtues, I [only] love [you, this] young man who is chief among ministers.[149]" Of this sort[150] is [our adversary's] inference, by means of the statement that fire counteracts cold, that [the Veda] is also reliable with regard to the imperceptible, even though it is seen to be contradicted by the means of valid cognition![151]

PVṬ *Ñe* D65b7–66a1/P79a6 = PVSVṬ 612,21–22). See also PVṬ *Ñe* D66a1–3/P79a7–b1 = PVSVṬ 612,24–27.

[146] For an explanation of the form *mātaḥ* (= *mātaraḥ*), see PVSVṬ 613,12–17.

[147] According to PVṬ *Ñe* D66a7/P79b7–8 ≈ PVSVṬ 613,17–18, *dharmapatnī* is to be analyzed as follows: *dharmasya sādhanabhūtā patnī dharmapatnīti madhya[ma]-padalopī samāsaḥ*[a] /. [a] PVṬ reads *mar gyi bum pa źes bya ba la sogs pa lta bu'o* after *samāsaḥ*, i.e., **tailaghaṭa ityādivat.* "A wife who is the means of accomplishing duty is a lawful wife. [This is] a compound that omits the middle word, PVṬlike *tailaghaṭa*PVṬ."

[148] "Old" (*jarat*) points to the lack of vigour (*vayovaikalya*); "one-eyed" (*kāṇa*), to ugliness (*vairūpya*, because the eye is the supreme locus of beauty, *paraṃ rūpasthānaṃ cakṣuḥ*); "of the village" (*grāmya*), to the lack of qualities such as skillfulness (*vaidagdhyādiguṇavaikalya*); "wood gatherer" (*kāṣṭhahāraka*), to poverty (*dāridrya*; PVṬ *Ñe* D66b2/P80a2–3 = PVSVṬ 613,20–22).

[149] "Beauty" (*rūpa*) points to elegance (*prāsādikatva*); "virtues" (*guṇa*), to skillfulness, etc. (*vaidagdhyādi*); "young man" (*dāraka*), to vigour (*vayas*); "chief among ministers" (*mantrimukhya*), to power (*aiśvarya*; PVṬ *Ñe* D66b5–7/P80a7–b1 ≈ PVSVṬ 613,28–614,7).

[150] I.e., like the unchaste woman's reply (PVṬ *Ñe* D67a5/P81a1 = PVSVṬ 614,8–9).

[151] PVṬ *Ñe* D67a7–b4/P81a4–b2 ≈ PVSVṬ 614,14–19: *tatra dharmapatnīsthānīyo vedaḥ / vipratipattitulyaṃ nityasya puṃsaḥ kartṛtvādyabhidhānam / netratulye pratyakṣānumāne / na ca dṛṣṭavyabhicārāyāḥ patnyā vacanaṃ garīyas tasya puruṣasya*

> [152]If [the entire Veda] were to be established as a means of valid cognition in this way, then what in this [world] would not be a means of valid cognition? Indeed, for [any] person who says lots of things there is [at least] one veracious [statement]. (PV 1.335)

Just as always (*atyantam*) saying what is true is extremely difficult,[153] so also is always saying what is not true. In that case, if due to the fact

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yena [sva]yaṃ vipratipattiṃ dṛṣṭvāpi svadarśanam apramāṇīkṛtya tasyā vacanaṃ yathārthaṃ kuryāt / evaṃ vedoktārthabādhakayoḥ pramāṇayor aprāmāṇyaṃ kṛtvā na vedasya patnīsthānīyasya dṛṣṭavyabhicārasya vacanād atyantaparokṣaṃ pratipadyemahīti /. "Here, the Veda is represented by the lawful wife. To claim, for example, that a permanent soul is the agent [of deeds], is similar to the crime [of adultery]. As for [the two *pramāṇa*s] perception and inference, they are similar to the [husband's] eyes. And it is not the case that for this man the words of [his] wife whose transgression [he has] witnessed (*dṛṣṭa*) are of greater weight [than his own eyes], so that, even though he has himself witnessed [her] crime, he should disregard the evidence of his own vision (*svadarśanam apramāṇīkṛtya*) and consider her words veracious. Thus, we cannot, considering the two *pramāṇa*s that contradict the things said in the Veda to be invalid (*aprāmāṇyaṃ kṛtvā*), know that which is transcendent from a statement of the Veda – [here] representing the wife – whose unreliability has been [duly] witnessed." See also Śākyabuddhi's additional explanations in PVṬ *Ñe* D67b1–3/P81a5–8. Earlier in this passage Śākyabuddhi already provided a lengthy explanation of Dharmakīrti's intention; see PVṬ *Ñe* D66b7–67a5/P80b2–81a1. One can understand Dharmakīrti's image as follows: (1) The husband's eyes catch the wife *in flagrante delicto*. ≈ The two *pramāṇa*s find the Veda to be mistaken. (2) The wife replies, in order to deny her guilt: ≈ (The opponent has) the Veda answer, in order to deny its erroneousness: (3) I wasn't unfaithful to you, don't trust your ("water-bubble") eyes. ≈ The Veda isn't wrong, don't trust your *pramāṇa*s! (4) Since everybody admits that one cannot have sex with a stupid, poor, ugly old man, what I say is true, I wasn't unfaithful to you. ≈ Since everybody admits that fire is a remedy for cold, what the Veda says is true, not erroneous. (5) In the same way as I am truthful on this point, I am to be trusted when I say that I love you, who are young, handsome, talented, and rich. ≈ In the same way as the Veda is truthful about empirical matters, it is to be trusted when it concerns transcendent things.

[152] In PV 1.335 and PVSV 175,7–10, Dharmakīrti points out another fault in his opponent's argument (PVṬ *Ñe* D67b4–5/P81b2 = PVSVṬ 614,20).

[153] According to Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ *Ñe* D67b6–7/P81b5–6) Dharmakīrti says "extremely difficult" (*atiduṣkara*) and not "totally impossible" (**atyantāsambhava*), because always saying what is true can indeed be achieved by those who have eliminated all the obstructions (**prahīṇasarvāvaraṇa*) and by those who have completely incorpo-

that [just] one statement [made by a person] is somehow[154] reliable, the rest of his statements, which are vast in number, were like that [i.e., reliable, then] there would be no person who would not be trustworthy.

[155]Moreover,

> This audible sound (*dhvani*) [which rests and originates] in the speaker is neither the nature nor the effect of the entities [expressed by it].[156] Now, apart from these two [logical reasons] there is nothing [else that might come into consideration] that does not deviate. (PV 1.336)

First, speech is not the nature of the [things] signified [by it], nor is it their effect, either; for it exists merely due to the speaker's intention even when these [things] are absent. Now, there is no other [kind of logical reason] for something [than these two] that does not deviate. And since, there being a deviation, a [word] could also occur otherwise (*tato 'nyathāpi*) [i.e., in the absence of that which is signified by it], the

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rated compassion (*sñiṅ rje goms par gyur pa can*, **karuṇāsātmībhūta*), i.e., Buddhas and higher Bodhisattvas.

154 I.e., according to PVṬ *Ñe* D68a1/P81b7–8 = PVSVṬ 614,26–27, "after the manner of the crow and the palm-fruit," (*kākatālīya*; see Monier-Williams 1963: 266[c] s.v.), i.e., completely accidentally.

155 In PVSV 175,10–176,12, Dharmakīrti leaves the question of *ekadeśāvisaṃvādana* and returns, first (PV 1.336–338/PVSV 175,10–176,4), to the issue of the relation between words and meanings introduced at PV 1.213/PVSV 107,19 (see below, p. 75 n. 162), and second (PV 1.339/PVSV 176,5–12), to the issue of non-perception which provided the original impetus for his excursus on scriptural authority (PVSV 107,14–176,4; see below, p. 75 n. 162). According to Dharmakīrti (see above, PVSV 172,20–22 and p. 59 n. 113) a relation between word and meaning could only consist in their identity (*tādātmya*, *tādrūpya*, *tatsvabhāvatā*) or in one's causing the other (*tadutpatti*), for something makes something known (*gamaka*) only if it has the same nature as that thing or is produced by it (*tatsvabhāvas tajjanyo vā san*), but not otherwise (*nānyathā*; PVṬ *Ñe* D68a3/P82a2–3 = PVSVṬ 615,10–11).

156 I.e., the audible sound, which has the speaker (*vaktṛ*) for its cause (*nimitta*; PV 1.336b *vaktari* is analyzed as a locative indicating the *nimitta*, PVṬ; note also PVṬ *Ñe* D68a4/P82a4 = PVSVṬ 615,13: *yasmād vaktari [s]ati dhvanir bhavati*), is related to the speaker's intention only (*icchāmātrapratibaddha*); it does not depend on the entities signified (*vācyavastu*) by it (compare PVṬ *Ñe* D68a5/P82a4–5 with PVSVṬ 615,14–15).

understanding of the [thing signified] cannot be due to the presence of that [word].

> Objection: [157][Words are indirectly the effects of the things signified, for] the occurrence[158] of [these] signifiers is caused by the perceptual cognition of the [things] signified. (PV 1.337ab)

Suppose the following [be urged]: Speech is indeed an effect, because the signifier occurs due to the perceptual cognition of the [thing] signified [, which in turn gives rise to the intention to express it. To this, we answer:] If it were so,

> how could this [occurrence of an utterance] present [, according to the scriptures considered,] mutually contradictory meanings concerning one [and the same thing]?[159] (PV 1.337cd)

If [there were] such a restriction that a word does not occur without the thing signified, [then] an utterance occurring in different doctrines would not attribute[160] contradictory natures [such as "permanent" and "impermanent"] to a single entity. It is indeed impossible that one [and the same entity such as a] sound could be [both] permanent and impermanent without [alternative] modes of being.[161]

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[157] The opponent now admits that there can be neither identity nor *direct* causality between words and meanings, but contends that an *indirect* causality (< *pāramparyeṇa vacanam arthakāryam*) between them obtains. Thus, signifiers being the indirect effects of things signified, the former still make the latter known (*gamaka*; PVṬ *Ñe* D68b2–3/P82b3–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 615,24–25). This indirect causality is accounted for as follows: thing signified (*vācyārtha*) → perceptual cognition (*darśana*) of it → speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*) → signifier (*vācaka*; PVṬ *Ñe* D68b3–4/P82b5 ≈ PVSVṬ 615,26–28).

[158] I.e., either in the form of physical production (*utpatti*), as a Vaiśeṣika or a Buddhist would conceive, or in the form of manifestation (*abhivyakti*), as a Mīmāṃsaka or a Grammarian would contend (PVṬ *Ñe* D68b3/P82b4 = PVSVṬ 615,25–26).

[159] I.e., it couldn't, for it would have to have the same meaning (*ekārtha*) in all the doctrinal systems (*sarvapravāda*) considered (PVṬ *Ñe* D68b5–6/P82b8 = PVSVṬ 616,11).

[160] On *upasaṃhāra* employed in a sense approximating *samāropa* (PVṬ *Ñe* D68b7/P83a2 = PVSVṬ 616,14–15), see BHSD 142[ab] s.v. *upasaṃharati* and *upasaṃhāra*.

[161] I.e., "without another aspect" (*prakārāntareṇa vinā*; PVṬ *Ñe* D69a1/P83a4 = PVSVṬ 616,16). According to Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ *Ñe* D69a1–2/P83a4–6) if one said "perma-

> [162]Therefore, scriptures necessarily related to entities are not in any way established for the [person] engaged in [religious] practice. How [then could this person ever] ascertain something through them? (PV 1.338)

It is the ignorant person who looks at scripture as a means of valid cognition in order to put into practice its teachings [, and this for two reasons: first,] because [those] who have thoroughly understood the truth[163] do not [need to] resort to the instruction [of others any longer]; and [second,] because the ignorant person cannot discriminate human beings whose [mental] qualities are inaccessible to the senses [and therefore he cannot recognize a trustworthy person].[164] Someone

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nent" with reference (*rjes su 'jug pas*) to the existence of a permanent aspect (**nitya-prakāra*) and "impermanent" on the basis of (**apekṣya*) a momentary phase (**kṣaṇa*), then there would be no fault; but to assert opposed properties (**viruddha-dharma*) without alternative modes of being (**niṣparyāyam*) is contradictory in regard to one and the same thing.

[162] After his long excursus on scriptural authority (PV 1.213–339/PVSV 107,14–176,4) Dharmakīrti now returns to the issue at stake in PVSV 107,14–25 (Yaita 1987: 5–6, Eltschinger 2007a: 217–218). In PV 1.199 and PVSV 101,23–102,8 (≈ PVin 2 65,1–9, see Steinkellner 1979: 62, Yaita 1985: 215–214) he had shown that the silence or non-operation (*nivṛtti*) of the three means of valid cognition (*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āgama*), i.e., mere non-perception (*anupalabdhimātreṇa*; PVSV 101,23; cf. *pramāṇa-trayanivṛttilakṣaṇā 'nupalabdhiḥ*; PVSV 176,7), does not allow one to establish the non-existence of an entity. In PVSV 107,14–17, an opponent attacks this conclusion and contends that the silence of scripture *does* allow one to establish the non-existence of an entity because scripture covers (*vy*$\sqrt{}$*āp*) all that exists. In PVSV 107,17–19, Dharmakīrti summarizes his previous arguments and then says (PV 1.213; for PVSV 107,22–25 [≈ PVin 2 66,4–7] thereon, see Yaita 1987: 6, Eltschinger 2007a: 218, and Steinkellner 1979: 65): *nāntarīyakatā'bhāvāc chabdānāṃ vastubhiḥ saha / nārthasiddhis tatas te hi vaktrabhiprāyasūcakāḥ //*. "Due to the absence of a necessary relation of words with things, one [can]not establish [i.e., ascertain] any object through them [i.e., words], because they [merely] indicate the speaker's intention."

[163] I.e., those who know the true nature of entities (*padārthānām aviparītaṃ rūpam*) and thus have thoroughly understood ultimate reality (*adhigataparamārtha*; PVṬ *Ñe* D69a5–6/P83b2–3 ≈ PVSVṬ 616,25–26).

[164] I.e., a cognitively limited person (*arvāgdarśin*) cannot distinguish (< *vibhāgakriyā*) whether someone is omniscient (*sarvajña*) or not, or whether someone says what is true (*avitathābhidhāyin*; PVṬ *Ñe* D69a6–7/P83b3–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 616,28–617,12). As a consequence, since he cannot ascertain this omniscient or veracious person's speech as being scripture (*āgamatvena*), this *arvāgdarśin* cannot engage in religious practice (PVṬ *Ñe* D69a7/P83b4–5). This refers back to PV 1.218–219 and PVSV

who sees that statements occur even in the absence of the desired meaning must indeed be beset with doubt – [asking himself,] "Is it true or not?" – even in the case of the discourse of people whose utterances have not been observed to deviate [from the truth]. Therefore, the [ignorant person] cannot ascertain anything by means of someone's statement.

> Therefore,[165] the non-existence of an entity [to be negated] is not established by the silence of [scripture] either. (PV 1.339ab)

[You] have stated [above] that non-perception defined as the silence of [scripture] proves non-existence. For everything falls within the scope of scripture, so that if something exists it will refer (*vṛtti*) [to it] in a reliable way.[166] [167][To this we reply:] Even if everything falls within its scope, this [ascertaining the non-existence of something] would be the case [only] if [scripture] were [indeed] silent when something does not exist. But that is not the case.[168] [Thus we have] stated that the [person] who wishes to engage in [religious] practice cannot establish [anything] through it [i.e., scripture].

> Therefore, it is not established that non-perception results in the ascertainment [of something] as non-existent. (PV 1.339cd)

109,24–110,15, where Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the contents of other persons' mental streams (*santāna*) are neither within the scope of (ordinary) perception (since they are supersensible) nor inferrable from physical and verbal behaviours (*kāyavāgvyavahāra*, since human beings are often seen to deliberately be-have in a deceptive way). See Yaita 1988: 434–435, Akimoto 1993, Dunne 2004: 366–368, and Eltschinger 2007a: 92–96 and 227–230.

[165] I.e., because of the impossibility of any ascertainment (*aniścaya*; PVṬ *Ñe* D69b3/P84a1 = PVSVṬ 617,20–21).

[166] See above, p. 75 n. 162.

[167] Rather than repeating the arguments put forward in PVSV 102,2–8 (e.g., the argument that scripture does not deal [*aviṣayīkaraṇa*] with matters not related to human goals [*puruṣārthāsambaddha*] and thus does not embrace all possible objects), Dharmakīrti here provisionally accepts that everything falls within the scope of scripture (PVṬ *Ñe* D69b5–6/P84a4–5 ≈ PVSVṬ 617,26–28).

[168] Because scripture also exists (*vṛtti*) independently of real entities (*vastv antareṇa*; PVṬ *Ñe* D69b7/P84a6–7 = PVSVṬ 618,6).

Therefore, the non-existence of [things] beyond the reach [of ordinary cognition] cannot be ascertained even if all three means of valid cognition [should] fail to operate.

> [169][Believing in the] authority of the Veda,[170] claiming something [permanent] to be an agent,[171] seeking merit in ablutions,[172] taking pride in one's caste,[173] and undertaking penance

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[169] Having shown throughout PV 1 that non-Buddhists (*tīrthika*) only talk nonsense (*ayuktābhidhāyitva*), Dharmakīrti concludes the work by pointing out, in a merely indicative way (*diṅmātram*), the five principal signs of their stupidity (*jāḍya*; compare PVṬ *Ñe* D70a2–3/P84b1–2 with PVSVṬ 618,12–13). That Dharmakīrti alludes to only five signs is a synecdoche (**upalakṣaṇa*), for the signs of the stupidity of the outsiders are innumerable (**aprameya*; PVṬ *Ñe* D70b6/P85a8–b1, to be compared with PVSVṬ 619,7–8).

[170] As the Brahmins do, thus revealing their own ignorance (**ajñāna*; PVṬ *Ñe* D70a3–4/P84b3–4). For grammatical explanations of the compound *vedaprāmāṇya*, see PVṬ *Ñe* D70a4–5/P84b4–6 = PVSVṬ 618,15–17.

[171] The words *kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ* can be interpreted in at least two ways. Śākyabuddhi interprets *kasyacit* as **ātmāder nityasya* (PVṬ *Ñe* D70a5/P84b6), thus understanding *kartṛ* as "agent" (see above, PV 1.332a and PVSV 174,14–16; see above, pp. 65–66): "claiming something [permanent] to be the agent [of deeds]." As for Karṇakagomin, he interprets *kasyacit* as *naiyāyikādeḥ* (PVSVṬ 618,18) and *kartṛ* as "creator" (*īśvaras tattvādīnāṃ karteti*; PVSVṬ 618,18): "someone's claiming that there is a creator [god]."

[172] Merit (*dharma*) consists in the absence of attachment (**sneha*), hostility (**dveṣa*), and error (**moha*), as well as the physical and verbal actions born of these mental factors (*tajjanitaṃ kāyavākkarma*). Now, ablutions consist in mere contact with water (*jalasaṃśleṣamātralakṣaṇa*) and thus cannot bring about merit (PVṬ *Ñe* D70a6–b1/P84b8–85a1 ≈ PVSVṬ 618,20–23). Although Dharmakīrti implies a critique of ablutions along these lines in PVSV 109,1–3 (see Yaita 1987: 8, Dunne 2004: 363, Eltschinger 2007a: 105–109, 223, and above, pp. 69–70 n. 142), Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin (ibid.) refer back to the "detailed refutations" (cf. *vistareṇa nirākṛtaḥ*) of *tīrthasnānavāda* by Ācārya Vasubandhu (in AKBh 282,8–9?) and other Buddhist masters. See La Vallée Poussin 1980: III.135 n. 2 and Eltschinger 2007a: 108 n. 126 for references.

[173] I.e., though devoid of qualities such as morality (*śīlādiguṇavaikalye 'pi*), someone takes pride in his caste by saying, "I am a Brahmin" (PVṬ *Ñe* D70b1/P85a1–2 ≈ PVSVṬ 618,24). Note PVṬ *Ñe* D70b2–3/P85a2–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 618,25–28: *[tathā hi brāhmaṇatvasāmānyaṃ gṛ]hītvā*[a] *jātivādāvalepaḥ syāt / brāhmaṇena pitrā brāhmaṇyā garbhe ya utpādas taṃ vā samāśritya / tatra vastubhūtasāmānyaniṣedhān na pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ / nāpy uttaraḥ / brāhmaṇabrāhmaṇīśarīrayor aśucisvabhāvatvena śarīrāntarād aviśeṣāt /*. [a] According to PVṬ *de ltar na bram ze ñid kyi spyi gzuṅ nas*.

to remove sin,[174] these are the five signs of complete stupidity devoid of any discrimination.[175] (PV 1.340)

"Indeed, one could take pride in one's caste either by accepting the universal 'Brahminhood' or by appealing to one's birth from a Brahmin father in the womb of a Brahmin woman. Among these [two possibilities] the first hypothesis is excluded (*na*), because real universals have been refuted [in the section devoted to *apoha*]. Nor is the second [hypothesis] sound, because the bodies of the Brahmin male and Brahmin woman do not differ from [any] other body in being of an impure nature." On Dharmakīrti's critique of caste, see PVSV 157,9–18 and Eltschinger 2000: 103–115; on the two arguments of Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin, see Eltschinger 2000: 139–140.

[174] I.e., tormenting one's own body (*śarīrapīḍana*) by practices such as fasting (*anaśanādi*; PVṬ *Ñe* D70b4/P85a5–6 = PVSVṬ 619,1). The stupidity of these undertakings is like that of ablutions (see above, p. 77 n. 172). The root cause (*nidāna*) of all evil (*pāpa*) consists of greed, hostility, and error (*lobhadveṣamoha*), which are mental factors. Undertaking physical penance (*santāpārambha*) is not contradictory (*aviruddha*) to these factors (i.e., to the causes of evil), hence it cannot purify one from evil (*pāpaśuddhi*; PVṬ *Ñe* D70b4–5/P85a6–7 ≈ PVSVṬ 619,2–4).

[175] I.e., devoid of rational knowledge (*nyāyānusārijñānarahita*), viz., of any knowledge that derives from the force of the *pramāṇa*s (*pramāṇabalaṃ vijñānam*; PVṬ *Ñe* D70b5–6/P85a7–8 = PVSVṬ 619,5–7).

Appendix: Philological Remarks

PVSV 166,20: read *jñānayāthātathyaṃ* (PVSV$_{\text{Tib}}$ D359b2/P526b5, PVṬ *Ñe* D49a4–5/P56b2, PVSVṬ 589,17).

PVSV 169,9: delete *vā* (PVSVṬ 596,28, Sāṅkṛtyāyana's edition of the *Svavṛtti* [596,5], PVṬ *Ñe* D54b5/P64a6). Note that PVSV$_{\text{Tib}}$ D361a5/P528b7 reads (*de dag*) *daṅ* (*gźan*).

PVSV 169,23 – PVSV$_{\text{Tib}}$ D361b2/P529a7 and PVṬ *Ñe* D56a1/P65b7–8 read *'jig rten gyi tha sñad las*, suggesting **lokavyavahārāt* instead of *lokāt* (PVSVṬ 598,16, Sāṅkṛtyāyana's edition of the *Svavṛtti* [598,2]).

PVSV 170,20–21 – °*mithyācāra*° (ms A, Sāṅkṛtyāyana's edition of the *Svavṛtti* [601,5]), against (1) °*maithunācāra*° (ms B, and probably PVSVṬ 601,23 [°*maithunācaraṇa*°], PVṬ *Ñe* D58a5/P68b8 [*'khrig pa spyod par byed*]), and (2) **°vivāhamithyācāra* (PVSV$_{\text{Tib}}$ D362a5/P530a6 [*bag mar len pa'i log pa'i spyod pa*]; cf. PVSV 125,23 and PVSV$_{\text{Tib}}$ D333b2/P493a3: *mātṛvivāha = ma bag mar len pa*).

PVSV 171,26: read *parīkṣyatām*.

PVSV 174,22: read *prasiddhaviparyayam* (PVSVṬ 612,7–8, PVSV$_{\text{Tib}}$ D364a6/P533a7, PVṬ *Ñe* D65a7/P78b2–3).

PVSV 175,8–9: read *saṃvādenāvaśiṣṭasya* (PVSV$_{\text{Tib}}$ D364b4/P533b8, PVṬ *Ñe* D68a2/P81b8).

Part 2 – Studies

HELMUT KRASSER

Logic in a Religious Context: Dharmakīrti in Defence of *āgama*[1]

1. INTRODUCTION

Contrary to what many have believed, Dharmakīrti's (~550)[2] view of scripture (*āgama*)[3] is unambiguous and clear.[4] In sharp contrast to Vasubandhu, who, in accordance with the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and other earlier Yogācāra texts, accepted three means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), namely, perception, inference, and – as the third – either the Buddha or the Sons of Buddha or their teaching,[5] and also in contrast to Dignāga, who accepted scripture as a means of valid cognition but subsumed it under inference, Dharmakīrti neither counts scripture as a separate means of valid cognition nor subsumes it under inference. For Dharmakīrti no scripture, including even the Buddhist teaching, is a

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[1] A short version of this paper was presented at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, September 1–5, 2009, Kyoto University.

[2] For the proposed date of ca. the middle of the sixth century for Dharmakīrti's time of activity, see Krasser 2012.

[3] The translation "scripture" for *āgama* is problematic (see Eltschinger 2007a: 17–20) and only adopted for want of a better one. *āgama* should also comprise, e.g., the eternal words of the Veda or the oral teachings of the Buddha or Mahāvīra that have been handed down without interruption.

[4] For a general overview of Dharmakīrti's philosophical thought, see Eltschinger 2010.

[5] See AKBh 76,22–23: *kiṃ kāraṇam / pramāṇābhāvāt / na hy eṣāṃ dravyato 'stitve kiñcid api pramāṇam asti* ***pratyakṣam anumānam āptāgamo*** *vā, yathā rūpādīnāṃ dharmānām iti /*; AKBh 460,2–3: *saddharmanītau tu punar* ***buddhā eva pramāṇaṃ buddhaputrāś*** *ca /*. See also BoBhū 25,19: ***pratyakṣam anumānam āptāgamaṃ pramāṇaṃ*** *niśritya*. For the acceptance of these three kinds of *pramāṇa*s in the VY, see Verhagen 2008; for their acceptance in other Yogācāra texts, see Eltschinger, forthcoming, n. 79.

means of valid cognition, and there can be no certainty based on scripture – quite a remarkable position for a Buddhist monk! The reason why this unambiguous understanding of scripture has not always been recognized as such is Dharmakīrti himself. He does not proclaim it very loudly – for, again, it entails that even the *buddhavacana* cannot be regarded as a *pramāṇa* – probably not only because it contradicts the definition of scripture given by Dignāga, but also because it was at odds with the attitude of the Buddhist community. Such a view certainly would not have been favoured by the spiritual authorities.

2. PVSV 108,1–109,22 ON PS 2.5ab

Dharmakīrti deals with Dignāga's definition of scripture in the context of his theory of concept formation and language, *apoha*. One of the cornerstones of his *apoha* theory, as formulated in PV 1.213, is that words have no connection with the external world; they can only make known the intention of the speaker, not external objects.[6] As this contradicts Dignāga's definition of scripture, immediately after explaining this verse in his *Svavṛtti* Dharmakīrti raises the following question in order to deal with this problem:[7]

> How then [should it be understood] when [Dignāga by his definition of *āptavāda*,] "The statement of a credible person is inference, because it is equal in not belying," said that scripture is inference?[8]

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[6] PV 1.213: *nāntarīyakatābhāvāc chabdānāṃ vastubhiḥ saha / nārthasiddhis tatas te hi vaktrabhiprāyasūcakāḥ //*. "Because words are not invariably concomitant with real entities (*vastu*), therefore [they] do not establish real entities (*artha*). For they make known [only] the speaker's intention."

[7] Dharmakīrti's treatment of Dignāga's *āptavāda* definition has been translated several times. For PV 1.213–217 with PVSV, see Yaita 1987 (included in Yaita 2005: 442–449); for PV 1.214–223 with PVSV, see Dunne 2004: 361–373; for PV 1.213–268 with PVSV, see Eltschinger 2007a: 217–385.

[8] PVSV 108,1–2: *yat tarhīdam* – ***āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā*** (PS 2.5ab) *ity āgamasyānumānatvam uktam*, *tat katham /*. A more accurate translation will be offered below. As I intend to deal with Dignāga's understanding of this definition elsewhere, in the following I will discuss only the problems related to Dharmakīrti's treatment of it. For (different) interpretations of PS 2.5ab, see Eltschinger 2007a: 70 (with n. 9), 218ff., and Lasic 2010.

Dharmakīrti devotes 4 verses with commentary to the solution of this problem, in which he provides two different interpretations of this definition.[9] Of these interpretations I will refer only to those statements that are necessary for my argumentation.

2.1. Why did Dignāga provide a definition of scripture?

Immediately following the posing of the above question Dharmakīrti tells us why we are in need of *āgama* at all.

> A person cannot live without relying on the validity of scripture because he has heard that in the case of certain [activities] the results of which cannot be perceived, engaging or not engaging [lead to] extremely praiseworthy or disastrous [results], and because he does not see anything that contradicts the presence of those [results]. Therefore [Dignāga] taught that the validity [of scripture] is due to a critical examination [of it, having in mind] "given that one has to proceed, it is better to proceed in such a way [i.e. critically examining the scripture][10]."[11]
>
> ... If that [treatise,] upon being examined, is not liable to making false assertions (*na ... visaṃvādabhāk*), [then] the one who proceeds might shine (*śobheta*)![12]

In other words: We do need religion because it is the only means to escape *saṃsāra*. Thus, we have to base our religious activities on *āgama*.

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[9] For a helpful synopsis and concise summary of this excursus on PS 2.5ab, see Yaita 1987: 2–3 and Dunne 2004: 240–241. For proposed changes, see below p. 100 n. 38.

[10] Cf. PVSVṬ 390,30–391,9: ***tat sati pravartitavye varam evam*** *āgamaṃ parīkṣya* ***pravṛtta ity*** *āgamasya* ***parīkṣayā prāmāṇyam āhā****cāryaḥ*.

[11] PVSV 108,2–6: *nāyaṃ puruṣo 'nāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsituṃ samarthaḥ, atyakṣaphalānāṃ keṣāñcit pravṛttinivṛttyor mahānuśaṃsāpāyaśravaṇāt*[a] *tadbhāve virodhādarśanāc ca. tat sati pravartitavye varam evaṃ pravṛtta iti parīkṣayā prāmāṇyam āha*.

[a] °*āpāya*° PVSV$_{ms}$ 25a2 (TSP 4,22–23; PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 140b6; *ṅan soṅ* PVSV$_{Tib}$ D322a4/P478b3; see Yaita 2005: 443 n. 159) : °*āpāpa*° PVSV, PVSVṬ 390,25.

[12] PVSV 108,15–16: *tad yadi na parīkṣāyāṃ visaṃvādabhāk pravartamānaḥ śobheta*.

2.2. PV 1.214–215: Which āgama should be followed?

In order to decide which *āgama* we should follow – this is explained in PV 1.214 with commentary – we have to look for a scripture that is coherent (*sambaddha*) and teaches a proper human aim (*puruṣārtha*) as well as a suitable means for obtaining it (*anuguṇopāya*). If we find such a scripture, for example that of the Buddhists, then we have to examine it in its entirety, as explained in PV 1.215 with PVSV. Whatever it teaches that can be checked by perception and inference has to be true. Anything taught in such a scripture must not be contradicted by perception or inference. Moreover, there cannot be a single internal contradiction in it. Such internal contradictions are checked with the help of the so-called *āgamāpekṣānumāna* (PVSV 109,1),[13] i.e., an inference that, based on passages of the scripture, tests its consistency.[14] If an *āgama* passes this threefold test[15] – whereby it is tested in all testable

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[13] Later (PVSV 174,22–23; see above, p. 69) Dharmakīrti uses the formulation *āgamāśrayeṇa cānumānena*. In contrast to this kind of inference an inference that operates with visible matters is called *anāgamāpekṣānumāna* (PVSV 108,24). In the fourth chapter Dharmakīrti terms this latter kind of *anumāna* together with perception as *vastubalapravṛttapramāṇa* (PV 4.108 ≈ PVin 3 31,11: *yac chāstraṃ vastubalapravṛttena pramāṇena svavacanena cābādhitaṃ dṛśyādṛśyayor viṣayayoḥ, tad grāhyam iti*). These two kinds of inferences are already distinguished by Pakṣilasvāmin (NBh 3,12 on NSū 1.1.1: *pratyakṣāgamāśritaṃ cānumanam*).

[14] On the application of this method as described in PV 1.214–215 by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, see McClintock 2010: 318ff.

[15] A possible source of this threefold analysis, which came to be known as *dpyad pa gsum* in the later Tibetan tradition, might be Vasubandhu's VY; see Verhagen 2008: 244–247 (Section Four, "Three *pramāṇas*") with the appendix (pp. 253–258). A similar idea is encountered in the definition of *āptāgama* in ASBh 153,5ff.: *yatropadeśe tat pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca sarvathā na virudhyete na vyabhicarataḥ sa āptāgamaḥ sampratyayitvāt*. "Die Unterweisung, zu der diese Wahrnehmung und [diese] Schlußfolgerung in keiner Weise im Widerspruch steht [und von der] diese nicht abweichen, ist *āptāgama*, weil er Vertrauen erweckt." Translation Oberhammer et al. 1991: 122^{b}–123^{a} s.v. *āptāgama*. On the background of the Tibetan "threefold analysis (*dpyad pa gsum*)" see Tillemans 1993: 10ff., and Keira 2006: 182 with n. 15, who informs us that the notion of "purified through the threefold analysis (*tshul gsum gyi brtag pas yoṅs su dag pa*)" is already found in Kamalaśīla's MĀ (D148b4–5): [*de'i phyir*] *bka' gaṅ źig tshul gsum gyi brtag pas yoṅs su dag pa thog ma daṅ tha ma daṅ bar du dge bar ṅes pa de ni mi slu ba'i phyir de mkhas pa rnams kyis brten par bya ba ñid do* //. "[Therefore,] since statements ascertained as faultless by means of three kinds of investigation (*tshul gsum gyi brtag pas*) and as excellent for the first

cases (*śakyaparicched**āśeṣa**viṣayaviśuddhi*, PVSV 109,3–4) – and is thus established to be without contradictions, its being pure or cleansed (*viśuddhi*)[16] constitutes its non-belying nature or reliability (*avisaṃvāda*, PVSV 109,4). "Non-belying" is of course the definitional characteristic of a valid cognition.[17] If a scripture is "purified" in this way, then we can infer that this scripture or testimony of a credible person (*āptavāda*) might be true also with regard to the non-empirical or transcendent things[18] it teaches, because the scripture or credible person is the same. And if then, based on that scripture, one acts towards non-empirical objects one might be lucky and obtain what one was looking for (see n. 12).

2.3. Does PV 1.216 comment upon PS 2.5ab?

Up to this point the existing interpretations and translations of PV(SV) (see n. 7) more or less agree, and I have followed them thus far. The situation changes, however, with the next verse, i.e., PV 1.216. Scholars disagree about the meanings of the words *agatyā* and *sāmānyāt* and

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[stage of practice, i.e., hearing (*śruti*)], the last [stage, i.e., meditation (*bhāvanā*)], and the middle [stage, i.e., consideration (*cintā*)], are non-belying (*avisaṃvāda*), scholars should rely upon such [statements]." On the resemblance of Dharmakīrti's threefold test to Āryadeva's CŚ 12.5 (= 12.280 in Tillemans counting), see Tillemans 1990: I.29–32.

[16] The choice of the term *viśuddhi* might have been inspired by a similar use in the *Ślokavārttika*, where *śuddhatva* of the causes guarantees the validity of the resulting cognition; see ŚV *codanā* 44ab: *tasmāt kāraṇaśuddhatvaṃ jñānaprāmāṇyakāraṇam.* "Therefore (*tasmāt*), the cause of validity in a cognition (*jñānaprāmāṇyakāraṇam*) is the excellence of causes (*kāraṇaśuddhatvam*)." Translation Kataoka 2011a: 248. See also Kataoka's n. 189 on the translation of k. 46, where the term *śuddhyasambhava* is used.

[17] See PV 2.1ab$_1$: *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam*. "Valid cognition is non-belying cognition."

[18] In this context Dharmakīrti refers to these kinds of things as "not knowable by perception or inference" (*pratyakṣānumānāgamye 'py arthe* PVSV 109,8). Later he also uses the term *atyantaparokṣa* (PVSV 153,7, 155,14, 175,3–4, PV 1.314c, 1.316a, 3.94, 4.210). For his usage of *parokṣa* in the sense of *atyantaparokṣa*, see Tillemans 1986: 44 n. 14 (= 1999b: 34 n. 13). The term *atyantaparokṣa* is also used by Uddyotakara (NV 204,12 on NSū 2.1.31) and occurs also in YD 70,15 on SK 4ab$_1$, 99,12 on SK 6cd, and 101,7 still on SK 6cd.

about the overall purport of the verse. Thus, it seems appropriate to have a closer look at the different positions.

2.3.1. Previous interpretations of PV 1.216

Let me begin with Tom Tillemans, to whom we owe much of our understanding of the Buddhist epistemologists' approach to scripture. In his article "Dharmakīrti, Āryadeva, and Dharmapāla on scriptural authority" he provides us with the following translation of the statement of Dignāga's we have been considering:

> PS II, k. 5a: Because authoritative words (*āptavāda*) are similar [to an inference] in not belying, they are [classified as] inference. (Tillemans 1986: 32 = 1999b: 27ff.)

In his summary of Dharmakīrti's PV 1.216, which if I understand him correctly[19] he considers together with PV 1.215 to be the core of Dharmakīrti's explanation of PS 2.5ab, Tillemans gives a slightly different account of Dignāga's statement. But first, let us have a look at Tillemans' translation of PV 1.216.

> *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā /*
> *buddher agatyābhihitā parokṣe 'py asya gocare* // PV 1.216
>
> As authoritative words are similar in being *avisaṃvāda*, the understanding of their imperceptible (*parokṣa*) object is also termed an inference, for [otherwise] there would be no way [to know such objects]. (Tillemans 1993: 11)[20]

On the basis of this translation of PV 1.216 Dignāga's position in PS 2.5ab is summarized by Tillemans as follows:

> (d) v. 216: Dignāga's point in saying that authoritative words were an inference was that when an authority's words (= scripture) have been found to be non-belying on rationally decidable matters, then we are jus-

[19] I derive this understanding from the fact that Tillemans presents Dignāga's PS 2.5ab together with PV 1.215–216 twice in order to outline "the epistemological school's position" on scripture (Tillemans 1990: I.24ff.) and the background of the Tibetan "threefold analysis (*dpyad pa gsum*)" (Tillemans 1993: 10ff.).

[20] Also translated in Tillemans 1990: I.25.

> tified to understand radically inaccessible matters based on that scripture.... (Tillemans 1999a: 399–400 = 1999b: 41–42)

I would subscribe to Tillemans' translation of PV 1.216, though we shall have to come back to the expression *agatyā* later (below, pp. 108–111). Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti's understanding of PS 2.5ab in the way Tillemans is suggesting poses a problem. I cannot see any basis in the wording of PS 2.5ab itself for saying that *our understanding* of the transcendent object of scripture is termed an inference. It is one thing to say that *āptavacana* is *anumāna* and another that our cognition of its object is *anumāna*. In other words, did Dharmakīrti over-interpret or even misinterpret Dignāga, or must we understand Dignāga in a different way?

As the *āgama*-section of Dharmakīrti's PVSV has been translated by Hideomi Yaita in 1987, by John Dunne in 2004, and by Vincent Eltschinger in 2007a, we may gain some help from considering their interpretations. Before looking at their analyses it should be mentioned that PS(V) 2.5ab is incorporated by Dharmakīrti in his PV(SV) twice, and that he interprets it somewhat differently each time. First, he refers to it when initially raising the question of its meaning, and then about a page later in the Gnoli edition, in concluding his first interpretation of PS(V) 5ab. On its first occurrence it is marked as a quotation,[21] on the second Dignāga's wording is used without explicitly characterising it as a quotation. The latter passage, namely PV 1.216, is commented upon by Dharmakīrti as follows:

> *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā /*
> *buddher agatyābhihitā parokṣe 'py asya gocare* // PV 1.216

> *tasya cāsyaivambhūtasy**āptavāda**sy**āvisaṃvādasāmānyād** adṛṣṭavyabhicārasya pratyakṣānumānāgamye 'py arthe pratipattes tadāśrayatvāt tadanyapratipattivad avisaṃvādo 'numīyate / tataḥ śabdaprabhavāpi satī na śābdavad abhiprāyaṃ nivedayaty evety arthāvisaṃvādād anumānam api /* (PVSV 109,8–11)

[21] PVSV 108,1–2: *yat tarhīdam āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatety āgamasyānumānatvam uktam, tat katham*.

Dunne's translation of the verse with commentary reads,[22]

> [Dignāga] said that, since the statements of a credible person are generally trustworthy, a cognition from such statements of those statement's object is a well formed inference of that object, even though the object is epistemically remote. The cognition is said to be an inference because there is no other way to know that object. [PV 1.216]
>
> These kinds of statements of a credible person – those [described by Dignāga] and those [accordingly delineated above] – are generally (*sāmānya*) trustworthy. Hence, not observing those statements to be misleading, one infers the trustworthiness of a cognition of those statements' object, even though it is not knowable by perception and empirical inference. One infers that such a cognition is trustworthy because it is based on those statements, just like the other cognitions based on those statements that can be verified by perception and empirical inference.
>
> Hence, even though that cognition comes from language, it does not make known just the speaker's intention like a cognition coming from [ordinary] language because in this case the cognition is also an inference of the statement's objects, since it is trustworthy with regard to those objects (*artha*). (Dunne 2004: 363ff.)

Here it is clear, as we have already seen in the translation of Tillemans, that in the verse our *cognition* of a transcendent object derived from the statements of a credible person is said to be an inference. However, Dunne's translation of the earlier occurrence of PS 2.5ab, where Dharmakīrti quotes it (PVSV 108,1–2) to introduce his discussion of scripture, construes the *testimony* of a credible person as a source for an inference.

> [Dignāga] said, "The testimony of a credible person is the source for an inference because it is generally trustworthy,"... (Dunne 2004: 361)

In a section earlier in his book which gives a general account of scriptural inference, titled "Scriptural Inference and Dharmakīrti's Rejection of Credibility," Dunne translates the same passage in another way.

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[22] In the translation offered by John Dunne his explanatory remarks are not always written in brackets in order to present a smooth text readable also for non-specialists. However, they easily can be recognized as such.

> Since the statements of a credible person are generally trustworthy, a cognition arising from them is an instrumental inference. (Dunne 2004: 239)

In the footnote to the translation Dunne justifies this interpretation with reference to PV 1.216.

> Note, first, that although the phrase "a cognition arising from them" must be supplied by context, Dharmakīrti clearly understands this statement in that fashion (see PV I.216, translated along with the rest of the section on scripture in the appendix).

Interestingly enough, this double understanding of one and the same passage – as referring to either scripture or the cognition that arises from it as an inference – is also to be found in Hideomi Yaita's treatment of Dharmakīrti's view of scripture. In his synopsis he summarises the passage we have just referred to as follows:

> Opponent (108,1f.): Dharmakīrti's statement is not consistent with Dignāga's statement in *PS* II 5ab, which recognized *āgama* (*āptavāda*) as a *pramāṇa*, i.e. *anumāna*. (Yaita 1987: 2)

His translation of PVSV 108,1–2 reads,

> (Opponent:) Then, how [do you explain] the fact that [Dignāga] said the sacred tradition (*āgama*) is [a *pramāṇa*, that is] *anumāna* [in his following statement:] "Because the words of a credible person (*āptavāda*) generally do not disagree, [the cognition based on it] is an inference (*anumāna*)"? (Yaita 1987: 6)

The above interpretation of PS 2.5ab in this *pūrvapakṣa* is obviously based on PV 1.216.

> Because the word of a credible person (*āptavāda*) generally does not disagree [with our experience], the cognition [based on *āgama*] even with regard to its (= *āgama*'s) object beyond the range [of any means of knowledge] is said [by Dignāga] to be an inference, for there is no [other] possibility (*agatyā*) [to explain it]. (Yaita 1987: 8)[23]

[23] Van Bijlert (1989: 123–124) is also of the opinion that PV 1.216 is an explanation of PS 2.5ab: "In the next verse Dharmakīrti uses this general conception of trustworthiness to give his first explanation of PS II.5ab … (PV I.216)."

Eltschinger (2007a: 219, 224) does not read PVSV 108,1–2 in light of PV 1.216 but treats both passages independently. Thus, the question remains: Did Dignāga say in PS 2.5ab that scripture is a kind of inference or did he term our *understanding* of their transcendent (*parokṣa*) objects an inference, or did he say both?

2.3.2. On the context of PV 1.216 with PVSV

As I cannot see how one can harmonize these two interpretations, the one clearly saying that *āgama* is inference (PVSV 108,1–2), the other that our cognition is inference (k. 216), it seems worthwhile to have another look at the context of PS 2.5ab.[24] This has been nicely summarized by Tillemans when arguing against Hayes' interpretation of PS 2.5ab in his monograph *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*.

> 2) In the immediately preceding passage to k. 5, Dignāga had made a distinction between two types of inference, depending upon whether the object is empirical or non-empirical, arguing that in the former case we can apply names to what is empirical, but in the latter case we only have a concept (*rnam par rtog pa* = *vikalpa*) and do not cognize the *svalakṣaṇa* object.
>
> 3) An opponent then tries to find an absurdity, saying that in that case authoritative statements about imperceptible objects would just express the conceptually invented object and not the real particular at all: hence there would be no difference between authoritative and unauthoritative statements.
>
> 4) Dignāga then replies that authoritative statements about heaven and the like do not express *just* the conceptually invented object: they are similar to normal inference because they too are non-belying with regard to the real particular. For, although the heavens and so forth are beyond our sense range, authoritative people have directly seen them and hence were able to apply the words "heaven," etc. (Tillemans 1990: I.22)

Tillemans had to base his summary on the two barely intelligible Tibetan translations of the PS(V) by Vasudhararakṣita and Kanakavarman. With the help of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary in Sanskrit we

[24] On the wider structural position of PS 2.5ab, see Lasic 2010: 514–522.

now can get a more nuanced picture. The opponent referred to by Tillemans in (3) in fact asks how this latter cognition operating with a non-empirical object which is a mere concept of the object can be inference (*kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam*).[25] Dignāga introduces his answer to this question by mentioning words such as heaven, the referent of which we never have seen: "For (*hi*) words like 'heaven' do not express the mere object (*arthamātra*)."[26] Next follows PS 2.5ab with the *Vṛtti*.

āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatvam / PS 2.5ab
āptavacanaṃ gṛhītvārthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt tasyānumānatvam uktam.[27]

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[25] A possible Sanskrit can be reconstructed as follows: *adṛṣṭārtha arthavikalpamātram, na viśiṣṭārthapratītiḥ. kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam. na hi svargādiśabdair arthamātram ucyate.* (= PSV$_K$ 111a2–3: *ma mthoṅ ba'i don la don du rnam par rtog pa tsam yin gyi don gyi khyad par rtogs pa ni ma yin no // ji ltar de rjes su dpag pa ñid yin te mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgra rnams kyis don tsam brjod ba ni ma yin no //*.) The Sanskrit is available in PSṬ$_{ms}$ 62b7: ***adṛṣṭārthe*** *svargādāv* ***arthavikalpamātram*** *iti* (PSṬ$_{Tib}$ D92a2/P103b1–2: ***ma mthoṅ ba'i don la*** *ni mtho ris la sogs pa la ste* / ***don du rnam par rtog pa tsam*** *źes pa*), quoted in PVSV 37,27; PSṬ$_{ms}$ 63a5: *tataś ced* ***arthavikalpamātraṃ*** *bhavati*, ***na viśiṣṭārthapratītiḥ*** (PSṬ$_{Tib}$ D92a7/P103b7–8: *de las gal te* ***don rnam par rtog pa tsam*** *du 'gyur gyi* ***don gyi khyad par rtogs par mi 'gyur*** *na*); PSṬ$_{ms}$ 63a4: ***kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam*** *iti* (PSṬ$_{Tib}$ D92a6/P103b7: ***'o na ci ltar de rjes su dpag pa yin źe na*** *źes pa* /); PSṬ$_{ms}$ 63a6: *āha* – ***na hī****tyādi* (PSṬ$_{Tib}$ D92b1–2/P104a2: *bśad pa* / ***ma yin*** *źes pa la sogs pa ste* /); PSṬ$_{ms}$ 63a7: *tasmān* ***nā****ptaprayuktaiḥ* ***svargādiśabdair arthamātram ucyate****. kiṃ tarhi. laukikaśabdāsādhāraṇe bāhye 'py artha iti* (PSṬ$_{Tib}$ D92b2–3/P104a3–4: *de'i phyir yid ches pas rab tu sbyar ba'i* ***mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgra rnams kyi*** (read: *kyis*) ***don tsam brjod pa ma yin*** *gyi* / *'o na ci źe na* / *'jig rten pa'i sgra daṅ thun moṅ ma yin pa'i phyi rol gyi don yaṅ ṅo źes pa'o //*).

[26] *na hi svargādiśabdair arthamātram ucyate*, see above, n. 25.

[27] For the reconstruction of the Sanskrit text (following mainly the Tibetan translation of Vasudhararakṣita), see below, p. 94. The Tibetan translation reads:

yid ches tshig kyaṅ mi slu bar // mtshuṅs phyir rjes su dpag pa ñid // PS 2.5ab
yid ches pa'i tshig ñid bzuṅ nas kyaṅ mi bslu bar mtshuṅs pa'i phyir de yaṅ rjes su dpag pa ñid du brjod do // PSV$_V$ 29a2–3.

yid ches tshig ni mi slu ba // spyi las rjes su dpag pa ñid // PS 2.5ab
yid ches pa'i tshig ñid bzuṅ nas don de la mi bslu ba'i phyir daṅ / mi 'dra ba'i phyir rjes su dpag pa ñid du bśad pa yin te // PSV$_K$ 111a3–4.

> ... (PS 2.5ab). Having grasped the statement of a credible person, *it* (*tasya*) has been said to be inference, because [it] is equal in not belying with regard to the object.

If I understand Dignāga's wording in the commentary correctly, this is the answer to the initial question *kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam*, referring to our *cognition* of *svarga* etc., the object of which never has been seen by us but only by the *āptas*. This interpretation goes smoothly with Jinendrabuddhi's comments when he says that the question, now reformulated as *kasmāt punas tasyānumānatvam* to conform to the wording he has previously used,[28] has to be answered by *arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt*. Jinendrabuddhi's comments read,

> ***āptavacanaṃ gṛhītve****tyādi. āptavacanaṃ gṛhītvāvisaṃvādādhigamahetuṃ* ***tasyānumānatvam uktam***[a]*. kasmāt punas tasyānumānatvam* ***arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvād*** *iti vyākhyeyam.* PSṬ$_{ms}$ 63b5–6 (***yid ches pa'i tshig bzuṅ nas*** *źes pa la sogs pa ste yid ches pa'i tshig bzuṅ nas mi bslu bar rtogs pa'i rgyur* / *de* ***rjes su dpag pa ñid du gsuṅs*** *so* // *ci'i phyir de rjes su dpag pa ñid yin źe na* / ***don la mi bslu bar mtshuṅs pa ñid kyi phyir*** *źes bśad par bya'o* // PSṬ$_{Tib}$ D93a1–2/P104b2–4)
>
> [a] *uktam* em. (*gsuṅs so* PSṬ$_{Tib}$) : *yuktaṃ* PSṬ$_{ms}$
>
> "**Having grasped the statement of a credible person**" and so forth. *It* (*tasya*) has been said to be an inference, having grasped the statement of a credible person which is a logical reason (*hetu*) for an understanding that [it] is not belying (*avisaṃvāda*). [The question] why now *this* (*tasya*) is an inference is to be explained by "**because [it] is equal in not belying with regard to the object**" (*arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt*).

tasya in Jinendrabuddhi's explanation thus would have the same meaning as it has in Dignāga's initial question and refer to the inference which is a mere concept, which would correspond to Dharmakīrti's *buddheḥ* in PV 1.216 or *pratipatteḥ* in the *Svavṛtti*. And Dharmakīrti's *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyāt* of PV 1.216, finally, would be his rephrasing of Dignāga's *arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt*. Thus, I propose to

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[28] PSṬ$_{ms}$ 63a4: ***kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam*** *iti* (PSṬ$_{Tib}$ D92a6/P103b7: ***'o na ci ltar de rjes su dpag pa yin źe na*** *źes pa* /); see above, p. 93 n. 25.

understand PV 1.216 together with the *Svavṛtti* as commenting upon Dignāga's *Vṛtti* on PS 2.5ab and not on PS 2.5ab itself.[29]

2.4. On sāmānyāt

The various interpretations of *sāmānyāt* have already been addressed by Lasic (2010: 511–514), whose main concern is a possible interpretation of PS 2.5ab in its own right, not Dharmakīrti's interpretation. Thus, he does not offer a solution for how to understand it in Dharmakīrti.

2.4.1 On the meaning of the ablative ending

The ablative ending of *sāmānya* has been translated in two ways: (1) as "insofar," etc., and (2) as "because," etc. Hayes' (1980: 252, 1988: 238) interpretation of the ablative as "insofar" has been refuted convincingly by Tillemans (1990: I.20–21).[30] The interpretation of the ablative as "because," "since," and the like, to which I subscribe, is favoured by the majority of scholars.

2.4.2. On the meaning of *sāmānya*

Also regarding the meaning of *sāmānya* there are two camps. One takes it as "similar" or "equal," etc., the other understands it as "in general" or "generally." The latter translation has been proposed by Yaita (1987: 6, 8) and van Bijlert (1989: 124), and it is also the one preferred by Dunne. Dunne (2004: 363–364 n. 10) argues for this interpretation against the understanding of Śākyabuddhi in order to avoid a contradiction with PV 1.218. He does so even at the risk of attributing to Dharmakīrti a form of fallacious reasoning that Dharmakīrti himself refers to as *śeṣavadanumāna* – and which, as we will see later, also pertains to Dignāga's definition and Dharmakīrti's interpretation of it, as

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[29] It goes without saying that, disregarding the context, *tasya* in PSV as well as in PSṬ easily could be understood as referring to *āptavacana*. In that case, however, we have to assume that the question *kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam* remains completely ignored.

[30] This refutation holds good also for van Bijlert's interpretation "in so far" (1989: 122).

well as to Śākyabuddhi's comments – by apparently taking the term "in general" in the stronger sense of "universally, without exception." He writes, "On this interpretation, the argument is that, since the statements of a particular author have been observed to be trustworthy in terms of observable objects, this general trustworthiness may be extended to unobservable objects." This understanding leads Dunne to the following translation of PVSV 109,7–9 (on k. 216, see above p. 90):

> These kinds of statements by a credible person – those [described by Dignāga] and those [accordingly delineated above] – are generally trustworthy. Hence, not observing those statements to be misleading, one infers the trustworthiness of a cognition of those statements' object, even though it is not knowable by perception and empirical inference.[31] (Dunne 2004: 364)

This translation is fine, given that *sāmānyāt* means "generally." Dharmakīrti here speaks of a *sāmānya* in terms of *avisaṃvāda* of two kinds of statements: *tasya cāsyaivambhūtasyāptavādasya*.[32] The first one referred to by *tasya* is, according to Karṇakagomin, the *āgama* said by Dignāga to be *anumāna*. The second one addressed by *asyaivambhūtasya* is the one that, in accordance with what has been said in k. 214, has been found to be coherent (*sambaddha*) and to teach a proper human aim (*puruṣārtha*) as well as a suitable means for obtaining it (*anuguṇopāya*), which then has been tested and ascertained to be trustworthy as described in k. 215 with PVSV.[33] The *āgama* at stake in Dignāga concerns heaven (*svarga*), which is not accessible to our knowledge. Thus,

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[31] PVSV 109,7–9: *tasya cāsyaivambhūtasy**āptavāda**sy**āvisaṃvādasāmānyād** adṛṣṭavyabhicārasya pratyakṣānumānāgamye 'py arthe pratipattes tadāśrayatvāt tadanyapratipattivad avisaṃvādo 'numīyate*.

[32] Here one would expect another *ca*: *evambhūtasya ca*. But this is not supported by the commentaries. PVSV$_{\text{Tib}}$ D322b6–7/P479a7 (*de daṅ 'di de lta bur gyur pa'i ñes pa zad pa'i tshig*) suggests the reading: *tasyāsya caivambhūtasya* or *tasyāsyaivambhūtasya ca*. The text either needs to be corrected or we have to suppose that *ca* is misplaced (*bhinnakrama*).

[33] PVSVṬ 394,9–10: ***tasyāgamasyācāryadignāgena** nirdiṣṭānumānabhāvasya*. ***asye**ty asmābhis*[a] ***sambaddhānuguṇopāyam***[b] *ityādinā vicāritasya.*

[a] *asmābhiḥ* refers to Dharmakīrti; cf., e.g., the comment on *atrocyate* (PVSV 39,30): ***atra** sāmānyalakṣaṇe 'smābhir **ucyate*** (PVSVṬ 174,21).

[b] *sambaddhānuguṇopāyam* em. (PV 1.214) : *sambandhād anuguṇopāyam* PVSVṬ, PVSVṬ$_{\text{ms}}$ 142a1.

Dharmakīrti would be saying that "these kinds of statements by a credible person – those [that speak about heaven] and those [accordingly delineated above] – are generally trustworthy." This implies that "statements speaking about heaven are generally trustworthy," whereby "generally trustworthy" means "checked by the threefold test." In order to avoid this problematic implication one can assume, of course, that Dharmakīrti with *tasya* does not mean anything special and only wants to inform us that Dignāga considers even that part of *āgama* he isn't specifically concerned with to be trustworthy.

Be that as it may be, it is in any case not clear why general trustworthiness justifies Dignāga's holding the *āgama* that speaks of heaven to be *anumāna*. This leads us to the question, On what basis can Dignāga, according to Dharmakīrti, claim *āgama* to be *anumāna*, even when *sāmānya* is understood as "similar" or "equal," etc., in terms of its being *avisaṃvāda*? First, however, one must answer the question, Similar to what? It seems there are two possibilities: (a) either leave it open, as I have done in the translation of PVSV 108,1–2 (see above, p. 84), or (b) take it specifically as "similar to inference." Those who have opted for the first alternative are Hayes (1988: 238), "insofar as they have the common character of not being false," Tillemans (1990: 20), "because authoritative words are similar in not belying" (similarly, Tillemans 1993: 10, 11), and Eltschinger (2007a: 219), "est semblable en fiabilité." Yet the same scholars have also on occasion opted for the second alternative: Hayes (1980: 252), "insofar as they have (in) common (with inference the) character of not being false," Tillemans (1986: 32), "because authoritative speech (*āptavāda*) is similar [to an inference] in being infallible," and (1990: 22), "they are similar to normal inference because they too are non-belying," and Eltschinger (2007a: 224), "est semblable [à l'inférence] en fiabilité."

Thus, the statement of a credible person with regard to transcendent objects such as heaven is either said to be inference on account of the general trustworthiness of the words of this credible person regarding perceptible and inferable matters, or on account of their being similar to normal inference in not being belying. Both interpretations are far from being self-evident, nor is there any commentarial support for them, as far as I can tell. There are, however, clear statements by the commentators that Dignāga in PS 2.5ab intended what Dharmakīrti would later call a *svabhāvahetu* and that *anumāna* should be under-

stood in the sense of logical reason (*liṅga*, *hetu*).[34] This did not escape Dunne, who provides the relevant material in the footnotes to his translation. The commentators also tell us that the equality or similarity is between the statements of a credible person concerning matters that can be checked by perception and inference and transcendent matters such as heaven that we cannot check. Already the comments by Śākyabuddhi (followed by Karṇakagomin) on the opening question at PVSV 108,1–2 are quite telling.

> Any statement of a credible person is non-belying, like [a statement] such as "All conditioned things are momentary." And this is a statement with regard to a transcendent object. Thus, this too is non-belying. Because **the statement of a credible person** is non-belying (*avisaṃvāditvāt*, [PVSVṬ, no equivalent in PVṬ]) **as its character of being non-belying is the same** in the way [explained] (*evam*), it **is inference**. Thus (*iti*), the teacher Dignāga said that scripture is inference with regard to the external object.[35] (Also translated in Dunne 2004: 361 n. 2)

Śākyabuddhi's and Karṇakagomin's comments on PV 1.216 are also quite clear on the point that the character of being non-belying in the case of a credible person's statement concerning transcendent matters is equal to or the same as this person's statement concerning matters that can be checked. And it is for this reason that *āptavāda* serves as an

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[34] For *āptavacana* as a *kāryahetu* see Tillemans' explanation on PV 4.92 (Tillemans 2000: 126ff.).

[35] PVṬ *Je* D242b3–5/P285b6–286a1: *gal te phyi rol gyi dṅos po la sgra tshad ma ñid yod pa ma yin na* / ***'on kyaṅ gaṅ 'di yid ches tshig ni mi slu ba spyi las*** (PVSV 108,1) *te gaṅ daṅ gaṅ ñes pa zad pa'i tshig de daṅ de ni mi slu ba yin te* / *dper na 'dus byas thams cad ni skad cig ma źes bya ba la sogs pa lta bu'o* // *śin tu lkog tu gyur pa'i don la ñes par zad pa'i tshig 'di yaṅ yin no* // *de bas na 'di yaṅ mi slu ba yin no źes bya ba de lta na ñes pa zad pa'i tshig ni mi slu ba spyi las rjes su dpag pa ñid yin pa de ltar na* / *slob dpon gyi* (read: *gyis*) *luṅ ni phyi rol gyi don la rjes su dpag pa ñid du gsuṅs pa yin no* // ≈ PVSVṬ 390,15–19: *yadi bāhye vastuni śabdasya nāsti prāmāṇyam*, ***yat tarhīdam āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyāt***. *yo ya āptavādaḥ, so 'visaṃvādī, yathā kṣaṇikāḥ sarve saṃskārā ityādikaḥ. āptavādaś cāyam atyantaparokṣe 'py arthe. tasmād ayam apy avisaṃvādītyevam* ***āptavāda****sy****āvisaṃvādasāmānyād*** *avisaṃvāditvād* ***anumānate****ty āgamasya bāhye 'rthe 'numānatvam uktam ācāryadignāgena.*

inferential mark[36] on account of which we can infer that our cognition does not belie.

> "Because that credible person's speech is the same in its trustworthiness (*avisaṃvādasāmānyāt*). That is, just as the credible person's speech is trustworthy with regard to an object that can be determined [through perception and ordinary inference], likewise it is trustworthy with regard to an extremely remote object also, precisely because it is the speech of a credible person." (Dunne 2004: 364 n. 10) It is therefore that the teacher Dignāga termed an inference a cognition arising from an inferential mark characterized as [this] person's credible speech that [such a cognition] is not belying with regard to a real state of affairs (*don la mi slu ba ... blo ni*, **arthāvisaṃvādabuddheḥ*).[37]

This interpretation of Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin is in accord with what Dharmakīrti himself explained in PVSV 109,8–11 when commenting on PV 1.216 (see above p. 89). Thus, I can see no harm in accepting this interpretation and translating PS 2.5ab from the viewpoint of Dharmakīrti as follows:

> Because the character of being non-belying of a statement of a credible person is the same [in the case of transcendent objects as in the case of objects that are accessible to us, it] is an inference [in the sense of an inferential mark].

sāmānyāt in PV 1.216 might be understood accordingly. It goes without saying that for the time being such an understanding is justified only

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[36] Jinendrabuddhi (PST$_{ms}$ 63b5–6, referred to above, p. 94) also explains the statement of a credible person to be a logical reason: *āptavacanaṃ gṛhītvāvisaṃvādādhigamahetuṃ tasyānumānatvam uktam*.

[37] PVṬ *Je* D245a7–b1/P289b5–7: ***ñes pa zad pa'i tshig*** *de ni* ***mi slu bar mtshuṅs pa'i phyir*** *te / ci ltar mṅon sum daṅ rjes su dpag pas mi slu ba'i don yoṅs su gcod par nus pa la ñes pa zad pa'i tshig mi slu ba de ltar śin tu lkog tu gyur pa* (read: *pa la*) *yaṅ yin te / ñes pa zad pa'i tshig ñid yin pa'i phyir ro // de bas na don la mi slu ba ñes pa zad pa'i tshig gi mtshan ñid can gyi rtags las byuṅ pa'i blo ni rjes su dpag pa ñid du slob dpon gyis brjod do //* ≈ PVSVṬ 393,25–28: *tasya**āptavāda**sya**āvisaṃvādasāmānyāt***.[a] *yathā śakyaparicchede 'rthe āptavādasyāvisaṃvādaḥ, tathātyantaparokṣe 'pi, āptavādatvād eva. tataś cāptavādalakṣaṇāl liṅgād utpannāyā avisaṃvāda**buddher anumānatā**cāryadignāgenā**bhihitā***.

[a] *tasyāptāvādasyāvisaṃvādasāmānyāt* PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 141b6 (PVṬ) : *tasyās tāvad asyāvisaṃvādāt sāmānyāt* PVSVṬ.

for Dharmakīrti. Whether this interpretation is faithful to Dignāga's understanding still remains to be investigated.

2.5. PV 1.217 – a second interpretation of PS 2.5ab

The above interpretation probably is the best Dharmakīrti could come up with without contradicting Dignāga's wording, although I cannot see anything in Dignāga's phrasing that would suggest that a scripture must be tested in its entirety, as proposed by Dharmakīrti. Perhaps because this is hardly possible Dharmakīrti provides us with a second, less demanding interpretation of Dignāga's *āgama* definition, according to which a person's reliability with regard to transcendent objects is inferred from his knowledge of the main religious teachings that he presents, such as the Four Noble['s] Truths.[38]

> *heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitaḥ /*
> *pradhānārthāvisaṃvādād anumānaṃ paratra vā* // PV 1.217

> *heyopādeyatadupāyānāṃ tadupadiṣṭānām avaiparītyam avisaṃvādaḥ. yathā catūrṇām āryasatyānāṃ vakṣyamāṇanītyā. tasyāsya puruṣārthopayogino 'bhiyogārhasyāvisaṃvādād viṣayāntare 'pi tathātvopagamo na vipralambhāya, anuparodhān niṣprayojanavitathābhidhānavaiphalyāc ca vaktuḥ.* PVSV 109,15–19

> Or [scripture] is inference with regard to the other [domain] due to its being not belying with regard to the principal points [i.e. the Four Noble('s) Truths], because the nature (*tattva*) of what is to be abandoned and what is to be realized together with their means is well established [by it].

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[38] I consider the method proposed in PV 1.217 as an alternative to the threefold analysis, i.e., the second possibility proposed by Dunne (2004: 241): "This test either supplements or perhaps replaces … the threefold analysis." Yaita and Tillemans consider it differently: "On the basis of credibility of *āgama* examined like that, Dharmakīrti proves the non-disagreement of the *āgama* even with regard to inaccessible thing talked of by the author, in the following two ways (v. 216–7)" (Yaita 1987: 3); "(e) v. 217 elaborates upon aspects of v. 216: when the scripture is non-belying on important rationally accessible things it should also be so on the inaccessible things" (Tillemans 1999a: 400 = 1999b: 42).

> Reliability consists in the fact that what is to be obtained and what is to be avoided [together with] their means, which has been taught by that [credible person], corresponds to reality (*avaiparītya*); like the Four Noble('s) Truths in the way it will be explained [in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter]. Because that very (*tasyāsya*) [thing that has been taught], which serves the human goal, [and hence] is suitable to being practiced, is reliable, the assumption that this is so also in the case of the other, transcendent realm may not lead to one's deception. [And this is for two reasons:] 1) because there is no counter evidence (*anuparodha*), and 2) because it is pointless for a speaker to make false statements without a purpose.

2.6. Conclusion of this excursus on PS 2.5ab

What we have seen so far certainly does not substantiate my claim that for Dharmakīrti scripture is not a means of valid cognition. On the contrary, we learn that the statements of a credible person and inferences based on a scripture that has either been well checked or expounds the main religious teachings, are reliable even with regard to real states of affairs and not just the speaker's intention. Thus – to invert a common saying – what you get is what he has seen.

However, before refuting other ways of accounting for the reliability of credible persons offered by opposing schools (PV 1.218ff.), Dharmakīrti concludes his interpretation of Dignāga's definition with the following words:

> *tad etad agatyobhayathāpy anumānatvam āgamasyopavarṇitam – varam āgamāt pravṛttāv evaṃ pravṛttir iti. na khalv evam anumānam anapāyam, anāntarīyakatvād artheṣu śabdānām iti niveditam etat.* PVSV 109,20–22
>
> Thus, this scripture has been explained in both ways to be inference for want of [any other] possibility (*agatyā*), [having in mind:] "Given that one has to proceed on account of scripture it is still better (*varam*) to proceed in such a way." However, inference in such a way indeed is not without problems (*na ... anapāyam*), for words are not invariably concomitant with [their] objects. This [we already] have explained [in PV 1.213].

Here we learn, if my interpretation of *agatyā* is correct, that scripture can only be said to be *anumāna* (in the sense of an inferential mark [*liṅga*] or logical reason [*hetu*]), because there is no better way to define it and because it is still better to proceed on the basis of a checked

or "purified" *āgama* than just blind faith, e.g., in the Veda. But, in whichever way this definition is to be understood, to infer the reliability of a credible person's statement with regard to transcendent matters is problematic. Thus, although Dignāga's definition is in contradiction with Dharmakīrti's theory that words are not connected to their objects, Dignāga nevertheless did the best he could under the circumstances that we require scripture to live our lives and, thus, ideally should rely on one that is optimally reliable. What kind of problem Dharmakīrti had in mind, when he says *na ... anapāyam*, he does not share with us here.

3. OTHER PV(SV) PASSAGES ON *ĀGAMA*

Alas, it is only much later that Dharmakīrti tells us specifically what kind of problem he had in mind. This kind of inference where one infers correctness with regard to transcendent matters from the correctness of statements in one part is a fallacious inference called a *śeṣavadanumāna*. Moreover, we know that Dignāga was aware of this type of fallacy, because in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* he refutes the *śeṣavadanumāna* of the Naiyāyikas. Dharmakīrti refers, without actually saying so, to PS 2.28b with *Vṛtti* where Dignāga refutes the Naiyāyikas using the same examples as Dharmakīrti. The main difference between these two kinds of *śeṣavadanumāna* applied by the opponent, in this case a Mīmāṃsaka, and by the Buddhist is that the Buddhist scripture is "purified" by an examination and thus it might sometimes be reliable. Thus, in this case the probability that it is true is greater, but there is no certainty.

> But another [theorist], renouncing the definition of scripture as [that which is] authorless [because of a similar criticism, and] wishing to prove the authority of the Veda in another way, says, "[Those] Vedic sentences for which there is no cognition [on the part of Buddhists as being true] are [in fact] true, because they are part of the [same] Veda, just like the sentence 'Fire is the remedy for cold,' etc." ...
>
> ... This kind of inference was declared to be not [really] a proof by the master [Dignāga] himself in pointing out the deviating character of the

> Naiyāyikas' *śeṣavat*-inference [in PS(V) 2.28b],[39] like the [so-called] proof that fruit [one has not tasted] has the same taste [as fruit one has tasted] because it has the same colour, and the [so-called] proof that rice grains one has not observed are cooked, like those which one has observed, because they are in one [and the same] vessel. And the manner in which this [*śeṣavat*-inference] is not a proof has [already] been stated earlier [in PV 1.14 with PVSV]. And [true,] we have stated this definition of scripture [too]. However, this [is justified only] if, for every object capable of being examined, there is correctness (*viśuddhi*) of positive and negative assertions by appropriate means of valid cognition. [And] even if there is no necessary relation between words and [their] meanings [, which would ensure the validity of scripture], it is better that a [person] act in [a state of] doubt [when it comes to matters relating to worldly prosperity and salvation];[40] *for* [*scripture*] *may occasionally be reliable in this case*.[41]

Why there can be no certainty Dharmakīrti has already stated before, where he also referred back to the definition of scripture I have dealt with at the beginning of this paper and to his remark that such an inference is not without problems.

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[39] PSV_K 115b2–4: *lhag ldan la yaṅ dpe byed na* // (= PS 2.28b: *śeṣavaty api ced vatiḥ*) *lhag ma daṅ ldan pa la yaṅ gal te dpe byed pa yin na / lhag mṅon sum daṅ mtshuṅs pa'i yul gaṅ la yod pa de'i śes pa ni lhag ma daṅ 'dra ba'o źes bya ba 'di yaṅ 'khrul pa'i phyir tshad ma ma yin te / gzugs mtshuṅs pas ro la sogs pa gdon mi za bar mtshuṅs par 'gyur ba ni ma yin no // de ltar na lhag ma daṅ ldan pa la yaṅ dper mi rigs pa yin no* //. See above, p. 62 and n. 126.

[40] The idea that one acts in regard to transcendent objects from a state of doubt once the scripture is purified is also propounded by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla; see McClintock 2010: 322–324.

[41] PVSV 173,16–174,1: *anyas tv apauruṣeyam āgamalakṣaṇaṃ parityajyānyathā prāmāṇyaṃ vedasya sādhayitukāmaḥ prāha – avitathāni vedavākyāni yatrāpratipattiḥ, vedaikadeśatvāt, yathāgnir himasya bheṣajam ityādi vākyam iti. ... svayam īdṛśam ācāryeṇānumānaṃ naiyāyika* ***śeṣavadanumāna*** *vyabhicāram udbhāvayatā tulyarūpatayā phalānāṃ tulyarasasādhanavad ekasthālyantargamād dṛṣṭavad adṛṣṭataṇḍulapākasādhanavac cāsādhanam uktam. tadasādhanatvanyāyaś ca pūrvam evoktaḥ. uktaṃ cedam āgamalakṣaṇam asmābhiḥ. tat tu sarvasya śakyavicārasya viṣayasya yathāsvaṃ pramāṇena vidhipratiṣedhaviśuddhau nāntarīyakatvābhāve 'pi śabdānām artheṣu varaṃ saṃśayitasya vṛttiḥ,* ***tatra kadācid avisaṃvādasambhavāt***... On this passage, see above, pp. 62–64.

> Objection: Isn't it the case that such a thing as the arrangement of the world, even though it is not an object [accessible] to reason, is known [by you Buddhists] from the statement of a person which must be assumed [to be true, on the basis of his reliability in regard to other things]? [Answer:] No, because [we have] no confidence [in such a person]. It is indeed not the case that, since [a person has been observed] not to err with respect to a certain [matter], everything [that person says] is like that [i.e. true, and this for two reasons: first], because one observes that [people who are known to be reliable in regard to a certain thing do in fact] err [in regard to other things]; and [second,] because a concomitance between the [verbal] activity of this [allegedly superior person] and reliability is not established. *Beyond that*, *the* [*aforementioned*] *definition of scripture has been accepted for lack of* [*any other*] *recourse*. *There is* [*indeed*] *no ascertainment* [*of supersensible things*] *from* [*scripture thus defined*, *and*] *this is the reason why* [*we have*] *also stated* [*above*] *that scripture is not a means of valid cognition*.[42]

These inferences are mainly uncertain, because one cannot establish a pervasion between scripture and its reliability, and only such a pervasion could guarantee the certainty of the inference. Therefore, Dharmakīrti repeats that this definition was assumed only in want of a better possibility and that there is no certainty from scripture. And this is the reason why he also said that *āgama* is not a *pramāṇa*.

In the last chapter of his PV Dharmakīrti refers to these passages.

> *prāmāṇyam āgamānāṃ ca prāg eva vinivāritam* / PV 4.101ab
>
> Now, it had already been refuted earlier that scriptures were *pramāṇa*s. (Tillemans 2000: 141)

So far we have seen that by reading bits and pieces from different discussions of *āgama* in the PVSV together the impression that we gained from Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga's definition of scripture, namely that it is a real *pramāṇa* with regard to external objects such as

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[42] PVSV 167,23–168,2: *nanu kaścil lokasanniveśādir ayuktiviṣayo 'pi sambhāvanīyapuruṣavacanād arthaḥ pratipadyate*. *na*, *apratyayāt*. *na hi kvacid askhalita iti sarvaṃ tathā*, *vyabhicāradarśanāt*, *tatpravṛtter avisaṃvādena vyāptyasiddheś ca*. ***agatyā cedam āgamalakṣaṇam iṣṭam***. ***nāto niścayaḥ***. ***tan na pramāṇam āgama ity apy uktam***. On this passage, see also above, pp. 42–44. The passage beginning with *na hi kvacit* is also translated in Tillemans 1999a: 400; see also Kataoka 2011b: 256 n. 10.

heaven, has now changed and it has become clear that *āgama* is not a *pramāṇa* at all. It is only under certain circumstances, namely when it has been completely checked and purified, that there might be a chance of proceeding successfully based on *āgama*. Or else, when an *āgama* or *āptavāda* expounds the main teachings, as we have seen in PV 1.217 with PVSV. What Dharmakīrti formulates in PV 1.217 and his commentary thereon serves as a leitmotif for his second chapter entitled *Pramāṇasiddhi*, which is entirely devoted to the proof that the Buddha is *pramāṇa*.[43] But in order to avoid the mistake of employing a *śeṣavadanumāna*, the Buddha is proved to be *pramāṇa* only metaphorically. Just as a *pramāṇa* qua cognition is not belying (*pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam* PV 2.1ab$_1$) and makes known a hitherto unknown object (*ajñātārthaprakāśo vā* PV 2.5c), in the same way the Buddha is not belying with regard to and makes known the Four Noble('s) Truths, which hitherto were unknown to us.[44]

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[43] PV 2.32 (cf. PV 1.217): *heyopādeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya* (: *hānyupāyasya* Miyasaka ed.) *vedakaḥ / yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ //*. "He who makes known the nature of what is to be obtained and what is to be avoided, together with their means, is assumed to be a *pramāṇa*, but not he who makes everything known." PV 2.145–146ab: *tāyaḥ svadṛṣṭamārgoktir vaiphalyād vakti nānṛtam / dayālutvāt parārthañ ca sarvārambhābhiyogataḥ // tataḥ pramāṇam, tāyo vā catuḥsatyaprakāśanam /*. "'Protection' [i.e., causing people to cross,] is stating the path seen by himself. He does not tell a lie, (1) because it is pointless, (2) because he is compassionate, and (3) because he perseveres in all his undertakings for the sake of others. Therefore [he is] a *pramāṇa*. Or, protection is illuminating the four Noble('s) Truths." On these one-and-a-half verses, see, e.g., Kataoka 2011b: 258–259 with n. 20.

[44] See Krasser 2001. It goes without saying that I do not agree with Franco who concludes his very learned chapter "The Framework and Proof-Strategy of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-Chapter" by comparing Dharmakīrti's strategy with that of Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana. Dharmakīrti was well aware of the fact that Dignāga's way of understanding *āgama* was similar to that of Pakṣilasvāmin and that both operated with a false *śeṣavadanumāna*, a mistake that Dharmakīrti avoided. Franco (1997: 39–40): "To conclude, I have tried to show that there are strong resemblances and parallelisms between Dharmakīrti's proof of the validity of the Buddhist *āgama*, which is based on the Buddha's being *pramāṇabhūta*, which is based in its turn on the establishment of the four noble truths, and Vātsyāyana's proof of the validity of the Veda, which is based on its composition by *āptas*, whose status is based in its turn on the effectiveness of the statements of the Āyurveda, the *mantras*, etc. I would even go so far as to say that although structurally the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter is construed as a commentary on the five epithets of the Buddha, the interpretation of the

4. MORE ON PVSV 108,1–109,22

These two accounts of *āgama*, according to which, on the one hand, it cannot be counted as a *pramāṇa* at all and according to which, on the other, it yields correct knowledge even of external objects, seem completely incompatible to me. Yet we find them in the work of one and the same author. Thus, to which view did he really subscribe?

The depiction of scripture as having the special status as an inference, but an inference that is not without problems, leads Dunne to an interesting description of Dharmakīrti's approach to it.

> A significant feature of this argument is the tension that it evidences between an appeal to one's own empirical knowledge as opposed to trusting in another's (i.e., the Buddha's) transempirical knowledge.... Nevertheless, despite this claim's empiricist tones, Dharmakīrti is apparently troubled by his own appeal to the Buddha's transempirical knowledge and concomitant extraordinary qualities. How else can we explain the fact that he immediately backpedals by denying that scriptural inference is really an inference at all (6)? Moreover, he then proceeds to reject explicitly any appeal to credibility (7). (Dunne 2004: 241f.)

Tillemans, on the other hand, who is well aware of the passages adduced above in §3, considers scripture as depicted in the PV(SV) 108,2–109,19 to be an "exception." In his summary of PV 1.216 he writes,

> (d) v. 216: Dignāga's point in saying that authoritative words were an inference was that when an authority's words (= scripture) have been found to be non-belying on rationally decidable matters, then we are justified to understand radically inaccessible matters based on that scripture. In this particular case, contrary to what was said in v. 213, we do infer something more than just the speaker's intention from his words: we also infer that the state of affairs obtains. This one 'exception' to v. 213 must be allowed because otherwise there would be no way (*agatyā*) for us to come to know radically inaccessible things. (Tillemans 1999a: 399–400 = 1999b: 41–42)

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epithets and the general strategy employed to prove the validity of the Buddhist teachings owe more to Vātsyāyana than to Dignāga." On Pakṣilasvāmin, see below, p. 110 n. 49.

And in his introduction to the same paper, which summarizes Dharmakīrti's position on *āgama*, we read,

> It is well known that Dharmakīrti commented upon the phrase *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā* in Dignāga as showing that quotations from authorities could be used to prove certain propositions inferentially. In particular, use of scripture or scriptural tradition (*āgama*) was supposedly not a separate means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), but was said to be an inference because similar to other inferences in reliably representing its object, i.e. in 'not belying' (*avisaṃvāda*). This then is *āgamāśritānumāna*, 'scripturally based inference'. Of course, not just any scripture can be used as a basis for such an inference, nor can such inferences pertain to any and all objects. The main criterion separating reliable from bogus scriptures is the threefold analysis whereby it is determined that ...

There follows a description of the threefold analysis. Then Tillemans goes on to say,

> ... Now, if the scripture passes this triple test, it is fit to be used in 'scripturally based inferences', but with the all-important stipulation that such inferences are only to be used in the case of radically inaccessible matters (*atyantaparokṣa*), ones which are not in the domain of observation or objective reasoning, but are only accessible once we have accepted (*abhyupagata*) scripture. In short, *āgamāśritānumāna* works where objective inference and observation leave off. ... This interpretation of Dharmakīrti's account of scripturally based inferences, which we shall term for short 'inference-like-any-other', is not just a hypothetical possibility. (Tillemans 1999a: 395–396; not reprinted in 1999b)

The questions I want to address here are:

- Was Dharmakīrti "troubled by his own appeal to the Buddha's transempirical knowledge"?
- Does Dharmakīrti hold the position that this "one 'exception' to v. 213 must be allowed because otherwise there would be no way (*agatyā*) for us to come to know radically inaccessible things"?

- Is this "inference-like-any-other"[45] more than "just a hypothetical possibility" and can it "be used to prove certain propositions inferentially"?

Let me begin with the second question by examining the meaning of *agatyā*.

4.1. On agatyā

agatyā in the context of the *āgama* discussion has been used by Dharmakīrti three times: once in PV 1.216, once in PVSV 109,19, and once in PVSV 168,1. It has been translated variously as follows (the passages are given approximately in chronological order):[46]

PV 1.216 (see above p. 88)

- "for [otherwise] there would be no way [to know such objects]" (Tillemans 1986: 32, 1990: I.25, 1993: 11; and similarly Dunne 2004: 364)
- "for there is no [other] possibility (*agatyā*) [to explain it]" (Yaita 1987: 8)
- "since there is no [other] possibility [but to also regard the latter kind of statement as an inference...]" (van Bijlert 1989: 124)
- "[... mais cela, Dignāga ne l'a dit qu']en raison de l'impossibilité [où l'on se trouve sinon] d'accéder [aux objets radicalement imperceptibles]" (Eltschinger 2007a: 224)

PVSV 109,19: *tad etad agatyobhayathāpy anumānatvam āgamasyopavarṇitam, varam āgamāt pravṛttāv evaṃ pravṛttir iti*

- "Thus [the fact that] *āgama* is *anumāna* has been described in [different] two ways [in v.216 & 217], owing to impossibility [of explaining in any other manner the *āgama*'s authoritativeness, i.e. by considering our ordinary conception:] 'When [some act] is going to be done, it

[45] If one accepts the account of *sāmānyāt* as proposed above in §2.4, then Tillemans' expression "inference-like-any-other" for this kind of inference might not be the best choice.

[46] See also McClintock 2010: 259.

is certainly (*evam*) better to act on the basis of *āgama*'." (Yaita 1987: 10)

- "This fact that scripture is an inference is asserted in both cases [i.e. in vv. 216 and 217] because of the lack of any [other] way. If one engages oneself on the basis of scripture, it is better to engage oneself in this fashion [on the basis of a correct scripture rather than on the basis of one which belies]." (Tillemans 1999a: 400)
- "[Mais de chacune] des deux manières [dont on l'a fait, ce n'est qu']en raison de l'impossiblité d'accéder [sinon aux objets radicalement imperceptibles que nous avons] exposé le caractère inférentiel de l'Écriture, [jugeant] que tant qu'à agir à partir d'une Écriture, mieux vaut agir ainsi." (Eltschinger 2007a: 227)
- "Thus, in both cases, that the scripture is a valid inference is explained because there is no [other] way." (Kataoka 2011b: 256)[47]

PVSV 168,1–2: *agatyā cedam āgamalakṣaṇam iṣṭam*

- "Now, we accept this defining character of scripture for lack of any [other] way." (Tillemans 1999a: 400)
- "And this definition of scripture [as an inference] is accepted [by us] because there is no other way." (Kataoka 2011b: 256 n. 10)

Of these possibilities I prefer the one according to which this definition was given or accepted for lack of any other way. I understand *agatyā* as referring back to the initial explanation I proposed in §2.1 of why Dignāga gave a definition at all, namely, because otherwise activity with regard to transcendent matters is not possible. Thus, he had no other choice than to give this definition, knowing that, though it is faulty, it is the best definition available. But he gave, of course, the best one that is possible. Thus, I prefer *agatyā* to be read with the past participles in these phrases: *agatyābhihitā* (k. 216), *agatyā* ... *upa-*

[47] Kataoka is of the opinion that *agatyā* should exclude such possibilities as the Buddha's being a liar or his teaching having no aim and so forth, by relating it to the Mīmāṃsaka proof of Manu's reliability.

varṇitam (PVSV 109,19–20), and *agatyā* ... *iṣṭam* (PVSV 168,1–2). This is also the approach taken by the commentators.[48]

If we understand *agatyā* as "for [otherwise] there would be no way [to know such objects]" or something similar, then we would have to supply the phrase "knowledge of transcendent matters," which, though implied in his explanation of k. 216 (*arthāvisaṃvādād anumānam* PVSV 109,11), Dharmakīrti tries to avoid. By introducing *agatyā*, understood in this way, Dharmakīrti is better able to down-play the obvious contradiction between his attitude towards scripture and Dignāga's definition and to arrive at the "solution" that it is still better to act towards transcendent matters on account of doubt, for sometimes it might work (*tatra kadācid avisaṃvādasambhavāt*, cf. above n. 41). Moreover, in this way Dharmakīrti can avoid committing a *śeṣavadanumāna* himself.[49]

I also do not follow Kataoka's hypothesis, though it is tempting, that *agatyā* excludes such possibilities as the Buddha's being a liar or his teaching having no aim and so forth. Here, the context is to explain away as much as possible the contradiction between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, not at all to prove that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa*.

Returning to the question under consideration, namely whether this "one 'exception' to v. 213 must be allowed because otherwise there would be no way (*agatyā*) for us to come to know radically inaccessible things" (Tillemans), I cannot see that scripture as defined by Dignāga in the way we have seen, so that it amounts to a *śeṣavadanumāna*, would

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[48] See, e.g., Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin on PV 1.216. PVṬ *Je* D245b2/P289b8–290a1: *de yaṅ* ***go skabs med*** *de rnam pa gźan gyis śin tu lkog tu gyur pa la 'jug pa med pa'i phyir ro* // [a]*'jug pa yod na de ltar 'jug pa'o*[a] [D : *'jug par bya'o* P] // ≈ PVSVṬ 393,30–394,8: *sā c****āgatyābhihitā****nyena prakāreṇātyantaparokṣe pravṛttyasambhavāt*, [a]*satyāṃ pravṛttau varam evaṃ pravṛtta iti*[a].

[a] cf. PVSV 108,5–6: *sati pravartitavye varam evaṃ pravṛtta iti*, and PVSV 109,20–21: *varaṃ pravṛttāv āgamād evaṃ pravṛttir iti*.

[49] This kind of *śeṣavadanumāna* we find implied by Pakṣilasvāmin. NBh 97,2 on NSū 2.1.68: *teṣāṃ khalu vai prāṇabhṛtāṃ svayam anavabudhyamānānāṃ nānyad upadeśād avabodhakāraṇam asti*. "Now, when these [ordinary] living beings do not know for themselves [through their own power of cognition those things that should be avoided or obtained], then there is no other cause of [correct] knowledge [left for them] than the [valid] instruction [given by the expert speaker]." Translation van Bijlert 1989: 161.

constitute an exception to verbal knowledge for Dharmakīrti in guaranteeing knowledge of or access to external objects such as heaven.[50] It is only when it comes to religious practice that, acting on the basis of a purified scripture, the probability of success is higher, but there is no certainty at all.

Connected to this problem is also the question whether such an inference based on scripture is more than "just a hypothetical possibility" and whether it can "be used to prove certain propositions inferentially."

4.2. On āgamāpekṣānumāna, āgamāśraya-anumāna

From the description by Tillemans cited above (pp. 106–107) we learn that "if the scripture passes this triple test, it is fit to be used in 'scripturally based inferences,'" also called *āgamāśritānumāna*. If I am correct in assuming that what Tillemans means by *āgamāśritānumāna* is what Dharmakīrti calls *āgamāpekṣānumāna* (PVSV 109,1), *āgamāśrayam anumānam* (NB 3.114, PVin 3 128,4),[51] or *āgamāpekṣam anumānam* (PV 4.48 = PVin 3.9; see Tillemans 2000: 78),[52] then I must confess I have not been able to find any passage in Dharmakīrti, where he calls an inference based on a purified scripture that has passed the triple test a "scripturally based inference." In PV 1 and PVSV Dharmakīrti uses scripturally based inferences only in the context of testing a scrip-

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[50] As nicely shown by Tillemans (1993: Intro. §§ 2–4, 1999a: 396–399), later Tibetans such as Tsoṅ kha pa or Śākya mchog ldan took such an inference based on scripture to be a full-fledged probative inference in which the *hetu* fulfils the *trairūpya* condition. See, e.g., Śākya mchog ldan's account in the translation of Tillemans (1999a: 398 n. 5): "As for proving the [reason's three] characteristics, the *pakṣadharma(tā)* is established by perception, for this reason is presented to an opponent who perceptually observes the statement, 'From giving comes wealth and from morality, happiness' [i.e. he sees that the statement is indeed present in the text of the *Ratnāvalī*]. As for the proof of the pervasion (*vyāpti*), there are the following two [subsections]: proving *anvaya* and proving *vyatireka*. We now take up the first [i.e. *anvaya*]. Take as the subject the *Ratnāvalī*; it is non-belying with regard to the propositions which it teaches, because it is a scripture [judged] immaculate through the three [kinds] of analysis." For Indian forerunners, see Eltschinger 2007a: 107.

[51] For the text and a translation of NB 3.114, see Tillemans 2000: 95 n. 336.

[52] In PVin 2.42 this kind of inference is also referred to as *āgamārthāśrayā yuktiḥ*, see above, p. 55 n. 97.

ture. He does so when first explaining the triple test in his comments on PV 1.215.

> *āgamāpekṣānumāne 'pi, yathā rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ cādharmam abhyupagamya tatprahāṇāya snānāgnihotrāder anupadeśaḥ.* PVSV 109,1–3
>
> Also in the case of a scripturally based inference[53] [there should be no invalidation (*abādhana*). Non-invalidation is] as follows (*yathā*): Having accepted (*abhyupagamya*) that demerit (*adharma*) consists in [defilements] such as desire (*rāgādirūpa*) and [the actions (*karman*)] born of them (*tat-*

[53] The text of Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 393,13–17) explaining the locative (*āgamāpekṣānumāne 'pi*) seems to be problematic: ***yathātmādīnām*** (/) *ādiśabdāt pradhāneśvarādiparigrahaḥ / na hy eṣāṃ kiñcil liṅgam asti yenānumeyāḥ syuḥ / etad api pratipādayiṣyati / viśuddhe viṣayadvaye* ( ) *'tyantaparokṣe cāgamaviṣaye paurvāparyavirodhena yasmin cintāṃ pravartayati tasminn* ***āgamāpekṣam anumānam api*** */ abādhanam iti prakṛtam /*. *ātman*, etc., in ***ātmādīnām*** (PVSV 109,1) constitute examples of entities that should not be taught to be inferable in a treatise. By the word *ādi*, according to Karṇakagomin, primordial matter (*pradhāna*) of the Sāṅkhyas and a creator god (*īśvara*) are included, because there is no inferential mark on the basis of which they could be inferred. The problem now is, whether *viśuddhe viṣayadvaye* should be read with *etad api pratipādayiṣyati* or with the next part beginning with *atyantaparokṣe*. The editor indicated *viśuddhe viṣayadvaye* as an unidentified quotation and read it with *atyantaparokṣe*. In that case *viśuddhe viṣayadvaye* has to be understood together with *atyantaparokṣe* as the object of the investigation by means of the scripturally based inference, as was done by Dunne (2004: 363 n. 9). Dunne, who also provides a translation of Śākyabuddhi's explanation, realized that this constitutes a problem and thus introduced his translation with the statement that Karṇakagomin "offers a somewhat less helpful comment." Thus, I propose to read *viśuddhe viṣayadvaye* with *etad api pratipādayiṣyati* and to correct the text to *etad api pratipādayiṣyati – viśuddhe viṣayadvaya iti* (or: *ityādinā*). *viśuddhe viṣayadvaye* would then be a reference to PV 4.50 where Dharmakīrti will explain that one can adduce passages from a scripture as inferential marks only after one has purified that scripture in terms of perceptible and empirically inferable objects according to the method explained in the comments on PV 1.214, but not before – this is the meaning of *viśuddhe viṣayadvaye*, etc. (see Tillemans 2000: 80). And as the opponents can prove *ātman*, *pradhāna*, etc., only with the help of inferential marks (*liṅga*) that are taught in their treatises, they have no *liṅga*s available as long as their treatises have not passed the test. The treatises, however, will not pass the test as they teach *ātman*, *pradhāna*, etc., to be inferable without there being a *liṅga* available. Thus, Dharmakīrti in PV 4.50 will explain that there is no *liṅga* whatsoever, on account of which *ātman*, etc., could be inferred (*na hy eṣāṃ kiñcil liṅgam asti yenānumeyāḥ syuḥ*. *etad api pratipādayiṣyati*).

> *prabhava*),[54] [a treatise] cannot prescribe [practices] such as the Agnihotra and ablutions (*snāna*) as means of eliminating it.

Later, this *abhyupagama* is presupposed in the comments on PV 1.333 (in the verse the formulation *āgamāpekṣenānumānena* is used).[55]

> *anyad api pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ* [a]*prasiddhaviparyayam āgamāśrayeṇa cānumānena bādhitam agnihotrādeḥ pāpaśodhanasāmarthyādikam.* PVSV 174,21–23[56]
>
> [a] *prasiddha* em. (PVSVṬ 612,7) : *prasiddhi* PVSV : *pratisiddha* $PVSV_{ms}$ 39b8.
>
> [The Veda states] yet other [things] which are contrary to what is established by perception and inference and which are negated by inference based on scripture, such as the capacity of the Agnihotra and [ablutions] to purify one of sin, etc.[57]

Thus, if I have not overlooked a passage in which Dharmakīrti uses the terms *āgamāśritānumāna*, *āgamāpekṣānumāna*, and the like for an inference that is based on a purified scripture, *āgamāpekṣānumana* for Dharmakīrti is not the same as the inference that is called by later Tibetans "inference based on authority" (*yid ches pa'i rjes dpag*, see Tillemans 1993: 12).

Coming back to the second and third questions posed above (see pp. 107–108), Is inference based on a purified scripture more than "just a hypothetical possibility," as Tillemans alleges, and can it "be used to prove certain propositions inferentially"? I would answer "no" to both. For Dharmakīrti such an inference is a *śeṣavadanumāna*, and thus I cannot see how it should be more than "just a hypothetical possibility." If such inferences nevertheless are used as in the Tibetan tradition, then the "certain propositions" that can be inferred based on a purified scripture would be any of the propositions of that scripture regarding transcendent matters. Once the scripture has been established to be

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[54] Cf. PVSVṬ 393,19: ***tatprabhavaṃ*** *rāgādisamutthāpitaṃ kāyavākkarma* ***cādharmam abhyupagamya***.

[55] This *abhyupagama* is also presupposed in PV 4.107; see Tillemans 2000: 150–152.

[56] For Śākyabuddhi's explanation, see above, pp. 69–70 n. 142.

[57] This *āgama* is attributed by Kamalaśīla to Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya, and others; see McClintock 2010: 319–320.

purified by the triple test, then any statement of that scripture regarding transcendent matters has to be non-belying (*avisaṃvāda*), because it is a statement of that scripture. The logical reason is a *svabhāvahetu*, as in the inferences of Śākyabuddhi referred to above (p. 99), at least in the various passages discussed by Tillemans.

Now we can consider the first question posed above (see p. 107). Was Dharmakīrti "troubled by his own appeal to the Buddha's transempirical knowledge"? As we have seen so far, Dharmakīrti has a clear concept of *āgama* and of Dignāga's definition: *āgama* is not a *pramāṇa* and there can be no certainty from its statements regarding transcendent matters; Dignāga's definition is faulty, constituting a *śeṣavadanumāna*. Thus, I think Dharmakīrti was not troubled by his own appeal to the Buddha's transcendent knowledge, but he was troubled by Kumārila. For Dignāga's definition came under fire in the *Ślokavārttika*, where Kumārila in the broader context of his refutation of omniscience has a section (ŚV *codanā* 121–132), which is titled "Denial of *ekadeśasaṃvādānumāna*" by Kataoka (2011a: 348). Already the introductory one-and-a-half verses make it clear that the argument at stake is the same as the one propounded by Dignāga in his definition of *āgama* in PS 2.5ab.

> Even a man who (*yo 'pi*), after having seen [i.e., ascertained] (*dṛṣṭvā*) a person to be reliable (*satyavāditām*) with regard to [perceptible] objects that have connections with the sense-faculties and so on (*indriyādisambandhaviṣaye*), supposes (*kalpayet*) [that a statement of that person must] also (*api*) [be true] with regard to an [imperceptible and religious] matter that one can only believe (*śraddheye 'rthe*), because it is a statement of the same person (*tadvacanatvena*), he too (*tenāpi*) would have proved (*sādhitā syāt*) validity (*pramāṇatā*) through dependence [on something external] (*pāratantryeṇa*).[58] (Kataoka 2011a: 348–354)

Although Kumārila refers to objects that are connected with the sense-faculties (*indriyādisambandhaviṣaye*), I think there is little risk in interpreting this as a reference to the objects of perception and empirical inference. This is at least the way Kumārila's commentators under-

[58] ŚV *codanā* 121–122ab: *yo 'pīndriyārthasambandhaviṣaye satyavāditām / dṛṣṭvā tadvacanatvena śraddheye 'rthe 'pi kalpayet // tenāpi pāratantryeṇa bādhitā syāt pramāṇatā /*.

stand it, alluding to the Buddha's teaching of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) as the basis for establishing that his teaching is (generally) true: Umbeka – *pramāṇāntaragocarārthapratipādake hi kṣaṇikādivākye*; Sucaritamiśra – *indriyādisambandhaviṣaye hi jñānamātrakṣaṇikatvādau*; Pārthasārathimiśra – *asmadādipramāṇagocarārthaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ sarvasaṃskṛtam ityādi buddhavākyam* (see Kataoka 2011a: 348–349 n. 374). This is exactly the example that is used by Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin when explaining PS 2.5ab as presented in PVSV 108,1 (*dper na 'dus byas thams cad ni skad cig ma źes bya ba la sogs pa lta bu'o //*; *yathā kṣaṇikāḥ sarve saṃskārā ityādikaḥ*; see above, n. 35). In the continuation of his argument Kumārila's tone becomes quite sarcastic as he shows what else one could prove by such an argument.

> This statement of mine (*vaco mama*) "the Buddha, etc. (*buddhādīnām*) are not omniscient" (*asarvajñam iti*) is true, because it is stated by me (*maduktatvāt*), just like (*yathaiva*) [my statements] "fire is hot" (*agnir uṣṇaḥ*) and (*api*) "[fire is] bright" (*bhāsvara iti*).[59, 60]
>
> And (*ca*) it is a perceived fact (*pratyakṣam*) that I uttered (*maduktatvam*) [this sentence], whereas you have to prove (*tvayā sādhyā*) that he [i.e., the Buddha and so on] stated (*taduktatā*) [these teachings]. Therefore (*tena*) mine (*madīyaḥ*) should be (*syāt*) a [correct] reason (*hetuḥ*), whereas yours (*tava*) is not established because it is doubtful (*saṃdigdhāsiddhatā*).[61] (Kataoka 2011a: 364)

I think that being faced with such mocking criticism and knowing that the back-bone of his own *apoha* theory is completely contrary to what Dignāga proposed with his *āgama* definition, it fits the context better if we assume Dharmakīrti to be troubled by Kumārila rather than by his own appeal to the Buddha's transempirical knowledge. Dharmakīrti could not but bite the bullet. And he did it quite skilfully.

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[59] On the possibility of a Mīmāṃsaka using such a kind of *śeṣavadanumāna* to derive the validity of the Veda in all its parts from a statement such as "Fire is the remedy for cold," see above pp. 102–103 with n. 41.

[60] ŚV *codanā* 130: *buddhādīnām asarvajñam iti satyaṃ vaco mama / maduktatvād yathaivāgnir uṣṇo bhāsvara ity api //*.

[61] ŚV *codanā* 131: *pratyakṣaṃ ca maduktatvaṃ tvayā sādhyā taduktatā / tena hetur madīyaḥ syāt sandigdhāsiddhatā tava //*.

5. SUMMARY

Putting now together these various bits and pieces of information scattered throughout the PV(SV), we can sketch the following picture.

Being confronted with the fact that Dignāga's definition of *āgama* as well as the cognition that arises from it as an *anumāna* is not only faulty but also incompatible with his *apoha* theory, the only possibility left for Dharmakīrti was to resort to damage control. But he tried not only to minimize the damage as much as possible but also to benefit from it.

First of all, this definition of Dignāga is not to be understood on a logical level.[62] It was presented by Dignāga only because humans like us cannot live without religion. This is due to the fact that credible persons report disastrous consequences of bad karma as well as the possibility of final release. Since we do not see anything that contradicts their reports, we are better off following their advice when we act. It is only under these circumstances that Dignāga gave this account;[63] being himself a specialist in logic (*nyāyavid*, PV 1.331), he knew very well that such a definition, logically speaking, is as deficient as the one proposed by the Naiyāyikas.[64] Thus, Dignāga set the standard for scripture as high as possible on a rational level – the entire body of *āgama* has to

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[62] PV 1.216 (*anumānatā ... agatyābhihitā*), see above, p. 88; PVSV 109,19–20 (*agatyā ... anumānatvam ... upavarṇitam*), see above, p. 101; and PVSV 168,1–2 (*agatyā cedam āgamalakṣaṇam iṣṭam*), see above, p. 104 n. 42. See also §4.1.

[63] PVSV 108,2–6; see above, p. 85 n. 11.

[64] PVSV 173,22–25 (on PV 1.331); see above, p. 103 n. 41. See also Tillemans 1999a: 401: "Karṇakagomin and Śākyabuddhi ad v. 216 are clear on the implications: scriptural inference is an inference because of the thought of people (*pumso 'bhiprāyavaśāt*) who want to engage themselves (*pravṛttikāma*) on the spiritual path: it is not an inference objectively (*vastutas*)." Tillemans cites, in n. 11, Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 394,20–22): *kiṃ tarhīṣṭasya pratyakṣānumānāgamyasyārthasyānantaroktena nyāyenāvisaṃvādād anumānam api pravṛttikāmasya puṃso 'bhiprāyavaśāt / vastutas tv ananumānam, śabdānām arthaiḥ saha sambandhābhāvāt /*. Already in their comments on *nāyam* (PVSV 108,2), etc., Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin had explained that Dignāga did not call *āgama* an inference in terms of real validity (*bhāvikaṃ prāmāṇyam*). PVṬ D242b5–6/P286a2–3: *'di skad du slob dpon gyis dṅos su tshad ma ñid du brjod pas luṅ rjes su dpag pa ñid du gsuṅs pa ni ma yin gyi / 'on kyaṅ skyes bu'i 'jug pa la ltos nas bstan pa yin no* // = PVSVṬ 390,21–22: *nācāryeṇa bhāvikaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ kathayatānumānatvam āgamasyoktam, api tu puruṣapravṛttim apekṣya*.

pass the triple test.[65] If it does, the probability that one will be successful in attaining one's religious goals is much higher.[66] But this triple test is not only helpful in religious matters, it also is an effective tool when dealing with the scriptures of the opposing schools. It is exactly this triple test that is consistently applied by Dharmakīrti throughout his works in order to refute the scriptures of his opponents; namely, they have to pass the test (1) in terms of perceptible objects, (2) in terms of objects that are inferable empirically, and then, finally, (3) in terms of internal contradictions which can be checked with the help of scripturally based inferences. And because *āgama* is not an independent *pramāṇa*, it cannot be used as long as it has not passed the first two steps of the triple test. Thus, many of the central doctrines of the scriptures of opposing schools, such as a permanent soul (*ātman*), primordial matter (*pradhāna*/*prakṛti*), or a creator god (*īśvara*), which in fact can only be proven by means of scripture (if at all), fail to pass the second step of the test, i.e., *ātman* and so on, which are taught to be inferable, in fact cannot be established by empirical inference.[67]

The price for escaping Kumārila's critique, for keeping his theory that there is no relation between words and external objects as stated in PV(SV) 1.213 – one of the cornerstones in Dharmakīrti's refutation of the validity of the Veda – and for dragging down all scriptures to the realm where they can be tested by perception or empirical inference, was very high. Dharmakīrti had to abandon the validity of all scriptures, including that of the Buddhists. This is quite consistent with the rest of his logical system which builds on pervasion (*vyāpti*). There is no way whatsoever to establish a pervasion between the act of speaking of a credible person and his telling the truth.[68] In accordance with this theory Dharmakīrti established a different method to prove the authoritativeness of the Buddha in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, basing himself on empirical inference and thus avoiding a *śeṣavadanumāna*.[69]

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[65] PV 1.214–215 with PVSV; see above §2.2.

[66] PVSV 174,1: *tatra kadācid avisaṃvādasambhavāt*; see above, p. 103 n. 41.

[67] See PV 4.2 and 4.48–52 (especially 4.48 and 50) in Tillemans 2000: 11, 78–83; see also above, p. 112 n. 53.

[68] PVSV 167,26–168,1: *tatpravṛtter avisaṃvādena vyāptyasiddheś ca*; see above, p. 104 n. 42.

[69] See above, pp. 105–106 and nn. 43 and 44.

While Dharmakīrti's courageous reform of Dignāga's theory of scripture, which he was forced to undertake not only by his own system but also by Kumārila, turned out to be quite successful within the framework of his own system, it could very well have pleased Kumārila and other non-Buddhists to see their worst critic giving up the validity of the *buddhavacana*. It was also very much welcomed by his Buddhist adversary Bhāviveka, who immediately sent his greetings:

> *atrocyate pramāṇaṃ naḥ sarvaṃ tāthāgataṃ vacaḥ* /
> *āptopadeśaprāmāṇyād bhadro hi pratipadyate* //
> *nāgamāntarasandigdhaviparyastamatiḥ paraḥ* /
> *tasmāt tatpratipattyarthaṃ tanmṛgyo yuktimannayaḥ* // MHK 5.8–9
>
> To this [*pūrvapakṣa* of the Yogācāra] we reply: All the words of the Tathāgata are authoritative (*pramāṇa*) for us, because the teachings of a reliable person are authoritative. A good one puts [these] into practice. The other one, whose mind is in doubt and confused by other scriptures, does not. Therefore the path of reasoning (*yuktimannaya*) should be followed by him in order to put these into practice.[70]

And it might well be the case that Bhāviveka was not the only one to accuse Dharmakīrti of not being a good (*bhadra*) Buddhist by being taken in by Kumārila's arguments against scripture, the arguments of the opponent (*āgamāntara*), and, in his confusion, thinking them to be his own arguments. There might have been other Buddhists as well who thought he had thrown the baby out with the bathwater.

[70] For the interpretation of these two verses and the commentary on the latter, see Section 1.3.1.1, "Who is the opponent in MHK 5.8–9?" in Krasser 2012: 545–546. For the text and different translations, see Hoornaert 2000: 78 and 90, and Eckel 2008: 225–227 and 394–395.

JOHN TABER

Dharmakīrti and the Mīmāṃsakas in Conflict*

1. INTRODUCTION: DHARMAKĪRTI'S RELATION TO MĪMĀṂSĀ

It is well known that Dharmakīrti in his writings is often preoccupied with Mīmāṃsā theories and arguments. Frequently the Mīmāṃsaka is an adversary and target of criticism, but occasionally he may have been a positive stimulus for Dharmakīrti's own thinking. For instance, Dharmakīrti's criticism of the *śeṣavadanumāna*, "inference with a remainder,"[1] as a fallacy at the beginning of *Pramāṇavārttika* 1, seems primarily intended to dispell a stock Mīmāṃsā argument[2] against the Buddha's omniscience, namely, the Buddha could not have been without desire (hence, he could not have been omniscient; for no omniscient person is possessed of desire), because he spoke.[3] Yet at the beginning

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[1] Which includes inferences from cause to effect as well as inferences from effect to cause and other inferences based merely on the non-observation of the *hetu* in the *vipakṣa*. On the *śeṣavadanumāna*, see PV 1.331/PVSV 173,22–26 above, pp. 62–63 nn. 126–127.

[2] It is implicit in Bhāviveka's presentation of Mīmāṃsā in MHK 9. MHK 9.3ab: *rāgādidoṣaduṣṭatvāt puruṣasya vaco mṛṣā*. Cf. MHK 9.15 and 16.

[3] See PV(SV) 1.12 and 14. I am inclined to resist the suggestion by Kataoka (2003a: 60–62 n. 35) that Dharmakīrti is specifically attacking Kumārila here. In ŚV *codanā* 137, Kumārila only points out that, being without activity, because he is without desire, the teachings of an omniscient person would have to have been composed by others (*deśanā anyapraṇītaiva*). He does not, to my knowledge, appeal to merely *speaking*, which is the reason given by Dharmakīrti PV 1.12c for erroneously inferring that one is possessed of desire (*vacanād rāgitādivat*), as a reason for denying an omniscient being. I think this is a significant difference. At ŚV *codanā* 132, moreover, and in his *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (TS_K 3157/$TS_Ś$ 3156) Kumārila mentions several

of *Pramāṇavārttika* 2, vv. 10–16, Dharmakīrti points out several fallacies in arguments allegedly proving an eternal creator of the universe that more or less match fallacies identified by Kumārila in his refutations of arguments for the existence of God in his *Ślokavārttika* – as if Dharmakīrti actually borrowed from Kumārila.[4] And perhaps most strikingly, at PV 2.5c Dharmakīrti introduces an alternative definition of *pramāṇa*, *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*, which is strongly reminiscent of the Mīmāṃsā definition of *pramāṇa* that specifies that it must, among other things, present that which has not been previously grasped (that is, it must be *anadhigatārthaviṣaya* or an *agṛhītagrāhi-* or *apūrvārthajñāna*, etc.), which requirement may also have been originally introduced by Kumārila.[5]

It is at the end of *Pramāṇavārttika* 1, however, beginning with verse 224 and extending to the end of the text – about a third of the treatise – where Dharmakīrti launches an all-out attack on Mīmāṃsā, focusing on the central claim of the Mīmāṃsakas that the Veda is eternal and

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reasons – *prameyatva* (ŚV *codanā* 132a), *jñeyatva*, *vastutva*, *sattva* (TS$_K$ 3157a$_2$b/TS$_Ś$ 3156a$_2$b) – but "speaking" or "being a speaker" (*vaktṛtva*; cf. SS 23,11–14) is not among them. Kataoka (forthcoming, n. 2) gives a whole list of passages from Dharmakīrti's works that, he maintains, "[seem] to presuppose (or criticize) ŚV or TV." Some of the passages Kataoka has discussed in published articles. As always, the devil is in the details and their interpretation. I would add to Kataoka's list the passage that begins PV 3.25ff., where Dharmakīrti refutes the reality of universals. Some of the ideas about universals he attacks are strikingly similar to ones that find expression in Kumārila's discussions.

[4] See Krasser 1999.

[5] Krasser 2001 traces this definition back to a verse quoted by Ratnakīrti that presumably comes from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*: *tatrāpūrvārthavijñānaṃ niścitaṃ bādhavarjitam / aduṣṭakāraṇārabdhaṃ pramāṇaṃ lokasammatam //*. It should be noted, however, that the verse mentions four criteria that must be met for a cognition to be a *pramāṇa*, namely, (1) it presents a new object, (2) it is definite, (3) it is free of sublation, and (4) it is produced by non-defective causes, and that only the first of these is alluded to by PV 2.5a. Moreover, it is unlikely, *pace* Krasser 2001: 195, that Dharmakīrti would have proposed this alternative definition "in order to prove to the Mīmāṃsakas that, even according to their own definition when understood properly, not the Veda, but the Buddha is to be regarded as a *pramāṇa*," since he would have been well aware that the Mīmāṃsakas considered the teachings of the Buddha to have been contradicted by other *pramāṇa*s in many respects. (Thus, at the very least, the cognition of the Buddha was not *bādhavarjita*!) And so Dharmakīrti's motive for introducing this alternative definition remains rather mysterious.

authorless. The passage that is translated in this volume, PV(SV) 1.312–340, represents the culmination of that critique. In this essay I would like to examine certain aspects of Dharmakīrti's treatment of Mīmāṃsā in this passage.

My main concern will be, How well do Dharmakīrti's criticisms in our text actually tell against the Mīmāṃsā position of the authorlessness of scripture? This may strike some readers as a rather unusual question to ask. Usually, as historians of Indian philosophy we restrict ourselves to reconstructing the ideas of Indian philosophers and understanding them in their historical context. We do not normally concern ourselves with their validity or cogency. I do believe, however, that this question is of relevance in assessing the depth and sophistication of Dharmakīrti's knowledge of Mīmāṃsā. Buddhist legends about Dharmakīrti tell us that he was born into a Brahmin family.[6] If that is true, then he would have received a Brahmin's education, which very well could have included instruction in, or at least exposure to, Mīmāṃsā. How extensive was his training in Mīmāṃsā? Was he really *steeped* in it – so that perhaps Mīmāṃsā had a more profound influence on his thought than we realize? His preoccupation with mantras, in particular, gives this impression. Or did he have merely a superficial acquaintance with it, just enough to arouse a strong aversion in him toward it and provide him with enough information to be able to devise clever objections against its doctrines?[7] (As they say, a little knowledge is a dangerous thing.) Or was his expertise in Mīmāṃsā somewhere in between?

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[6] Thus, Tāranātha (GCh 229): "Having a very sharp intellect, he [Dharmakīrti] thoroughly studied from his early childhood the fine arts, the Vedas with all their *aṅga*s, medicine, grammar and all the *tīrthika* philosophies."

[7] In my experience in the United States, at least, the most outspoken atheists are those who attended Catholic schools when they were young.

2. DHARMAKĪRTI'S TREATMENT OF MĪMĀṂSĀ

2.1. Overview of Dharmakīrti's critique of Mīmāṃsā, PV(SV) 1.312–340

For the Mīmāṃsaka the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the Veda is grounded on its authorlessness (*apauruṣeyatva*). Dharmakīrti has the Mīmāṃsaka declare at PV 1.224 that the falsehood of statements can derive only from the defects of the humans who utter them (i.e., principally, their ignorance or dishonesty); an authorless statement therefore cannot be false. Up to the section of the text we have translated Dharmakīrti has already challenged this doctrine on several fronts.[8] The authorlessness of the Veda would require that there be an eternal connection between word and meaning; but the connection between word and meaning is established by convention; indeed, in general, any relation between independent entities is not real but only mentally constructed.[9] It would also require that words and sentences are themselves uncreated and permanent; but we know them to be transient, like everything else. (Here, Dharmakīrti presents his *vināśitvānumāna*.)[10] We know, moreover, that humans are capable of devising mantras that are causally efficacious; thus the fact that the Veda contains mantras does not speak against its having a human author, either.[11] Nor does the fact that there is no memory of an author of the Veda; for a phenomenon of a certain

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[8] See above, pp. 9–15.

[9] PV(SV) 1.226–238. See Eltschinger 2007a: 138–142.

[10] PV(SV) 1.269–283ab. Extensive arguments specifically against the eternality of words and the sentence (whether conceived of as a *sphoṭa* or a succession of phonemes, *varṇānupūrvī*) are found at PV(SV) 1.247–268. For detailed summaries see Eltschinger 2007a: Chapters 5 and 6. Much of what Dharmakīrti says in his critique of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the eternality of language, starting with PV(SV) 1.225, seems to presuppose ideas of Kumārila. Yet there are at least two very important views of Kumārila that have an obvious bearing on his discussion that, as far as I am able to discern, he ignores: (1) the intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) of all cognitions and (2) the impossibility of fixing the relation between word and meaning by convention (expounded in ŚV *sambandhākṣepaparihāra*). It is these sorts of lapses (there are others) that still make me reluctant to accept the widely held thesis that when Dharmakīrti is attacking Mīmāṃsā he is specifically attacking Kumārila, despite all the good work done by other scholars to point out evidence for it.

[11] PVSV 123,14–124,23 and PV(SV) 1.292–311. See Eltschinger 2001 and 2008.

type – in this case, a linguistic corpus – will always have the same cause as other things of that type, whether or not it is immediately known, just like fire and fuel.[12]

Now, in this final section, beginning with v. 312, Dharmakīrti presents his final *reductio ad absurdum* of the Mīmāṃsā position – as if saving his most devastating criticism for last. Even if the Veda were authorless, he points out, *we could never know what it means*! For the Veda itself does not tell us what it means; humans must *surmise* it. And there is, according to the Mīmāṃsakas' own assumptions, no human qualified to interpret the Veda; for they believe that humans are incapable of knowing the supersensible things of which the Veda speaks.[13]

> *artho 'yam nāyam artho na iti śabdā vadanti na /*
> *kalpyo 'yam arthaḥ puruṣais te ca rāgādisaṃyutāḥ* // PV 1.312
>
> [Vedic] words do not [themselves] declare, "This is our meaning, not this." The meaning [which Vedic words have] must be postulated by humans. The latter are possessed, however, of [moral defects] like desire.

Moreover, it is doubtful that there is any unbroken, uncorrupted tradition of Vedic interpretation. Even if there were an "authorless" tradition of interpretation, we could not be confident we knew what it meant any more than we are in knowing what the Veda means, since it would refer to the same supersensible matters. Finally, mundane usage (*lokavāda*, *prasiddhi*) cannot be resorted to as a criterion for determining the meaning of Vedic statements, least of all by the Mīmāṃsakas, who like to point out that what ordinary humans say is for the most part untrue – hence, surely, how they commonly employ words cannot serve as any kind of *pramāṇa* – and who also routinely deviate from common usage themselves in their Vedic interpretations.

Dharmakīrti thus presents the spectacle of a community of people diligently following the prescriptions and prohibitions of texts the meaning of which, according to their own teachings, they could not

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[12] PV(SV) 1.242; see the entire section PV(SV) 1.239–247.

[13] MīSū 1.1.4. See ŚV *pratyakṣasūtra*, esp. 17–37; Taber 2005: 51–58.

possibly understand. No wonder that the final statement of his critique is an expression of utter contempt for the pious Brahmin!

> *vedaprāmāṇyaṃ kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ*
> *snāne dharmecchā jātivādāvalepaḥ /*
> *santāpārambhaḥ pāpahānāya ceti*
> *dhvastaprajñāne pañca liṅgāni jāḍye* // PV 1.340
>
> [Believing in the] authority of the Veda, claiming something [permanent] to be the agent [of actions], seeking merit in ablutions, taking pride in one's caste[14] and undertaking penance to remove sin – these are the five signs of complete stupidity devoid of any discrimination.

2.2. Dharmakīrti's discussion, PV(SV) 1.319–320ab

Let us look a little more closely at some of the things Dharmakīrti says about "ordinary parlance" (*lokavāda*) or common usage (*prasiddhi*) as a criterion for determining the meaning of Vedic sentences and the possibility of an eternal, authorless tradition of exegesis. He takes up both of these matters together in vv. 319–320ab and his extensive *Svavṛtti* thereon. The account that follows is essentially identical to our synopsis of this section of the text. Because of its significance for assessing Dharmakīrti's knowledge of Mīmāṃsā, in particular, it seems worthwhile to highlight it here.

In raising the question of the criterion of common usage Dharmakīrti may have had in mind the principle stated at *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.30 that the words of the Veda and ordinary language have the same meanings. In any case, Mīmāṃsakas routinely cite *prasiddhi*, common usage, as a reason for interpreting Vedic passages in certain ways; at other times, however, they justify deviating from common usage.

Is it possible, then, that we needn't rely on anyone with a special gift for knowing the supersensible to interpret for us what the Veda means; rather, we can just construe Vedic sentences ourselves according to the ordinary, everyday meanings of their words? Dharmakīrti immediately points out that, even if we construe Vedic words as ordinary ones, they will still in many instances be polysemic, as indeed ordinary words

[14] Lit., "pride in declaring/speaking about one's caste."

often are. Who will be able to determine which of the many possible meanings of a word in the Veda is the right one? (v. 319) The ordinary meaning of everyday discourse, moreover, is established by convention, which is accessible to instruction, while the Veda is supposedly eternal. Who could, in the case of words which supposedly have a beginningless, authorless relation with supersensible meanings, be able to tell us what they mean?

If, on the other hand, one held that there is an explanation of the meaning of the Vedic word that is beginningless and authorless as well – that is to say, an exegetical tradition that extends forever back into the past – then the problem is just moved back a step. How is the meaning of this beginningless explanation known? Moreover, how do we know the explanation has never been corrupted? We are aware of various factors that introduce errors into traditions – enmity, pride, and so forth. And why would the Mīmāṃsaka, of all people, put confidence in a supposedly unbroken tradition of explanation, since he is the one who emphasizes that humans afflicted with moral faults are not to be trusted?[15] That, in fact, is his most characteristic point – "the color of his own face" – says Dharmakīrti.

In the continuation of his *Svavṛtti* to v. 319 Dharmakīrti goes further into how we hear of Vedic schools recovering after nearly dying out – even today some have only a few reciters – so that one might suspect that even those schools that have many adherents today could have been nearly extinct at one time but were restored, and that in the process of restoration errors could have crept into the recitation of the Veda in various ways. And the same could be the case for any "beginningless" tradition of Vedic interpretation.

In summary, it would seem that one cannot establish the meaning of the Veda either through a beginningless, authorless explanation or ordinary linguistic practice. Returning to the latter, Dharmakīrti points out that even if the relation of word and meaning weren't conventional but eternal, ordinary parlance still shows us that words in general are

[15] Thus, Kumārila's famous statement (ŚV *codanā* 144ab), "At all times, humans for the most part speak what is untrue" (*sarvadā cāpi puruṣāḥ prāyeṇānṛtavādinaḥ /*). I am not convinced that *anṛtavādin* necessarily means here, or in the Vedic passage cited by Śabara (ŚBh II.4,4), *anṛtavādinī vāk*, *intentionally* speaking falsehood, hence lying.

polysemic, so that there would always be doubt about the meanings of Vedic words; indeed, there are lots of Vedic words whose meanings are unknown or known but used in unusual ways. But mainly what ordinary parlance teaches us is that a word can mean *anything*; it is actually only by convention that it is assigned to a specific meaning. So again in the case of Vedic words, it seems that a person capable of knowing supersensible things would be required to tell us the *supersensible* meanings to which they are assigned.

Yet even the Mīmāṃsaka, continues Dharmakīrti in PV(SV) 1.220ab, does not always follow common usage when it comes to explaining the meaning of Vedic words. He offers as examples the words *svarga* and *urvaśī*. *svarga* commonly means "heaven," but the Mīmāṃsaka construes it as "delight."[16] *urvaśī*, meanwhile, is usually the name of a nymph who resides in heaven, but typically the Mīmāṃsakas do not interpret proper names in the Veda as referring to individuals – which would impugn its eternality if they were themselves "non-eternal" – but offer etymological analyses instead.[17] Moreover, ritualists referred to the two kindling sticks that are rubbed together to start the fire in the Soma sacrifice as Urvaśī (the lower) and Purūravas (the upper one), who according to a widespread myth was her consort.[18] (Learned Buddhists who knew the myth and the ritual must have thought this was a fine joke!) The Mīmāṃsaka, moreover, cannot claim that one must sometimes resort to an uncommon meaning because the common one is blocked, i.e., it does not fit the context, for how could one ever know in the case of a Vedic statement, which refers to a supersensible state of affairs, that the common meaning is blocked? And if we accept uncommon meanings in the case of such words as *svarga* and *urvaśī*, how do we know we shouldn't accept one for *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*, say, "One should eat dog meat"? The meaning of this sentence cannot be resolved by other Vedic passages, because the meaning of those other passages are in doubt as well – for all we know, the occurrence of *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* there could also mean "One should eat dog meat"! Thus Dharmakīrti repeats the slur,

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[16] See ŚBh V.72,6–7 ad MīSū 4.3.15.

[17] See ŚBh I.121,7–10 ad MīSū 1.1.28 (*pūrvapakṣa*) and I.123,7–124,5 ad 1.1.31 (*siddhānta*). For etymological derivations of *urvaśī* see Nir 5.14.

[18] See TaitS 1.3.7.1 and 6.3.5.2–3; for versions of the myth see ṚV 10.95 and ŚB 11.5.1.

made initially in v. 318, for which this part of *Pramāṇavārttika* 1 is famous.

The criticisms that Dharmakīrti directs against Mīmāṃsā interpretive practices in our text, and especially in PV(SV) 1.319–320ab, reflect a knowledge of Mīmāṃsā that goes considerably beyond just the awareness that the Mīmāṃsakas held the Veda to be authorless, that even the relation between word and meaning is authorless, and that humans are incapable of cognizing the supersensible, because they are corrupted by desire, etc. They refer to specific exegetical principles, such as that the meaning of the words of the Veda and those of ordinary parlance are (for the most part) the same, that nevertheless in certain circumstances the common meaning must be abandoned, and that in many instances other passages of the Veda itself clarify what a particularly problematic passage means. And, also quite significantly, they allude to the Mīmāṃsā belief that recensions of the Veda are liable to extinction or at least periodic decline. Kumārila appeals in his *Tantravārttika* to lost Vedic texts as the basis of the authority of the *dharmaśāstra*s.[19] Do these references indicate that Dharmakīrti had a really in-depth knowledge of Mīmāṃsā, indeed, that perhaps at one point in time he had even been trained in Mīmāṃsā?

A way to approach this matter, I think, is to ask, What would a Mīmāṃsaka make of these kinds of criticisms? Would they have seemed adequate, or even be seen as posing a serious challenge, to someone thoroughly trained in Mīmāṃsā? Do they really get at the heart of Mīmāṃsā exegetical practice? Could they have been posed by someone who really knew what Mīmāṃsā was about? Or are they the objections of someone who was brilliant and perhaps much more knowledgeable of Mīmāṃsā than most, but who was fundamentally an outsider? That is what I would like to consider in the rest of my essay. I believe the short answer to the question, What would a Mīmāṃsaka make of these criticisms?, is something like the following. Contrary to what Dharmakīrti claims, *the Veda itself tells us what it means*. Mīmāṃsā, drawing on an ancient tradition of Vedic exegesis, provides us with a system of rules and principles, as clear and objective as the rules of logic, for interpreting it. One need only learn how to apply the proper methodo-

[19] See Kataoka, forthcoming.

logy – which it is in fact one of the main tasks of Mīmāṃsā to elucidate – and the meaning of the Veda will unfold. But the full answer to this question is quite complicated, and I can only begin to give a hint of it here.

3. THE MĪMĀṂSĀ SCIENCE OF EXEGESIS

3.1. The interpretation of arthavādas in Mīmāṃsā

*Pāda*s 2–4 of the first *adhyāya* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* and its commentaries (to which I shall refer, for the sake of convenience, as the *Mīmāṃsādarśana*) are specifically concerned with the meaning of the Veda – with whether it has any meaning, whether its meaning is coherent, and how to ascertain its meaning. The question of the meaning of Vedic passages is of course a theme that recurs throughout the *Mīmāṃsādarśana*, but it constitutes the main preoccupation of the *adhikaraṇa*s that come immediately after the general discussion of the means of knowing Dharma in the *tarkapāda*. In the first *adhikaraṇa* of the second *pāda* (*sūtra*s 1–18) the question is raised whether those passages of the Veda that do not directly relate to action are without *artha*.[20] Although "without *artha*" (*ānarthakya*) here means without purpose, it is closely related to being without meaning. Certain sentences of the Veda appear not to have a purpose because they cannot be construed as enjoining actions or accessories of actions. Thus, we encounter statements such as "He [Agni, frightened by the Asuras] cried (*arodīt*). That he [viz., Rudra] cried constitutes the rudra-ness of Rudra" (TaitS 1.5.1). This occurs in a Brāhmaṇa passage that discusses the *punarādheya*, the rite for rekindling the sacrificial fire. Later in the same *Saṃhitā*, in a discussion of the *kāmyeṣṭi* for offspring and cattle, we meet with the sentence "Prajāpati cut out his own fat" (TaitS 2.1.1). Now crying, the *pūrvapakṣin* of Śabara's commentary points out, is not something one can do at will; and having cut out one's own fat, one could not (presumably, completely incapacitated!) proceed to perform the sacrifice, as specified, "with a hornless goat."[21] Construed as injunc-

[20] MīSū 1.2.1: *āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthānāṃ tasmād anityam ucyate*.

[21] ŚBh II.3,1–3.

tions, such passages do not make sense. Other passages, meanwhile, are contradicted by scripture itself, or even by perception. Thus, "The mind is a thief, speech is a liar" (MaitS 4.5.2)[22] which Śabara associates with a discussion of the *dakṣinā* given to the priests;[23] and "During the day it is only the smoke of the fire that is seen, not its flame, and during the night only the flame of the fire is seen, not the smoke" (parallel: TaitB 2.1.2.10),[24] which Śabara connects with the injunction "In the evening one offers [by saying] *agnir jyotir jyotir agniḥ*, in the morning [by saying] *sūryo jyotir jyotiḥ sūryaḥ*" (TaitB 2.1.9.2).[25] The first two sentences cannot be injunctions because they are contradicted elsewhere by prohibitions against stealing and lying;[26] the last is contradicted by ordinary experience. These kinds of sentences, the *pūrvapakṣin* concludes, "do not effect a permanent purpose,"[27] and so may be excluded from consideration in interpreting the Veda. This point may have been raised within Mīmāṃsā or ritualist circles, that is to say, not necessarily by Buddhists or other heterodox skeptics, but by experts in the sacrifice who simply thought that the meaning of certain portions of the Veda may be ignored, or that they may not even be intended as having meaning at all.[28]

The solution to the apparent purposelessness of such sentences, as developed in the *siddhānta* of the first *adhikaraṇa* (*sūtra*s 7ff.), is to interpret them properly as *arthavāda*s which praise the actions of the

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[22] ŚBh II.4,4.

[23] *hiraṇyaṃ haste bhavaty atha gṛhṇāti*, parallel to MaitS 4.8.3, which reads *nayati* instead of *gṛhṇāti* (see Garge 1952: 108). ŚBh II.28,2–3.

[24] ŚBh II.5,4–5.

[25] ŚBh II.28,9–12.

[26] See ŚBh IV.322,3–378,3 ad MīSū 3.4.12–13, where Śabara argues, remarkably, that TaitS 2.5.5.6, *nānṛtaṃ vadet*, has as its scope, not human behavior in general, but only the Darśapūrṇamāsa!

[27] ŚBh II.3,5–6: *tasmād evaṃjātīyakāni vākyāny anityāny ucyante. yady api ca nityāni tathāpi na nityam arthaṃ kurvantīti*.

[28] In the continuation of the passage the *pūrvapakṣin* explains that the objection is not intended to impugn the entire Veda: *sa eṣa vākyaikadeśasyākṣepo na kṛtsnasya vākyasya* (ŚBh II.3,7–8). Concerns about the meaningfulness of mantras are attributed by Yāska to Kautsa in Nir 1.15, who argues that if the Veda is without meaning then a science of etymology is unnecessary. Renou (1960: 68), meanwhile, notes that a *Prātiśākhya* of the Atharva Veda school is ascribed to a certain Kautsa.

injunctions they are associated with.[29] Also in TaitS 2.1.1, for example, the sentence "Vāyu is the swiftest deity" comes immediately after the injunction "One who desires wealth should sacrifice (*ālabheta*) a white [victim] dedicated to Vāyu." This sentence, then, supports the injunction by eulogizing the god to whom the victim is sacrificed; it is an *arthavāda*. When an *arthavāda* occurs together with an injunction, it motivates the sacrificer to carry out the rite. Yet the connection between *vidhi* and *arthavāda* is not always clear, nor is the manner in which the *arthavāda* supports the *vidhi*. Often an *arthavāda* must be interpreted *figuratively*. When in the same passage it is said, "Prajāpati cut out his own fat," it is not intended that this ever happened.[30] From the story told in this section of the Brāhmaṇa, however – of Prajāpati creating livestock and offspring by cutting out his own fat and placing it in the fire, which moreover can be given a perfectly reasonable sense if one grasps the secondary meanings of its words[31] – it becomes evident that a praising of the efficacy of the act enjoined, in this instance, the sacrificing of a hornless goat dedicated to Prajāpati by one desiring offspring and cattle, is to be understood.[32]

Similarly, the mentioning of tears, which Śabara associates with the injunction not to place silver on the *barhis* for the priest – one should, rather, always give gold! – is to strengthen the prohibition; for, the passage continues, "The tear that was shed became silver; therefore silver is not a suitable gift, for it is born of tears" (TaitS 1.5.1.1–2). The *arthavāda* does not really report that Rudra wept, but connects silver with weeping and unhappiness. And so for the other false statements, e.g., "The mind is a thief, speech is a liar" – this, too, strengthens the injunc-

[29] MīSū 1.2.7: *vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnāṃ syuḥ*.

[30] For, Śabara explains (ŚBh II.26,11–12), if the mentioning of an actual occurrence (*vṛttāntānvākhyāna*) were asserted (*vidhīyamāna*) then the fault of the Veda's having a beginning would ensue.

[31] Śabara (ŚBh II.27,1–4) offers such a reading: "Prajāpati would be some eternal thing – wind, space, or the sun. 'He cut out his own fat' [would mean] rain, the wind, a ray of light. 'He placed it in the fire' [would mean,] in lightning, the light [of the heavens] [read: *varcasi*?], or the mundane [fire]."

[32] ŚBh II.26,1–27,4.

tion to give the priests gold, according to Śabara and Kumārila.[33] The mind is a thief in a secondary sense, "due to its form,"[34] because, as Śabara explains, "as thieves have a concealed form so does the mind."[35] Speech is figuratively a liar, "because of what is predominant," i.e., for the most part people say what is untrue.[36]

All of these sentences, then, can be given a coherent meaning that associates them with action, first, by construing them together with the appropriate injunctions in the same or other passages[37] and, second, by ascertaining their figurative meaning when they have one.[38] Mīmāṃsā is largely dedicated to showing how to make such determinations.[39]

3.2. The construal of mantras

The interpretation of *arthavāda*s is just one of many areas in which Mīmāṃsā developed a scientific methodology for solving problems of interpretation. Another very important topic in Mīmāṃsā of course is

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[33] Kumārila (TV II.28,13–14) explains – rather implausibly – that mind and speech are being deprecated because, though related to the action to be performed, they are of much less significance than the gold: *tadatyantāntaraṅgabhūtayor apy anayor dūreṇa hiraṇyād ūnatvaṃ steyānṛtavādayogād iti*.

[34] MīSū 1.2.11: *rūpāt prāyāt*.

[35] ŚBh II.28,6–7.

[36] See above, p. 125 n. 15.

[37] That is, together with which they form "a single sentence" (*ekavākyatā*). See McCrea 2000: 436–7.

[38] Some of the most notable cases where one is called upon to resort to figurative meaning are those passages that attribute physical features to deities, as if they were embodied. Mīmāṃsā in general rejects the popular notion of deities as supernatural beings. See MīSū 9.1.6–10 and 10.4.23. According to Garge 1952: 152, "It is clear … that the Mīmāṃsakas do not regard the Deities as objects of worship nor believe that they exist anywhere except in the words of the Vedic texts. They are only eternal concepts."

[39] According to Garge 1952: 261, "*arthavāda* passages appear in the Vedic Texts in numerous forms, giving rise to a number of complicated questions regarding their syntactical interpretations. Jaimini composed as many as sixty-four *sūtras* and eleven *adhikaraṇas* in which he exhaustively explains all the principal types in which the *arthavāda* texts appear in Vedic Texts."

the construal of mantras, the principal question in their case being whether they are meaningful at all. As Śabara poses it,

> Now, is it the case that mantras express something intended or do not express something intended? Do they assist the sacrifice by revealing a meaning or by their mere utterance?[40]

The *pūrvapakṣin* notes various mantras that appear to be nonsensical in different ways. They mention things that do not exist (ṚV 4.58.3 refers to a bull [*vṛṣabha*] with four horns, three feet, two heads, and seven hands);[41] they assign purposes to inanimate objects ("O plant, protect this one!" TaitS 1.2.1.b);[42] they are self-contradictory ("Aditi is the heaven, Aditi is the atmosphere" ṚV 1.89.10);[43] or their meanings are simply unknown (*sṛṇy eva jarbharī turpharītū* ṚV 10.106.6).[44] Thus, it would seem that their meanings are not intended, but just the uttering of the (nonsensical) mantra is what is important.

Śabara's *siddhāntin* responds, however, that the meanings of mantras are fully intended and that they are purposeful in that they "bring to light the subsidiary parts of the sacrifice during the sacrifice,"[45] that is, as later treatises will explain, they serve as a kind of script for the priest to follow in performing the ritual. [46] Thus, they are meaningful, but in many instances their meaning is figurative. The mantra mention-

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[40] ŚBh II.49,1–2. See Taber 1989.

[41] MīSū 1.2.31*a*: *avidyamānatvāt*.

[42] MīSū 1.2.31*b*: *acetane 'rthe khalv arthaṃ nibandhanāt*.

[43] MīSū 1.2.31*c*: *arthavipratiṣedhāt*.

[44] MīSū 1.2.31*e*: *avijñeyāt*. In the Jośī edition of *Mīmāṃsādarśana* 1.2–2.1 MīSū 1.2.31 is broken into nine parts, numbered 31–39, "for ease of explanation" (p. 48, note). The beginning of the *siddhānta*, *aviśiṣṭas tu vākyārthaḥ*, however, restarts the numbering with 32. Jha's translation also breaks up *sūtra* 1.2.31 but begins the *siddhānta* with number 40! All of Śabara's examples of unintelligible Ṛgvedic mantras in his discussion of this reason appear to be taken from Yāska's *Nirukta*. See Nir 13.5 for an explanation of ṚV 10.106.6; Nir 6.15 for an explanation of *amyak* (in ṚV 1.169.3: *amyak sā*); and Nir 5.11 for *kāṇukā* (in ṚV 8.77.4: *indraḥ somasya kāṇukā*). See Garge 1952: 143–144.

[45] ŚBh II.57,12–15: *yajñe yajñāṅgaprakāśanam eva prayojanam … na hy aprakāśite yajñe yajñāṅge ca yāgaḥ śakyo 'bhinirvartayitum*.

[46] See AS 17: *prayogasamavetārthasmārakā mantrāḥ. teṣāṃ ca tādṛśārthasmārakatvenaivārthavattvam*. See Taber 1989: 149–50.

ing a bull with four horns, etc., Śabara explains, should be taken as an *arthavāda*, construed figuratively as follows: the four horns are the *hotṛ*s; the three feet are the *savana*s; the two heads are the sacrificer and his wife; the seven hands the meters; the bull is the sacrifice, and so on. It is like describing a river by saying, "It has Cakravāka birds as its breasts, a row of swans as its teeth, reeds as its clothes, and mosses as its hair."[47] "Aditi is heaven, Aditi is the atmosphere," similarly, should not be taken literally. It is like saying, "You are my mother, you are my father."[48]

In fact, a meaning always exists for a mantra, but it may not be evident to everyone.[49] In difficult cases, Śabara explains, the meaning must be determined "from the roots of words by means of illustrative passages, etymology, and grammar."[50] Kumārila expands this list to include the purpose (*artha*) of the mantra, i.e., its application to a particular ritual action; its context (*prakaraṇa*), i.e., all the relevant passages specifying the various factors of the sacrifice to which it belongs; the hymn in which it occurs; the deity to whom it is addressed; and the *ṛṣi* to whom it is attributed[51] – Kumārila of course explains that this means, not the *ṛṣi* who *composed* the mantra, but the *ṛṣi* who, according to legend, employed it on an important occasion.[52] And he goes on to

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[47] ŚBh II.64,6–12.

[48] ŚBh II.65,7–8. Cf. Nir 4.23. Indeed, ṚV 1.89.10 reads in its entirety: *aditir dyaur aditir antarikṣam aditir mātā sa pitā sa putraḥ / viśve devā aditiḥ pañca janā aditir jātam aditir janitvam*.

[49] MīSū 1.2.41: *sataḥ param avijñānam*.

[50] ŚBh II.66,1–67,1: *nigamaniruktavyākaraṇavaśena dhātuto 'rthaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ*. The Vedic passages cited in the *Nirukta*, e.g., as revealing the meanings of words are called *nigama*s. As suggested by Kullūkabhaṭṭa ad MS 4.19 (*paryāyakathanena vedārthabodhakān nigamākhyāṃś ca granthān*), compilations of such examples with explanations may have existed. Kumārila and Śabara generally recommend resorting to etymology in explaining unknown Vedic words, yet they also recognize the principle that the established conventional meaning (*rūḍhārtha*), when it is known, is more authoritative. See, e.g., TV II.149,2–154,4 ad MīSū 1.3.10. As for grammar, the eighth *adhikaraṇa* of the *Mīmāṃsādarśana*, MīSū 1.3.24–29, is devoted to establishing its importance for Vedic study. See below, p. 141–143 nn. 86–87.

[51] TV II.66,2–3: *tatra cārthaprakaraṇasūktadevatārṣanigamaniruktavyākaraṇajñānāny adhigamopāyāḥ, teṣāṃ hy evamartham eva paripālanam*.

[52] TV II.66,10–14.

offer detailed explanations of the *pūrvapakṣin*'s examples of mantras whose meaning is unknown.[53] Note that Śabara and Kumārila do not appeal here to an "authorless explanation that has come down through an unbroken tradition," as Dharmakīrti has his Mīmāṃsaka suggest,[54] not to mention expositors endowed with a special capacity for perceiving supersensible things! Although we may recognize certain authorities, they are simply those who have proven themselves the most skilled in applying the above-mentioned considerations.[55]

3.3. The determination of figurative meaning

As we have seen, one must often resort to figurative or secondary meaning in order to make sense of *arthavāda*s and mantras, yet there is a method for doing that, as well.[56] MīSū 1.4.23[57] gives the grounds for construing a word figuratively – literally, as a "statement of a secondary aspect or feature" (*guṇavāda*) – when its primary meaning is blocked. As Śabara and Kumārila explain at length, a word can be employed in a secondary sense when it refers to a quality related to its primary meaning.[58] (The Mīmāṃsā theory of metaphor is quite

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[53] E.g., of *sṛṇy eva jarbharī turpharītū* (ṚV 10.106.6), TV II.66,18–67,9. Cf. Nir 13.5. Cf. Sāyaṇa's explanation (ṚVBh 4.695), which is quite similar. See Garge 1941–42.

[54] See PVSV 168,15–16 above, pp. 45–46. But see also below, pp. 141–142 n. 86.

[55] Kumārila (TV II.67,25–27) concludes his discussion of MīSū 1.2.41: *tad evaṃ sarvatra kenacit prakāreṇābhiyuktānām arthotprekṣopapatteḥ prasiddhatarārthābhāve 'pi vedasya tadabhyupagamāt siddham arthavattvam*. "Thus, in this way, since it is possible in every case for those who are versed in [the Veda] to reflect on its meaning in some way, it is established that the Veda is meaningful, even though a commonly known meaning is absent, because [those experts] accept this (?)."

[56] Cf. the complaint of the *pūrvapakṣin* at the beginnning of the discussion of *arthavāda*s, TV II.2,7–14.

[57] Taken as one *sūtra* in the Jośī edition of *Mīmāṃsādarśana* 1.2–2.1: *tatsiddhir jātiḥ sārūpyaṃ praśaṃsā bhūmā liṅgasamavāyaḥ*. Jha breaks it into six *sūtra*s, 1.4.23–28.

[58] ŚBh II.315,5–321,2 and TV ad loc. The word "lion," e.g., indicates as its primary meaning something in which courage predominates. One uses "lion" figuratively when one intends to refer to the *quality* of courage in something, e.g., a man, which is related to the primary meaning of the word. Śabara (ŚBh II.315,5) formally etymologizes *guṇavāda* as *guṇād eṣa vādaḥ*, "This statement is due to a quality." Nevertheless, he uses the expression in his discussion as meaning "the statement of a quality/secondary aspect" (e.g., ŚBh II.315,6: *katham aguṇavacano guṇaṃ brūyāt*).

sophisticated and merits detailed treatment by someone.) The quality in question can be "accomplishing that [function]" (*tatsiddhi*), as when it is said, "The grass bundle (*prastara*) is the sacrificer" (TaitS 2.6.5.3). The sacrificer is the most important of all the factors of the sacrifice; when the *prastara* is placed upon the *barhis*[59] and thereby, as it were, given a place of honor, it assumes a role similar to that of the sacrificer; it accomplishes the same function.[60] Or the quality in question may be that of "origin" (*jāti*) – that is to say, having the same origin – as in the case of the sentence "The Brahmin is of fire" (TaitB 2.7.3.1); for both the Brahmin and fire are said to have come out of the mouth of Prajāpati. Or it can be visual similarity (*sārūpya*), as in the case of the sentence "The post is the sacrificer" (par. ŚB 13.2.6.9); for both stand erect. And so on. In sum, the determination of figurative meaning in Mīmāṃsā is not a subjective matter, either, but follows established rules.

3.4. The appeal to common usage (lokaprasiddhi)

Of course, the main guiding principle for determining the meanings of Vedic words is the fact, as Mīmāṃsā sees it, that the words of the Veda are the same as the words of ordinary parlance and have the same meanings. As I mentioned above, this principle is stated in MīSū 1.3.30 and developed in the commentaries thereto.[61] Dharmakīrti criticizes the Mīmāṃsakas, in PV(SV) 1.319–324, for employing this principle arbitrarily. They insist on it, he implies, when it suits their purposes and abandon it when it doesn't. The *Mīmāṃsādarśana*, however – though actual practice of course may have been different – is always careful to justify when it applies and when it doesn't.

On the face of it, according to Śabara's *pūrvapakṣin* in ŚBh 1.3.30, the words of the Veda and ordinary parlance seem to be different. We have such sentences as "The cows of the gods move on their backs" (ĀpŚSū 11.7.6) and "May Agni kill the Vṛtras (*vṛtrāṇi*)" (par. ṚV

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[59] Namely, in the course of the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice. See TaitS 1.1.11.

[60] TV II.315,21. Cf. however McCrea 2000: 438, who offers a different analysis.

[61] Again, the basic idea is already found articulated by Yāska, Nir 1.16: *arthavantaḥ* [*mantrāḥ*] *śabdasāmānyāt*. Cf. MīSū 1.2.32 (*aviśiṣṭas tu vākyārthaḥ*) in the discussion of the meaningfulness of mantras, and ŚBh (ad loc.) II.57,5: *aviśiṣṭas tu loke prayujyamānānāṃ vede ca padānām arthaḥ*.

6.16.34). Whatever "cows" and "Agni" refer to in these sentences, they cannot be the same things we mean when we use those words in common speech.[62] But the *siddhāntin* insists that we recognize the words themselves as familiar; we don't perceive any difference between them and common words.[63] It is just a question of how they are being employed in these sentences. The word "cows" in the above mantra, e.g., is used to refer to *divine* cows, and we would expect divine cows to have rather different properties from ordinary ones.[64] But the core meaning of the word is the same. As Kumārila puts it, just as men with snub noses and hooded ears (? *karṇaprāvaraṇa*) are no less men, so cows with different properties from ordinary ones, e.g., dwarf cows, are still cows.[65] The cows that are referred to in Vedic texts, moreover, often *are* just ordinary ones, especially when it is a matter of the *dakṣinā* to be given to priests! In any case, when we proceed on the assumption that the meanings of words are the same as those of ordinary parlance, from which they are in fact phonetically indistinguishable, then the Veda for the most part makes sense; it consists of intelligible injunctions, and the application of its mantras to ritual acts is clear.[66]

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[62] In the case of Agni, it is well known that Indra, not Agni, is the slayer of the Vṛtras. Meanwhile, *vṛtra* in common parlance is masculine, not neuter. See the various other reasons for holding Vedic words to be different cited by Kumārila, TV II.231,15–19.

[63] ŚBh II.232,5: *na teṣām eṣāṃ ca vibhāgam upalabhāmahe*. See TV II.233,21–25 for Kumārila's expansion of this point.

[64] TV II.233,8–9: *yathāśrutagavādīnāṃ yāpi vācyāntare śrutiḥ / arthaikatvāvirodhena guṇamātrānyatāparā //*. Or else, as Kumārila suggests (TV II.233,23–234,1), the sentence could mean that from the perspective of the gods in heaven cows on earth appear to be moving on their backs!

[65] TV II.233,10–13.

[66] This seems to be the point being made by MīSū 1.3.30 itself: *prayogacodanābhāvād arthaikatvam avibhāgāt*. "There is sameness of meaning [of Vedic and ordinary words], because there is [the comprehension of] injunctions and applications, because there is no [perceived] difference." Śabara and Kumārila interpret the two ablatives of the *sūtra* as providing separate reasons. The first reason for sameness of meaning – thereby, implicitly, sameness of the words themselves, Kumārila clarifies (TV II.232,18–19) – is that it makes possible the comprehension of injunctions from the Veda and the applications of its mantras. Śabara and Kumārila, however, both consider this an inadequate response, since it indicates merely a *prayojana* for considering the words and meanings the same, not a reason why they

In fact, the vast majority of words in the Veda are words we recognize. It is because we are confident that *uttānā vahanti* means "move on their backs" that we suspect that *gavāḥ*, "cows," is being used in an unusual sense. When we hear the sentence *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*,[67] the words *juhuyāt* and *svargakāmaḥ*, at least, are already quite familiar to us. We know that someone desirous of heaven is being told to make some sacrifice. The only real question can be, what exactly does *agnihotra* mean? Yet even then, the various possibilities for analyzing the word etymologically are clearly given. Those are to be weighed, moreover, in light of the fact that it is not just the Vedic texts that have been handed down, but also all the rituals that go with them, and the associations of certain rituals with certain texts.

Indeed, the pertinent question in regard to *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* for the Mīmāṃsaka is not, Could it mean something completely different from what scholars versed in the Veda have always taken it to mean? Such a suggestion, for those who are otherwise able to follow the Veda as a coherent body of prescriptions and prohibitions, would be simply absurd. The pertinent question is rather, according to MīSū 1.4.4 and the commentaries thereon, Does the word *agnihotra* enjoin a *guṇa*, an accessory of the sacrifice – that is to say, one of the complex of items that comprise the sacrificial act: the substance offered, the instrument used to offer it, the deity to whom it is offered, and so forth – or is it merely the *name* of a sacrifice?

The answer to this question is provided, then, according to the Mīmāṃsā method of analysis, as follows. If we take *agnihotra* as a *bahuvrīhi* meaning that in which an offering (*hotra*) is made *to* Agni (*agnaye*

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must be so considered (ŚBh II.232,3–5: *ucyate prayojanam idam. hetur vyapadiśyatām iti. tato hetur ucyate. avibhāgād iti*). A second reason for sameness of meaning is therefore required: namely, essentially, because we recognize the words as being the same. It does seem possible, however, to read the two ablatives as nested: the meanings of Vedic and ordinary words must be the same, because we comprehend coherent injunctions from the Veda, due to the fact that we recognize the words themselves as the same.

[67] Which, however, is not precisely matched by any Vedic text. The texts that come closest to it are TaitS 1.5.9.1: *agnihotraṃ juhoti*; KāṭhS 6.3: *payasāgnihotraṃ juhoti*; and MaitS 1.8.6: *ya evaṃ vidvān agnihotraṃ juhoti*. Garge takes the Kāṭhaka and Maitrāyaṇīya passages as providing the originative injunctions for the *agnihotra*; see Garge 1952: 102 and 266. See also above, p. 40 n. 35.

hotram asminn iti), maintains the *pūrvapakṣin*, then it would appear to enjoin one of the accessories of the sacrifice, specifically, the *deity* for whom it is intended. "In this way," Śabara states, "common usage will be upheld."[68] The *siddhāntin*, however, points out that the deity of the *agnihotra* is already indicated by another text.[69] Since an injunction can enjoin only that which is previously unknown,[70] the mentioning of *agnihotra* in *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* could not have injunctive force in reference to the deity. It must therefore function merely as the name of a sacrifice to be offered to Agni; i.e., the sentence should be taken to be enjoining the sacrifice itself, not one of its accessories. Thus, the correct analysis of the word, still as a *bahuvrīhi*, will draw attention to the *action* to which it refers: "that in which there is an offering to Agni, which is a sacrifice (*homa*), that is an *agnihotra*."[71] Kumārila even argues that the compound that is the basis of the *bahuvrīhi* should be read, not as a dative *tatpuruṣa* – which would directly enjoin an offering *for* Agni – but as a genitive *tatpuruṣa*, which merely *mentions* Agni ("an offering of Agni").[72]

In the cases of other names of sacrifices, discussed in other *adhikaraṇas* in the first part of MīSū 1.4, one must diverge even further from common usage. In the injunction *citrayā yajeta paśukāmaḥ* (TaitS 2.4.6.1) one would normally assume *citrayā* to refer to a speckled cow;[73] thus, the injunction should be taken as enjoining a particular kind of victim. But this would entail a "syntactic split" (*vākyabheda*) –

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[68] ŚBh II.285,4–5: *prasiddhir evam anugrahīṣyate*.

[69] Namely, *yad agnaye prajāpataye ca sāyaṃ juhoti*, par. MaitS 1.8.7.

[70] ŚBh II.285,12–13: *aviditavedanaṃ ca vidhir ity ucyate*. See Kataoka 2003b. Kataoka argues that the idea that a *vidhi* can only enjoin something not previously known was the basis for the well-known Mīmāṃsā doctrine that a *pramāṇa* is "the apprehension of an unapprehended object" (*agṛhītārthagrahaṇa*). His thesis is plausible, but I do not think one can exclude the possibility that the derivation went in the other direction.

[71] ŚBh II.286,1–2: *yasminn agnaye hotraṃ homo bhavati tad agnihotram*.

[72] Similarly, we speak of *aśvaghāsa*, "grass of horses" (TV II.287,23–288,11).

[73] For a discussion of the problems associated with this citation, see Garge 1952: 29–30, 83.

more than one thing would be enjoined in a single statement.[74] Thus, in this instance, too, we must interpret *citrā* as the name of the sacrifice. Similarly, for *udbhidā yajeta* (*Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa* 19.7.2[75]), one would normally, on the basis of the known meanings of the components of the word *udbhid*, take it to be referring to the axe.[76] In that case, however, since *yajeta* actually means, according to the Mīmāṃsā analysis of optative verbs, *yāgena kuryāt*, one would have to construe *udbhidā* figuratively as *udbhidvatā*; that is to say, one would read the sentence as *udbhidvatā yāgena kuryāt*. But it is preferable to avoid resorting to a secondary meaning whenever possible – another basic Mīmāṃsā rule. Therefore, one should take *udbhid* as the name of the sacrifice being enjoined. The sentence, then, is a primary injunction of a certain sacrifice.[77]

In sum, although the meaning of the word in ordinary parlance is in most cases the key to understanding a Vedic word, there are circumstances where it has to be abandoned. Yet this is never to be done arbitrarily, without concrete justification, as Dharmakīrti seems to suggest.[78] One of the main purposes of Mīmāṃsā, especially in the section

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[74] If *citrā* referred to a property of the victim, then the sentence would specify that a sacrifice previously mentioned should be carried out by means of a cow that is female and speckled, and that the sacrifice will have cattle as its result. All that cannot be enjoined by a single sentence! (ŚBh II.280,1–281,1 ad MīSū 1.4.3). Cf., however, the treatment of *aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā somaṃ krīṇāti* (par. TaitS 6.1.6.7) in ŚBh IV.33,2–35,5 ad 3.1.12, which one would expect to be parallel, but which differs for subtle reasons. See McCrea 2000: 442–446.

[75] According to Jha; not confirmed by Garge 1952.

[76] TV II.271,5–8.

[77] ŚBh II.274,5–277,1 ad MīSū 1.4.2.

[78] Even when it comes to *svarga*, one of Dharmakīrti's examples of a word that Mīmāṃsakas do not construe according to *prasiddhi*, Śabara offers an elaborate justification, ad MīSū 6.1.1–3 (ŚBh V.173,13–184,4), for why it is not to be taken in its customary sense. There, the topic of the *adhikaraṇa* is whether *svarga*, in injunctions such as *darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargakāmo yajeta*, "One who desires heaven should sacrifice with the new and full moon ceremonies," refers to the principal factor (*pradhāna*) of the ritual or to a secondary element (*guṇa*), with the implication that if it refers to the latter, then the purport of the injunction is that only one who desires heaven is qualified to carry out the sacrifice (the full argument is too complex to relate here). Such a view is maintained by the *pūrvapakṣin*, who supports it by alleging that according to ordinary usage (*laukikaḥ prayogaḥ*), heaven is a sub-

of the *Mīmāṃsādarśana* under discussion (MīSū 1.2–1.4), is to provide guidelines for when it is to be abandoned and when not.

3.5. The resolution of polysemy

Yet often words in ordinary parlance are polysemic. Dharmakīrti asks, Who can determine which of several meanings of the ordinary word the Vedic word is supposed to have?[79] Now, the problem of how to decide between multiple meanings of a word is taken up in the fourth (*Yavavarāha*) *adhikaraṇa* of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3 (*sūtra*s 8 and 9).[80] As Śabara introduces the topic, we find the words *yava*, *varāha*, and *vetasa* in the Veda. Yet these words are used differently among different speakers in different locales (*deśa*). In some places *yava* refers to barley (*dīrghaśūka*), in others to mustard seed (*priyaṅgu*); for some speakers *varāha* means a pig, for others, a kind of bird; and in some places *vetasa* means cane (? *vañjula*), in others, the rose-apple tree (*jambu*).[81] How do we decide in which senses these, and other apparently polysemic words, are being used in the Veda? The *pūrvapakṣin* maintains that, since different meanings are established among different communities of speakers in each case, there should be an option.[82] The

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stance (*dravya*) – as we gather when people say, "Fine silken clothes are heaven," "Sixteen-year-old girls are heaven," etc. – in general, "a substance that yields delight (*prītimad dravyam*)" (ŚBh V.176,4). He rejects the common employment of *svarga* for a certain place, since there is no evidence for the existence of such a place (ŚBh V.177,9–16)! Since substances are commonly intended as being *for the purpose of actions*, hence as subordinate factors, heaven would therefore be a subordinate factor. In the end this interpretation is rejected by the *siddhāntin*, who argues for deviating from the common usage cited by the *pūrvapakṣin*, yet apparently agreeing with him that we should not take *svarga* as referring to a particular place, and interpreting heaven rather simply as "delight" or "happiness" (*prīti*), i.e., the principal thing to be brought about by such sacrifices.

[79] See PV(SV) 1.319cd and 323 above, pp. 44 and 54–55.

[80] This is the *fifth adhikaraṇa* in Jha's translations of the *Śābarabhāṣya* and *Tantravārttika*.

[81] ŚBh II.139,2–140,2.

[82] MīSū 1.3.8: *teṣv adarśanād virodhasya samā vipratipattiḥ*. "Because of not seeing any opposition in their case, a different view is equal in force." Kumārila (TV II.140,7–10) presents the leading idea of the *pūrvapakṣa* as follows: *yatra deśe hi yaḥ śabdo yasminn arthe prayujyate / śaktis tadgocarā tasya vācikākhyā pramīyate // tasyāś ca*

siddhānta, however, as stated by MīSū 1.3.9, is that "[those meanings], rather, which are based on scripture [are to be chosen]; for that is the basis [of Dharma]."[83] Or, as Śabara somewhat freely explains the *sūtra*, "The meaning of a word [in the Veda] is what it is for those who base themselves on scripture,"[84] i.e., those "learned" (*śiṣṭa*) in the Veda. Indeed, *they* are the basis (*nimitta*) for ascertaining *śruti* and *smṛti*.[85] What this means, once again, is not that such people have some capacity others lack, or access to an eternal, authorless tradition of exegesis, even though Śabara speaks of their commanding "an unbroken memory of words and the Veda."[86] It means, rather – as I understand it –

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sarvagāmitvaṃ tannyāyatvāt pramīyate / naikeṣām eva sā hy asti keṣāṃ cid vā na vidyate //. "If a word is used in a particular meaning in a particular place, it is cognized that it has a *śakti*, called expressive, which has that [meaning] as its scope. And it is cognized that that [*śakti*] pervades everywhere, since it is suitable for that. Indeed, it does not exist for only some people but not exist for others."

[83] MīSū 1.3.9: *śāstrasthā vā tannimittatvāt*.

[84] ŚBh II.141,4: *yaḥ śāstrasthānāṃ sa śabdārthaḥ*.

[85] ŚBh II.141,5–142,1: *śiṣṭā nimittaṃ śrutismṛtyavadhāraṇe*. I take *śiṣṭa* as having a stronger connotation than merely "cultured," which it seems to have, e.g., in the Dharmaśāstras.

[86] ŚBh II.141,5: *teṣām avicchinnā smṛtiḥ śabdeṣu vedeṣu ca*. We encounter other locutions like this in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the eighth *adhikaraṇa* (1.3.24–29) of Kumārila's TV. This *adhikaraṇa* concerns whether the Veda makes any restriction regarding the correct use of words, hence, whether the study of the grammatical *smṛti* texts (such as Pāṇini) pertains to Dharma. (The Grammarian tradition of course held that the study of *vyākaraṇa* does pertain to Dharma; see, e.g., MBh I.8,3–22.) The *pūrvapakṣin* argues to the contrary that grammar is of no relevance, maintaining at one juncture in his long discourse (TV II.200,3–202,14) that it is not necessary or even helpful in resolving doubts about the meaning of the Veda (*asandeha* is one of the purposes of grammar listed by Patañjali, MBh I.13,14); for other means suffice – first and foremost, "the usage of elders" (*vṛddhavyavahāra*), but also *nigama*, *nirukta*, *kalpasūtra*, and *tarka*. See TV II.200,3–6: *asandehaś ca vedārthe yad apy prayojanam / tad apy asad yato nāsmāt padavākyārthanirṇayau // yataḥ padārthasandehās tāvad bahavo vṛddhavyavahārād eva nivartante. śeṣāś ca nigamaniruktakalpasūtratarkābhiyuktebhyaḥ sarveṣām arthapratipādanaparatvāt*. Yet in this passage the *pūrvapakṣin* also refers to "the tradition of knowers of the meaning of the Veda" (*vedārthavitparamparā*) and "the tradition of expositors" (*vyākhyātṛparamparā*), and even suggests at one point that the explanation of the Veda is as eternal as the Veda itself (TV II.201,18–21): *na cāgṛhītaśabdārthaiḥ kaiś cid vyākaraṇāśrayaṇāt / vyākhyātuṃ śakyate vedo yataḥ syāt tena niścayaḥ // yathaivāvasthito vedas tathā vyākhyāpi sarvadā / ataḥ sthūlapṛṣatyādivyākhyā vyākaraṇād ṛte //*. Kumārila does

that their judgment is informed by lifelong study of the Veda; they are steeped in its meaning. They know, in particular, the entire Veda, the contexts in which words occur and how they are used; they have also studied grammar and the *kalpasūtra*s. Just as one would want to consult someone who has devoted his life to studying Dharmakīrti and Buddhist literature when trying to figure out a difficult passage in Dharmakīrti, so would one want to consult one who has devoted his life to studying the Veda and its auxiliary sciences when trying to ascertain the meanings of Vedic words.[87]

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not endorse this view in his *siddhānta*, but neither does he explicitly reject it. This passage suggests in any case that there very well could have been *some* Mīmāṃsakas who believed that the meaning of Vedic terms is secured *in part* by an unbroken, authorless tradition of exegesis. It is well known that, elsewhere, Kumārila is decidedly guarded toward any tradition that is not ultimately grounded on the Veda. This pertains especially to heterodox practices, such as those of the Saṃsāramocakas and the Buddhists (Halbfass 1983: 15–16). But at TV II.75,16–23 he rejects a mere tradition of remembering an injunction to perform the *aṣṭakā* (mentioned MS 4.150), without any Vedic basis, as insufficient for establishing its authority, because it would be like a tradition of the blind (*andhaparamparā*). Cf. ŚBh II.73,1–74,2 (*pūrvapakṣa*).

[87] Cf. however, TV II.141,14–15: *rasavīryavipākānāṃ bhedād vaidyair yavādayaḥ / nirdhāryāḥ svārthatattvena dharmasiddhyaiva yājñikaiḥ //*. "[The meaning of] *yava* and so forth are ascertained by experts in medicine from differences in taste, strength, and ripening, according to the nature of their meanings [i.e., the things themselves], whereas they are [ascertained] by experts in the sacrifice by virtue of their accomplishing Dharma." This, however, need not be taken as implying a *supernormal* ability of perceiving Dharma on the part of experts in sacrifice, but a profound knowledge of all aspects of Dharma and its ramifications as defined by the Veda. Thus, Kumārila will say later, in the *siddhānta* of the eighth *adhikaraṇa* (on grammar), that those *thoroughly versed in the rules of grammar* can *perceive* correct and incorrect words (*sādhutvam indriyagrāhyam*) – just as those versed in the Dharmaśāstras can tell if someone is a Brahmin just by looking at him (TV II.217,13–218,4)! There, he will employ the analogy of the expert jeweler (TV II.219,16–21): *yady apy anabhiyuktānāṃ prayogo 'sti sasaṅkaraḥ / abhiyuktā vivekṣyante tathāpi brāhmaṇādivat // … yathā ratnaparīkṣāyāṃ sādhvasādhutvalakṣaṇam / tathā vyākaraṇāt siddhaṃ sādhuśabdanirūpaṇam //*. By contrast, other ancient authorities explicitly attributed the ability to directly perceive Dharma to *ṛṣi*s, who then in turn taught the mantras to lesser beings who lack any supernormal ability. Thus, Yāska, Nir 1.20: *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ. te 'varebhyo 'sākṣātkṛtadharmabhya upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ*. Cf. MBh I.11,11–12. Such statements are conspicuously missing in Kumārila. Indeed, such a view is rejected by Bhartṛhari, VP_R 1.150

Thus, those versed in the Veda will know, in particular, the continuation of the passage (*vākyaśeṣa*), which of itself often clarifies which meaning is intended. They are able to recite (*samāmananti*), for example, the following text which occurs after "vessels full of *yava*" have been enjoined:[88] "When other plants wither, these still stand, as if rejoicing."[89] Since barley matures in early spring when other plants have lost their leaves, this indicates that there is a practice of using *yava* to refer to barley in the Veda. Similarly, there is the text, "Therefore the cows run after the *varāha*s,"[90] which clarifies that in the Veda *varāha* refers to pigs. Finally, those learned in the Veda will know the text "The *vetasa* is water-born,"[91] which indicates that *vetasa* refers to the *vañjula* plant, which grows in the water. The general principle that applies to all these cases is enunciated at MīSū 1.4.29, "In doubtful cases [the meaning is determined] from the continuation of the passage."[92] Dharmakīrti indeed may be alluding to this principle when he says, PVSV 170,5–11, that one cannot resolve the meaning of a problematic Vedic passage by resorting to other Vedic passages, because the meaning of those other passages are in doubt as well.[93] This criticism, however, assigns all Vedic sentences to the same level of incomprehensibility and makes no distinction between those the meaning of which is more or less obvious and those whose meaning is obscure indeed.

(Cardona 2007: 697 and n. 25) and, as I interpret him, by Kumārila as well, ŚV *codanā* 143–151.

[88] ŚBh II.142,1: *yavamayeṣu karambhapātreṣu vihiteṣu*. It is uncertain which Vedic text Śabara is referring to.

[89] *yatrānyā oṣadhayo mlāyante 'thaite modamānā ivottiṣṭhanti*. Source unknown. There are of course many passages cited by Śabara that have not been traced. Of approximately 1700 passages cited, from a variety of *śākhā*s, less than half have been identified. Śabara only a few times indicates the source of a citation himself. Many passages he quotes inexactly, or deliberately modifies, or combines with other passages. Moreover, he may well have cited from Vedic texts that are now completely lost or used compendia that no longer exist. For a comprehensive discussion see Garge 1952, esp. pp. 39–50.

[90] ŚB 4.4.3.19.

[91] TaitS 5.3.12.2.

[92] MīSū 1.4.29: *sandigdheṣu vākyaśeṣāt*.

[93] See above, pp. 52–53.

Precisely because the meanings of these words become clear from their context, however, and also disputing that these examples really are polysemic to begin with,[94] Kumārila suggests another interpretation of the *adhikaraṇa*. How does one decide on the meaning of a word used in the Veda when it has one meaning among Āryas and another among Mlecchas? *pilu*, for example, among the Āryas means a particular tree and among the Mlecchas an elephant. Here, the *pūrvapakṣin* suggests again – rather provocatively, it would seem – that there should be an option; for both words are expressive within the communities that employ them.

> Just as there is the notion of the beginninglessness of the connection[95] for the meaning comprehended by Āryas, so for the meaning comprehended by Mlecchas, for the reason is the same.[96] For there is no interruption of the use of it among the Mlecchas; and how could one comprehend a difference of beginningless *śaktis*?[97]

The *siddhāntin* responds: The notion that Mleccha words are expressive is erroneous; one is misled by their similarity to Ārya words. "Just as there are corruptions of [the forms of] words due to metaphorical and incorrect employment, etc., so there are corruptions of meanings (*arthāpabhraṃśa*)."[98] And it is those versed in the *śāstra*s who are able to recognize them, "like [false coins] can be distinguished from among both true and false coins by those who are expert in them."[99]

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[94] TV II.142,16–19.

[95] Read *sambandhānāditāmatiḥ*, *pace* TV and TV$_H$ 387,15.

[96] Namely, there is no memory of the founder of the convention, and so forth.

[97] TV II.143,16–19: *yathaiva hy āryagamye 'rthe sambandhānāditāmatiḥ / mlecchagamye tathaiva syād aviśiṣṭaṃ hi kāraṇam // na prayogāvadhis tasya mlecchеṣv api hi dṛśyate / anādyor arthaśaktyoś ca viśeṣo gamyatāṃ katham //*. Cf. ŚBh II.183,2–5 ad MīSū 1.3.24.

[98] TV II.144,3: *śabdāpabhraṃśavad eva gauṇabhrāntyādiprayoganimittā arthāpabhraṃśā bhavanti*. A similar point is made by the *pūrvapakṣin* in *adhikaraṇa* 5 ad MīSū 1.3.10 (II.150,22): *dharme cānādarāt teṣāṃ bhraṃśyetārtho 'pi śabdavat*. The *pūrvapakṣin* goes on to explain how Mleccha words only *seem* to have denotations by virtue of their similarity of Sanskrit words. Kumārila apparently follows the Grammarians in this matter; see VP$_R$ 1.175–183.

[99] TV II.144,4–5: *sādhvasādhukarṣāpaṇamadhyād iva tatparīkṣibhir vivektum*.

> Thus, *because they are expert in the [various] recensions*, the view of those who reside in Āryāvarta is thought to be valid knowledge (*pramā*) of what is a means of Dharma or the meaning of a word.[100]

And those who know more *śāstra*s are accorded more authority when it comes to what is the true meaning of a word in the Veda.[101, 102]

4. SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS

This will have to suffice as a very brief and inadequate survey of ways in which Mīmāṃsakas believed they were able to ascertain meaning of

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[100] TV II.144,7–8: *ataḥ śākhābhiyuktatvād āryāvartanivāsinām / yā matiḥ saiva dharmāṅgaśabdārthatvapramā matā* //. My italics, of course, to emphasize that the reason is not "because they can perceive Dharma"!

[101] TV II.144,10–11: *abhiyuktatarā ye ye bahuśāstrārthavedinaḥ / te te yatra prayuñjiran so so 'rthas tattvato bhavet* //.

[102] Kumārila nevertheless goes on to argue in his interpretation of the fifth *adhikaraṇa* (according to Jośī's enumeration) of MīSū 1.3 (*sūtra* 10) that words that are current *only* among Mlecchas should be construed as they are used conventionally by them and should not be given artificial designations by means of grammar and etymology. Kumārila goes on to consider yet another interpretation of the fourth *adhikaraṇa* according to which it concerns what to do when words have different meanings in ordinary parlance and the Veda (TV II.146,3ff.). For example, *caru* means a dish in ordinary language, but in the Veda it means a kind of porridge, usually of rice (*odana*) which is mixed with curds or milk (despite the phrase cited by Śabara at the beginning of the *adhikaraṇa* ad MīSū 1.3.8 [ŚBh II.139,2]: *yavamayaś caruḥ* [source unknown]). Here too, however, Kumārila is inclined to set aside common usage when the text of the Veda clearly demands construing a word according to a different meaning. This is, as before, generally clear from the entire passage. After it is enjoined, "The *caru* is to be offered to Aditi in the milk," it is said, "[One pleases] Aditi by cooked rice (*odana*)." Thus, "the word *caru*, by virtue of its *śakti* being excluded from the illogical designation of multiple meanings, is restricted to just one meaning *according to the common usage of the Veda and those versed in sacrifice*, and refers to cooked rice" (TV II.148,11–12: *tathā caruśabdo 'py anyāyānekārthābhidhānapratibaddhaśaktitvād ekatra niyamyamāno yājñikavedaprasiddhibhyām odanaviṣaya eva bhavati*; cf. TV II.146,12: *yājñikānāṃ ca vede ca prasiddhis tv odanaṃ prati* //). From this and other statements one sees that *prasiddhi* evidently means for Kumārila established usage *relative to* a literature or a community. It is not necessarily equivalent to *lokavāda*.

the Veda by objective methods. Many more examples could be given.[103] These examples show that Mīmāṃsā consists in a system of established rules and procedures, as objective as those of logic, for interpreting scriptural passages. *Starting from the entirely reasonable assumption that most of the words in the Veda are ordinary Sanskrit words*, then resorting to grammatical analysis, etymology, the examination of context, the collation of other occurrences of words and parallel passages, and knowledge of the rituals with which Vedic passages are associated, Mīmāṃsakas were confident that they could come up with plausible hypotheses about the meanings of Vedic words and sentences that are otherwise unknown or obscure. They – or at least the Mīmāṃsakas we have been considering, Śabara and Kumārila – make no appeal to the authority of individual teachers with supernatural ability – such persons are never mentioned, as far as I can tell, though to be sure the existence of *bona fide* experts in Vedic interpretation was acknowledged – or any eternal authorless tradition of interpretation. Indeed, their methods were not altogether unlike the "objective" methods employed by modern philologists today in interpreting Vedic texts.

Thus, when Dharmakīrti asserts, "Vedic words do not cry out, 'Come, you revered Brahmins, this is to be grasped as our meaning, not something else,'" we can imagine the Mīmāṃsaka responding, "To the contrary, the Veda can be made to yield up its secrets *if one rigorously applies the proper methodology*." The Mīmāṃsaka would have been just as supremely confident that he could make sense of the Veda as is the modern Vedic scholar Michael Witzel, who writes,

> If we follow these rules and use all the other tools mentioned earlier [in discussing the editing of the *Kaṭha Āraṇyaka*], we can achieve in Vedic Studies a certainty that approaches that of the natural sciences. In fact, we can proceed in a similar fashion, by trial and error, and by proposing a theory [about the exact meaning of a text] and actually testing it. Only when the word, concept, or custom is *hapax* or is attested too infrequently to allow a proper investigation of the whole range of meanings,

[103] For further discussion of rules for interpreting the meaning of words, see Garge 1952: 252–256. Much of the second *kāṇḍa* of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* is devoted to how to determine the meanings of words in their various contexts. See, e.g., VP_R 2.303ff.

> must we remain content with a merely probable answer, or a mere guess. In all other cases, of course, only after painstaking study, we can conclude that yes the theory was right [, thereby arriving confidently at the meaning of the passage], or no it was not.[104]

Of course, the Mīmāṃsaka would never suggest, as Prof. Witzel does, that one is able "to enter the Vedic mind," i.e., discern "the original intent of the composers of the text."[105] He would, rather, claim to be able to grasp the "intent" of the Veda itself.[106]

It is the appreciation of Mīmāṃsā as a fixed system of rules, indeed, *as a system of "logic" independent of human invention*, which may be applied correctly or incorrectly, that is conspicuously lacking in Dharmakīrti.[107] More specifically: He knows that the Mīmāṃsakas appeal to *prasiddhi* and *vākyaśeṣa*, but he seems not to have any idea what that entails in specific instances, that the application of these concepts is constrained in all kinds of ways. He knows that the Mīmāṃsakas generally distrust what ordinary people say – hence, it would seem, one cannot rely on common usage as a *pramāṇa* in determining the meanings of words; but he ignores the fact that the ordinary meaning of a word is something that is agreed upon by everyone, hence it is evi-

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[104] Witzel 1996: 174–5, with bold type removed.

[105] Witzel 1996: 167.

[106] See Yoshimizu 2008.

[107] Indeed, Bhartṛhari refers to a list of exegetical principles in VP$_R$ 1.152 (and *Vṛtti*), similar to the sorts of rules invoked by Śabara in construing problematic Vedic passages, as the kind of "reasoning that is in conformity with Vedic scripture, which [serves as] the eye for those who do not see" (VP$_R$ 1.151ab: *vedaśāstrāvirodhī ca tarkaś cakṣur apaśyatām /*), i.e., for those unable to comprehend the Veda through their own insight. He goes on to state that such "reasoning, which resides in men, is the capacity of the words themselves" (VP$_R$ 1.153ab: *śabdānām eva sā śaktis tarko yaḥ puruṣāśrayaḥ /*); see Cardona 2007: 699–700. That is to say, the principles one follows both in using language to express one's intention and in interpreting the meaning of an utterance when it is spoken are determined by the reality of language itself – one could say, they are *objective*. "Language alone is the teacher" (*śabda evopadeṣṭā*, VPV 209,1). Cf. Bronkhorst 1997: 368: "[According to Mīmāṃsā] the Veda … is not produced by a human mind … nor should it be interpreted by a mind. Or rather, only those interpretations which reduce the interference of the mind to a minimum can be accepted as correct." Bronkhorst in that essay argues along much the same lines as I have argued here.

dently not a matter of *opinion* or *judgement* (where the reliability of one's informants would actually come into play).[108] He knows that Mīmāṃsakas interpret certain words in strange ways (*svarga*, *urvaśī*), yet he seems hardly aware of the extensive roles played by figurative meaning and etymological meaning in Mīmāṃsā discussions. He knows there are problems with polysemic words in the Veda, but he does not appreciate the variety of tools the Mīmāṃsaka has at his disposal for solving them. He knows that the Mīmāṃsakas recognize certain authorities, but does not seem to be aware that their status for the Mīmāṃsakas is based on their learning, not personal charisma – which Mīmāṃsakas are outspokenly suspicious of – or supernormal ability. He knows that the Mīmāṃsakas were aware that the transmission of the Veda was subject to the vicissitudes of time,[109] but he doesn't seem to understand that that would be moot for most Mīmāṃsakas – certainly the ones we have been considering here, Śabara and Kumārila – when it comes to the problem of interpreting the Veda, since they do not appeal to any authorless tradition of Vedic exegesis. He imagines that *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* might mean "One should eat dog meat," but he doesn't realize that there was a legitimate question about what kind of injunction it is, and, more generally, he is oblivious to the question of the nature of *vidhi* and all the other issues concerning *vidhi* with which not just Mīmāṃsaka but most other Brahmanical schools as well were deeply preoccupied.

Thus, in the end, we arrive at the not very surprising result that, while Dharmakīrti exhibits broad knowledge of problems of Mīmāṃsā exegesis in PV(SV) 1.312–340, he displays nothing like an expert's command. It is possible he received some training in Mīmāṃsā at an early stage, but it would have been an introductory course. The sorts of criticisms he directs against Mīmāṃsā exegetical practices do not hold up very well, and do not really address the essence of Mīmāṃsā, which is, again, that those practices are dictated by, and in turn testify to – insofar as they *work* – the inherent meaningfulness of the Vedic corpus; it is possible to ascertain the objective meaning of a text. I believe that most modern scholars working on textual materials believe this – that

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[108] Cf. ŚV *sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 14cd.

[109] Though, interestingly, he does not mention the fact that Mīmāṃsakas thought that some Vedic texts have been completely lost.

it is possible to get at the meaning of a text, removed from any consideration of the author's intention[110] – and so, to that extent, they too are Mīmāṃsakas!

It would have been surprising, however, if matters turned out any differently. Dharmakīrti, after all, is addressing his own community – other Buddhists. He is not trying to convince Mīmāṃsakas or, it would appear, even get at the truth. In general, philosophical debate in classical India was characterized by *jalpa*, "disputation," not *saṃvāda*, "discussion." It was acceptable to raise *prima facie* objections to the views of one's adversaries, as a means of protecting one's own position, without necessarily having to represent those views sympathetically or completely accurately, placing the burden on one's opponent to set the record straight; nor did one go very far considering the best responses to one's objections.[111] In short, a classical Indian philosopher was not obliged to become an expert in the systems he was criticizing, and Dharmakīrti was no exception. I must say, as a philosopher, I find this final stage of his critique of Mīmāṃsā, for all its cleverness, rather disappointing. The real strengths of the Mīmāṃsā position are unappreciated, the deepest issues are not addressed. Even though his criticisms of Mīmāṃsā go farther than those of other Buddhists,[112] Dharmakīrti in the end must be seen, in his critique of Mīmāṃsā, as another example of the dominant polemical tendency of classical Indian thought.

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[110] From Wimsatt and Beardsley to Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Paul Ricœur, modern critics and philosophers have pointed out various ways in which texts transcend their authors and so must be interpreted without regard to "author's intention."

[111] One may contrast Socrates' consideration of the views of Protagoras in Plato's *Theaetetus* 165d–168c.

[112] E.g., Bhāviveka, and even his successors Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Śubhagupta, whose critiques of Mīmāṃsā exegesis are not as sophisticated as Dharmakīrti's and were probably derived from his.

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PSV_K — *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga), Tibetan translation of PSV by Kanakavarman and (Mar thuṅ) Dad pa('i) śes rab. P no. 5702, *Ce* 93b4–177a7. No equivalent in D.

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